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vAbstract
The three chapters of this thesis are independent. Each of them investigates how the
design of allocation rules may shape the outcome of a market. The first chapter studies
the consequences of restricting the mechanisms available to a monopsonist to uniform
price posting mechanisms. I show that it doesn’t always prevent him to extract mean-
ingful information from the sellers before posting the price. I also show that conditioning
this offer on the transaction achieving a minimal quantity facilitates this task. Finally, I
address the welfare and the implementation issues and apply the results to takeover op-
erations. The second chapter studies the allocation of houses to students, when students
have preferences over the houses they receive and over their friends’ allocation. I show
that the random serial dictatorship can be modified to accommodate this new set-up.
The two solutions proposed have weak incentive properties if students can cooperate.
However, I show that this problem disappears for one of them if the market is large
and competitive. Finally, the last chapter studies how the design of entrance university
exams can be used to influence the composition of high schools and universities. It shows
that if the test is noisy or if the peer effects for the good students are low, giving the
university’s slots to the best students of each high school selects better students than
giving them to the best students overall and desegregates high schools.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Jedes von ihnen untersucht, wie
die Gestaltung von Allokationsregeln das Ergebnis eines Marktes beeinflussen kann. Das
erste Kapitel untersucht die Folgen der Beschränkung der Mechanismen, die einem Mo-
nopsonisten zur Verfügung stehen, auf Mechanismen, die allen Verkäufern den selben
Preis anbietet. Ich zeige, dass dies Beschränkung nicht immer verhindert, dass er In-
formationen der Verkäufer extrahiert und den Preis damit anpasst. Das zweite Kapitel
befasst sich mit der Verteilung von Studentenwohnheimplätzen. Die Studenten dürfen
eigene Präferenzen bezüglich eines Wohnheimplatzes sowie zur Zuteilung ihrer Freunde
angeben. Ich zeige, dass der random serial dictatorship modifiziert werden kann, um diese
neuen Präferenzen zu ermöglichen. Die beiden vorgeschlagenen Lösungen haben schwa-
che Anreizeigenschaften, wenn die Studierenden kooperieren können. Ich zeige jedoch,
dass dieses Problem für den ersten Lösungsvorschlag verschwindet, wenn der Markt groß
und wettbewerbsfähig ist. Schließlich wird im letzten Kapitel untersucht, wie die Gestal-
tung von Aufnahmeprüfungen an Universitäten die Zusammensetzung von Gymnasien
und Universitäten beeinflussen kann. Das Kapitel vergleicht zwei Aufnahmeprüfungen.
In der ersten, werden die besten Schüler jedes Gymnasiums ausgewählt, während in der
anderen die insgesamt besten Studenten ausgewählt werden. Wenn der Test verrauscht
ist oder wenn die Peer-Effekte für die guten Schüler niedrig sind, schickt der erst Test
bessere Studenten in der Universität und fordert Vielfalt in Gymnasien.
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1Introduction
The three chapters of this thesis are independent. Each of them shows how the careful
design of allocation rules can help to fix the problems encountered in a market. De-
spite the differences between the goods exchanged and the constraints imposed on these
exchanges, all chapters rely on similar game theory concepts to model the interactions be-
tween the participants. Each player has preferences over the possible outcomes and these
preferences are often partially unknown to other participants. The players act rationally
and most of the time non cooperatively. These allocating mechanisms try to extract in-
formation from the agents and to induce actions in order to implement outcomes favored
by the designer.
The most obvious difference between the three problems studied is the kind of goods
that have to be allocated. In the first chapter, the shares of a firm have to be allocated
between the original shareholders and a potential buyer. In the second chapter, rooms
in different houses have to be assigned to students. In the last chapter, high schools’ and
university’s slots have to be distributed among students. The differences between these
goods have consequences on the type of tools available to design the allocation rule. In
chapter one, because shareholders of the same firm hold a common good, a transaction
involving only one of them affects the others. This led regulators to limit the use of price
schemes and allocation rules discriminating between shareholders. In chapter two and
three, the social norms about education forbid monetary transfers between the agents.
In chapter two, the designer choice is reduced to algorithms that match the students to
the rooms as a function of the information they voluntary disclose. In chapter three, the
designer can use test scores and students’ allocations in high school to extract information
on the students. The form of the preferences is the last difference between the three
problems. Contrary to the other chapters, the agents’ preferences are not represented by
a utility function in the second chapter.
The first chapter explores the problem of a buyer acquiring goods from many sellers
with interdependent valuations under different constraints on price and quantity dis-
crimination. The motivating example is a model of takeover of public firms under the
European Union’s regulation. This regulation forces the buyer to post a unique price
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to all shareholders but allows him to condition his offer on the transaction achieving a
minimal quantity. First, I suppose that the buyer considers only mechanisms with a uni-
form posted price respecting ex-post constraints. I describe under which circumstances
the buyer may elicit and use the private information held by the sellers. I compare
it with two classical benchmarks, the optimal mechanism imposing a constant posted
price and the optimal mechanism with no constraint. Then, I study the consequences
of adding a lower bound on the demand. Two examples illustrate the mechanisms and
provide insights on the welfare impacts. Finally, a simple implementation of the optimal
mechanism confirms anecdotal evidences and sharpens the policy implications.
The second chapter of this thesis studies a house allocation problem in which students
have preferences not only over the house to which they are allocated but also over the
allocation of their friends. This is a special case of a matching problem with externalities.
I first show that the random serial dictatorship is not efficient in such a set-up. Then, I
study a mechanism, called the random serial group dictatorship, used at some colleges
to allocate students to rooms. In this mechanism, students form groups that are treated
as agents of a random serial dictatorship. I show that it is efficient and that truth-telling
is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced. However, students may collectively lie about
the composition of their groups to obtain better outcomes. I further show that if there
is enough competition for the best slots, this incentive disappears as the market grows.
Finally, I present a new efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, the random serial bossy
mechanism. In this mechanism, the dictator is chosen among the non-allocated students
and can allocate his entire group of friends. However, I show that it gives even stronger
incentives to students to collectively lie about the composition of their group.
In the third chapter of this thesis, Renaud Foucard and I study how the design of
entrance university exams can be used to influence the composition of high schools and
universities. We set up a model in which peer effects display decreasing differences and
the composition of high schools is the result of a decentralized matching. We show that
while fully centralized exams lead to segregation through positive assortative matching,
partially decentralized exams in which students enter university based on their relative
performance within a school may desegregate secondary education. A social planer can
always desegregate high schools by changing the net return of higher education, or some-
times by controlling the precision of the test. We then discuss different possible objectives
for a social planner and the resulting optimal test. We show that the trade-off between
the diversity of high schools and the performance of the university’s selection disappears
if the precision of the test or the peer effects for high ability students are weak.
3Chapter I
Optimal Uniform Price
Mechanisms with ex-post
Constraints
Based on Frys (2018b).
1 Introduction
This paper studies the economic effects of restricting the mechanisms available to a
monopolist to uniform price posting mechanisms. It also explores the consequences of
conditioning this offer on the transaction achieving a minimal quantity. I analyze this
problem in the form of the procurement problem of a potential buyer who wants to buy
identical goods from multiple potential sellers. I suppose that the sellers have flat offer
curves, interdependent reservation prices and correlated signals whereas the buyer has
a fixed and flat demand curve. This set-up fits among others the problem of an offeror
choosing a mechanism to buy shares of an offeree company.
This paper shows that the interdiction of price and quantity discrimination doesn’t
always prevent the buyer to extract meaningful information from the sellers before posting
the price. When the valuations are asymmetric enough, the optimal mechanism uses the
information of sellers with high valuations to buy at a lower price from others. Allowing
the buyer to link the price offered with an acceptance threshold extends the set of signals
and valuation functions where the buyer uses the sellers’ reports. This lower bound is
never violated in equilibrium. It enlarges the set of incentive compatible price functions
by punishing reports inconsistent with the total quantity offered. As usual in problems
of price discrimination, the profit of the buyer increases with discrimination but the
expected total quantity sold, the sellers’ surplus and the overall welfare might increase
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or decrease as a function of the valuation functions. Finally, the mechanism can be
implemented through a series of sequentially decreasing posted prices and demand lower
bounds. Between each step, the buyer collects the information of the sellers dropping out
and uses it to post a lower price to the rest. This in turn shed a new light on takeovers
regulation in the European Union’s member states and challenges previous theoretical
analysis of the question.
The European Union forbids indeed price and quantity discrimination between the
firm’s shareholders during a takeover but allows the offeror to withdraw his offer if the
number of shares tendered doesn’t reach a threshold. The regulation on takeovers is
described by a directive of the European Parliament and Council (2004). Its transcrip-
tion in the law of the different European countries as well as its economic consequences
were evaluated for the European commission in a assessment report written by Marccus
Partners and the Center for European Policy Studies (2012). This directive applies only
to "companies [...] the securities of which are admitted to trading on a regulated market
in a member state". Its first goal is "to protect the interest of holders of the securities".
To achieve this goal, the European parliament voted two articles that are of particular
relevance for a buyer choosing a buying mechanism. Article 3 states that "all holders
of the securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded equivalent
treatment". Article 5 states that if a person after buying securities of a company has the
"control of that company, Member state should ensure that [he/she] makes a bid [...] to
all the holders of those securities at [...] the highest price paid for the same securities by
the offeror [...] over a period [...] no less than 6 month and no more than 12 month before
the bid". The report confirms that these two articles force a buyer who wants to own
more than 30% of a firm to restrict himself to mechanisms without price discrimination
nor quantity discrimination. As resumed in this report, it can force "a potential offeror
who may only wish to purchase 35% of the shares to be prepared to purchase 100% which
includes people owning 34% and wishing to increase to 35%". Actually, the directive reg-
ulates the entire timing of the game. After a buyer declared his intention to own more
than 30% of the firm, he has a deadline to submit a bid to all shareholders. Then, the
shareholders have a deadline to accept or reject the bid. If the bid can be linked to an
acceptance threshold and if in the end the percentage of shares tendered is below that
threshold, the buyer can submit another bid and restart the whole procedure. As for the
rest, the directive lets "the member states [...] lay down rules which govern the conduct
of the bids at least as regards [...] the lapsing of the bid; the revision of the bid". In
particular, "the offer document [...] shall state at least [...] the maximum and minimum
percentage or quantities of securities which the offerer undertake to acquire". The rules
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implemented by the member states are summarized in the assessment report and a guide
to public takeovers in Europe written by the law firms Bonellierede et al. (2016). In
accordance to articles 3 and 5, a maximum on the overall quantity purchased can only
be set if the offerer wishes to acquire less than 30% of the shares of the firm, which is
the case this article focuses on. However, the directive lets the national regulators decide
whether or not the buyer may set a lower bound on the total quantity of shares tendered
under which the offer lapses. The requirements to set a so-called "level of acceptance"
differ from one European country to another. In the six countries studied in Bonellierede
et al. (2016): France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
the buyer can choose between at least a few different levels of acceptance.1
Modelling the takeover as a procurement problem with one buyer and many sellers
find its justification in the assessment report written by Marccus Partners and the Cen-
ter for European Policy Studies (2012). According to it, more than 90% of the takeover
operations are the result of bilateral negotiations between one potential buyer and the
owners of the firm. Moreover, it states that firms having a dispersed ownership structure
are considered as easier targets and, therefore, more often concerned by takeover oper-
ations. Finally, the regulation of the European Union focuses almost exclusively on the
case of one buyer and concerns only publicly traded firm, which supposes many owners. I
opted for a setting with interdependent valuations and one-dimensional signals. The idea
behind this hypothesis is that all shares have an underlying common value, namely the
sum of the discounted future profits. Each seller gathers information to build an estimate
of this value that is represented by the one-dimensional private signal he received. This
information might partly come from sources common to all sellers and, therefore, might
be correlated. Would a seller know the information of another seller, he would update
his estimate of the value, making valuation functions interdependent. Note that even if
a seller knows all signals, the underlying value remains uncertain. If sellers value their
own information differently than the others’, the valuations are not common. The second
example presented in this article explains in detail this phenomenon. On the contrary,
the buyer’s valuation is exogenous. It is consistent with a buyer lending no credence to
the information of the sellers or one having some intrinsic value from owning a share,
independent of the future cash flows. Finally, the publicly traded price of the firm puts
a lower bound on the possible valuations of the sellers.
The model studied is of greater relevance than its application to takeover bids in the
1This possibility may be conditional on the offer being voluntary, but a rational buyer would rather
make a voluntary offer than buying shares that trigger a mandatory offer when the former is better for
him.
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EU suggests. First of all, a large number of countries have similar rules. The assessment
report compares the legislation of nine non-EU countries and the same price must be
offered to all shareholders in all cases. In the US only, the legislation allows the buyer
to submit a first bid for the first x% of the shares and a second lower bid the remaining
shares (two tier bids). More generally, in many monopoly markets the buyers might
have interdependent valuations with private signals. The question of how to regulate
price discrimination in such markets is an open question, just as the question about
the consequences of stepping away from pure fixed price posting mechanisms. The paper
highlights the differences between the optimal mechanisms with a constant and a uniform
posted price. It shows that mechanisms partially regulating price discrimination might
have interesting properties and in some cases outperform the strict forbidding as well as
the laissez-faire cases.
The next subsection discusses the related literature. In Section 3, I present the basic
model and definitions. Section 4 derives the two benchmarks with constant posted price
and without regulation. Section 5 studies the case where the monopsonist must post a
uniform price but cannot set an acceptance threshold. Section 6 takes this last option
into account and derives the optimal mechanism under the regulation of the European
Union. Section 7 presents a simple way to implement the mechanism and discusses policy
implications as well as extensions to partial offers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Overview
The literature on optimal selling mechanisms dates back to Myerson (1981). In this
article, the seller of an object faces multiple potential buyers with independent valuations.
It presents an optimal mechanism implementable in bayesian Nash equilibrium with
interim individual rationality constraints. It provides some examples with interdependent
values that will inspire succession of articles finishing with McAfee and Reny (1992).
These articles finally show that under some conditions on the valuations the mechanism
designer can extract almost the entire interim expected rent. The optimal mechanism
offers to each seller a menu of random participation fees whose realization depends on
the signals of the others. Inspired by the same article, Maskin et al. (1989) extended
the initial set-up to one with objects to sell. Their mechanism with unit demand is
very similar to the benchmark with no regulation. Later on, Ausubel and Cramton
(2002) studied the efficiency and relative performance of the uniform price and pay-as-
bid auctions to sell multiple objects. They show in my set-up that the uniform price
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auction has an efficient bayesian equilibrium if bidders are symmetric. However, the
optimality of this auction is not addressed.
Wilson (1985) disputed the relevance of the interim constraints considered in these
papers. He pointed out that the buyer may not know the beliefs of the sellers about each
others’ signals. In response, the literature developed mechanisms with ex-post constraints
that are robust to this uncertainty. Perry and Reny (2002)2 constructed an efficient mul-
tiple objects auction. They proved a revenue equivalence theorem for mechanisms with
ex-post constraints when a single crossing condition holds. Segal (2003) showed that
when valuations are independents, the optimal mechanism with ex-post constraints is a
posting price mechanism. The price for player i is the price a monopolist would post if
he knew all but player i’s signals. The benchmark case, studied in section 4, is a sim-
ple generalization of this article. The theoretical justification for ex-post implementable
mechanisms came only afterwards. Bergemann and Morris (2005) explored the relation
between ex-post implementation and interim implementation. They showed that the
mechanism designer can restrict to ex-post implementable mechanisms, if he requires the
mechanism to work for all possible full support common prior of the agents. This result
relies on the fact that the mechanism designer restricts himself to mechanisms where
agents report only their payoff types and no higher order beliefs. However, Chung and
Ely (2007) proved that if this is not the case and if the buyers have independent valua-
tions, there exists a realistic belief of the sellers such that the optimal bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism raises the same revenue as the optimal strategy mechanism. Fi-
nally, Jehiel et al. (2006) showed that in my set-up, the set of deterministic social choice
functions that are non constant and ex-post implementable is non generic, if signals are
multidimensional.
The last strand of literature relevant for this paper is the one focusing on third degree
price discrimination and its effect on welfare. When all markets are covered, Schmalensee
(1981) and Aguirre et al. (2010) provided a framework and techniques to derive the change
in output and welfare due to price discrimination. It is particularly helpful in the first
example presented in this paper. Finally, Cowan (2016) provided sufficient conditions
on the distribution of the reservation prices such that the quantity sold increases. The
proof of this proposition is used in the second example presented in this paper.
2More precisely in the working paper associated, Perry and Reny (1999).
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3 The Model
There are n shareholders i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, and one potential buyer, who designs the
buying mechanism. I suppose that participants have quasilinear utilities, are risk neutral
and have no budget constraint. Each shareholder i has λi ∈ N shares and values each
share vi(x) ∈ R where x = (xj)nj=1 ∈ X and xi ∈ Xi ⊆ R is a private signal received by
i. I suppose that vi(x) is differentiable, strictly increasing in xi and weakly increasing
in x−i a.e.. The buyer values each share w ∈ [mini,x∈X vi(x); +∞) and believes that
the signals are drawn according to the distribution function f(x) positive a.e. with no
mass point. Without loss of generality, I can normalise Xi to [0; x¯] and mini vi(0) to
0. Actually, for any n increasing bijections from Xi to X ′i ⊆ R, (gi(·))ni=1 = g(·), I can
define a new vector of signals, y = g(x), and new valuation functions, ui(y) = v(g−1(y)),
without changing the distribution of the valuations. This new parameterization does not
affect the properties defined above and the regularity, positivity and the weak symmetry
on the axes’ intersections defined hereafter.3
The game as it is regulated by the directive is the following. As soon as the buyer
owns more than 30% of the firm, he has a month to submit a bid to all shareholders.
This bid consists of a price p per share and an acceptance threshold Λ. Once this bid
is submitted, each shareholder i has one month to decide how many shares he wants to
tender di ∈ [0;λi]. If the shareholders tendered less shares than the threshold, i.e. if∑
i di = ΛT < Λ, the game stops and everybody receives a 0 utility. If the shareholders
tendered more shares than the threshold, i.e. if ΛT ≥ Λ, the game ends, all the tendered
shares ΛT are bought at price p and the buyer’s utility is (w − p)ΛT whereas seller i’s
utility is di(p− vi(x)).
I suppose that the buyer can commit to the offer he does, that he can communicate
with the sellers before submitting a bid and that this communication is contractible.4
I also suppose that the buyer is restricted to use deterministic prices and acceptance
thresholds. A general bidding mechanism can be then written as (H,R, p (·) ,Λ (·) , r (·))
where H =×ni=1Hi with Hi the set of possible messages that seller i can send to the
buyer, R =×ni=1Ri with Ri the set of possible recommendations that the buyer can send
to seller i, p : H → R is the price per share, Λ : H → R is the acceptance threshold and
3An intuitive normalization when the signal of a buyer increases his expected valuation, e.g. when
signals are positive, is to set yi = E[vi(x)|xi]. The signal is then simply interpreted as the interim
valuation of the seller.
4The first assumption is verified in France and in the UK. See section 7 for a discussion on these
assumptions and how they might be weaken.
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r : H → R the vector of recommendations sent to the sellers. The timing of the game
can be then described as follows:
1. The buyer commits to using a mechanism (H,R, p (·) ,Λ (·) , r (·)).
2. Each seller reports a message hi ∈ Hi.
3. Each seller observes p(h), Λ(h) and ri(h) and decides how many shares he wants
to tender di ∈ [0;λi].
4. If ΛT < Λ, the utilities are 0 for everybody. Otherwise, the shares tendered are
bought, the buyer receives (w − p (h)) ΛT and each seller receives di (p (h)− vi (x)).
The strategy space of the sellers depends on how much information they have on the
other sellers’ signals in each step. There is no clear answer to this question for three
reasons. First, the distribution of the signals may not be common knowledge. In partic-
ular, the shareholders may have a more precise estimate of each other’s valuations than
the buyer, due to their past interactions. Secondly, it seems difficult for the buyer to
control how much information is released to the sellers during the course of the game.
They may observe how many shares are tendered and may update their beliefs accord-
ingly. Besides, a shareholder who doesn’t tender his shares has an incentive to reveal
his private information. Indeed, if he does, the others will update their beliefs and may
change their decisions. In turn, observing these changes helps the first seller build more
accurate beliefs and he may discover that he can sell his shares for a profit. Finally, if
the mechanism is not constant, it releases automatically information about the signals
of all sellers through the value of p(m) and Λ(m). If there are only two or three sellers,
they may be able to inverse the price and threshold functions and pin down each other’s
signals5.
To overcome this problem, I focus on ex-post equilibria. If the buyer restricts himself
to mechanisms that depend only on the sellers’ payoff types space and work for all
sellers’ common priors with full support, I can apply the revelation principle of the
robust mechanism literature, Bergemann and Morris (2005) or Chung and Ely (2002).
It implies that I can restrict with out loss of generality to direct mechanisms that are
truthful and obedient ex-post6.
5Green and Laffont (1987) studied an optimal mechanism where the sellers’ strategies are robust to the
information revealed through the mechanism. But the absence of revelation principle with this posterior
equilibrium concept makes it impracticable in cases with more than two players.
6Chung and Ely (2007) proved that the buyer cannot improve the mechanism by asking the sellers to
report higher order beliefs if he has a maxmin approach and the sellers have private valuations. But it
could in principle happen with interdependent valuations.
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In this ex-post set-up, the moral hazard constraint implies that di(p,Λ, x) = λi1{p≥vi(x)}
and, therefore, that ΛT (p, x) =
∑n
i=1 λi1{p≥vi(x)}. Denoting C the set of functions from
X to R, the problem of the buyer reduces to the following:
max
(p(x),Λ(x))∈C2
∫
X
1{ΛT (p(x),x)≥Λ(x)}ΛT (p (x) , x) [w − p(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i ≤ n, x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi:
1{ΛT (p(x),x)≥Λ(x)}1{p(x)≥vi(x)}[p(x)− vi(x)] ≥
1{ΛT (p(z,x−i),x)≥Λ(z,x−i)}1{p(z,x−i)≥vi(x)}[p(z, x−i)− vi(x)]
(1)
Besides, throughout the paper I use some of the following notations and definitions.
I denote vi the random variable vi(x). For all J ⊂ N and xJ ∈ XJ , vi | xJ is distributed
according to the c.d.f. G(vi | xJ) and the d.f. g(vi | xJ). Finally, I define a.e. the virtual
valuation of i knowing xJ , Vi(vi, xJ) = vi + G(vi|xJ )g(vi|xJ )
7. To be able to easily separate high
from low virtual valuations, I also need the following regularity condition:
Definition 1. The problem is called regular given xJ ∈ XJ for seller i if and only
if the virtual valuation Vi(·, xJ) crosses w at most once and from below.
In the rest of the article, I call the problem regular, if it is regular for all sellers with
J = ∅. Similarly, I call the problem regular for seller i given XJ if it is regular given
all xJ ∈ XJ . This regularity condition is the extension in this set-up of the classical
regularity condition used in the literature. As in the set-up with independent valuations,
I can find a simple sufficient condition for the problem to be regular given XJ .
Corollary 1. The problem is regular for seller i given XJ for any w, if G(vi | xJ) is
log-concave in vi on its support for all xJ ∈ XJ .
The log-concavity of the c.d.f. in a procurement problem is the equivalent of the
increasing hazard rate condition in selling problems. Both are a consequence of log-
concavity of the distribution function. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that this
condition is verified for a large range of classical distribution functions. The log-concavity
conditions on xJ and not v−i because the valuations are interdependent. Note that these
two properties are not affected by a reparameterization of the model. In the special
case where J = N \ {i}, I denote F (xi | x−i) the cumulative distribution function of xi
knowing x−i, and f(xi | x−i) its distribution function. For all v in the support of vi | x−i,
7I extend Vi(·, xJ) outside the support of vi | xJ by its value in the lowest or the highest vi on the
support.
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I define xi(v, x−i) = {xi | vi(x) = v}, the signal of i such that his valuation given x−i
is equal to v8 and mi(x) = vi(x) + dvidxi (x)
F (xi|x−i)
f(xi|x−i) the virtual valuation function
9. The
regularity condition can be translated into conditions on F (·) and v(·).
Corollary 2. The problem is regular given x−i for seller i if and only if mi(·, x−i) crosses
w at most once and from below
The proof is in the appendix. The regularity condition implies that mi is well defined
on the indifference curve going through w. In the same way, the regularity condition given
xJ can be translated using the generalized Leibniz integral rule.10 The next definition
describes how the signal of a seller j helps to infer the virtual valuation of a seller i. The
introduction claims that in the takeover case signals are liable to be positively correlated.
So a higher signal for j might mean a higher virtual valuation for i. I actually use a notion
more local than correlation.
Definition 2. The signal of seller j ∈ J is positive for seller i given xJ ∈ XJ if
and only if the virtual valuation of i knowing xJ , Vi(w, xJ), increases in xj.
If this condition is required for all valuations and all vectors in XJ , it extends to this
set-up the classical dominance hazard rate condition used in the literature. Indeed:
Corollary 3. The signal of j is positive for i given XJ for all w if and only if for all
xJ ∈ XJ and x′j > xj, vi | x′−i dominates in terms of the reverse hazard rate vi | x−i.
It implies that the distribution of seller i’s valuation knowing the others’ signals
is unambiguously improved when the signal of j rises. A sufficient condition for this
property is that the two variables vi, xj | x−ij are affiliated for all x−ij11. As for the
previous definition, if J = N \{i}, this condition can be transposed to conditions on F (·)
and v(·) that are developed in the Appendix. The two examples presented hereafter are
used throughout the paper. In this section, they help illustrates the implications of the
properties defined above.
Example 1. The first example explores the case where the sellers have linear valuations.
For any sellers i and j ∈ N ∪ {0} there are αij ≥ 0 such that: vi(x) = α10 +
∑n
j=1 α
i
jxj.
8I extend xi(·) outside of the support of vi | x−i by 0 and x¯.
9mi is well defined a.e. which is sufficient here.
10Denoting xi,J (v, xJ) = {xN\J | vi(xN\J , xJ) = v}, G(vi | xJ) = P (xN\J ≤ xi,J (v, xJ) | xJ) =∫
xN\J≤xi,J (v,xJ )
f(xN\J | xJ)dxN\J , and g(vi | xJ) =
∫
s∈xi,J (v,xJ ) f(s | xJ)~u(s) · ~n(s)ds.
11xi, xj | x−{ij} affiliated for all i, j, x−{ij} is equivalent to x affiliated, so what I require here is a
bit different from affiliation of the signals. The properties of affiliated random variables are extensively
studied in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Karlin and Rinott (1980). Karlin and Rinott (1980) showed
that a large range of the classical correlated multivariate distributions are affiliated.
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I will focus on the symmetric two sellers case where αi0 = 0, αii = α1 and αij = 1 −
α1. Besides, I suppose that the joint cumulative distribution of the buyer’s belief about
the sellers’ signals can be written as follow F (x1, x2) = x1x21−θ(1−x1)(1−x2) where θ is a
dependance parameter belonging to [−1, 1]. This random variable, derived from the copula
of Ali et al. (1978), has uniform marginals on [0, 1] and verifies the regularity condition.
Finally, the information of the sellers is positive for all θ > 0.
Example 2. The second example details the micro foundations presented in the introduc-
tion to justify the set-up with correlated valuation and interdependent signals. I supposes
that seller i believes that the signals are drawn from a multi-dimensional log-normal dis-
tribution lnN (lnV,Σi). V is the n dimensional vector with the true valuation v on each
coordinate. Σi is the matrix of seller i’s beliefs about the covariance matrix of the log-
errors of the signals. I suppose that his valuation of one share given the vector of signals
is the maximum likelihood estimator of v.12 In the case with two sellers the valuation
functions can be written as:
ln (vi (x1, x2)) = βi,1 ln(x1) + (1− βi,1) ln(x2), with βi,1 = σi,2 − ρiσi,1
σ2i,1 + σ2i,2 − 2ρiσi,1σi,2
σi,2
βi,1 increases with the relative precision of the seller i’s signal and approaches 1/2 when
the correlation increases. Moreover, I suppose that βi,1 ∈ [0, 1] and focus on the case
of two symmetric sellers. Reparameterizing the model and denoting yi = ln(xi) and
ui(y1, y2) = vi(ey1 , ey2) shows that the log-concavity of the c.d.f. of the buyer’s belief
about yi | y−i implies the log-concavity of the c.d.f. of vi | x−i13. In the same way, the
dominance of the reverse hazard rate of the buyer’s belief about yi | y−i implies the same
property on vi | x−i. Finally, to ensure that the problem is regular and the information
of the sellers is positive, I suppose that the buyer also believes that the signals follow a
symmetric log-normal distribution with a positive correlation parameter.
Having now clearly defined the problem, I study three simpler set-ups. I first solve
the classical case of a monopsonist who has to post a constant price. It also represents
the case where communication with the sellers before setting the price is impossible.
12A closely related bayesian version is one where the sellers have an improper log-normal prior about
v with a infinite variance parameter and where his valuation function is E[v|x], the min square error
estimator.
13There is no contradiction between the fact that the buyer doesn’t know the beliefs of the sellers
and the fact that he knows their valuation functions. The belief that pins down the valuation function
of seller i is the belief of seller i about how the other sellers’ private information is produced and its
relationship with his private information and the true valuation. On the contrary, the belief that enters
his bayesian incentive constraint is the belief about the realization of the others’ private information.
Indeed, when seller i learns about the realization of the other players’ signals, it doesn’t alter his own
valuation function.
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In the same section, I also solve the case where the buyer can communicate with the
sellers and freely discriminate between them through prices and quantities. The section
afterwards studies the case where the sellers can communicate with the buyer but price
and quantity discriminations are forbidden. This corresponds to problem 1 with the
additional condition that Λ(x) = 0. The complete problem presented in this section is
studied in section 6. The results of the first three parts are used as building blocks and
benchmarks to understand how these restrictions change the optimal mechanism. Finally,
the last section discusses the implementation of the optimal mechanism, its robustness
to weaker commitment hypotheses as well as its extension to the case where the buyer
can set an upper bound on the quantity bought.
4 The Two Benchmarks
4.1 Optimal Constant Posted Price
In this subsection, I suppose that the buyer has to post a uniform price and cannot
communicate with the sellers beforehand. The buyer is then restricted to mechanisms
where p(x) is a constant function and Λ(x) is equal to 0. This benchmark is feasible
under the restrictions described in section 3. It constitutes, therefore, a lower bound on
the profit that the buyer can make in problem 1. With these additional restrictions, the
problem reduces to the following choice of p ∈ R:
max
p∈R
∫
X
ΛT (p, x)[w − p]f(x)dx
Denoting Gi(p) the cumulative marginal distribution function of vi and Q(p) =
∑
iGi(p)
the expected number of shares tendered at price p, I can rewrite the problem as:
max
p∈R
[w − p]Q(p)
The buyer finds himself in the classical problem of a monopsonist. The buyer’s belief
about the distribution of the sellers’ valuations sets his belief about the offer curve Q(p)
and the optimal price. The optimal posted price p∗ exists and belongs to (0; maxi{vi(x¯)}].
If the solution is interior, it verifies the following equation:
−Q(p∗) + [w − p∗]Q′(p∗) = 0
Denoting p∗i the optimal price for player i if the buyer can discriminate between the
sellers, I can show that:
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Proposition 1. If the problem is regular, p∗ belongs to [mini{p∗i },maxi{p∗i }]. Moreover,
if p∗i ≥ p∗ and G′i(p) dominates Gi(p), p∗ increases if the buyer changes his belief from
Gi(p) to G′i(p)14.
The proof of the general case is in the appendix. But the case where the marginal
distributions of the vi are symmetric provides a good intuition. Indeed, in that case,
Q(p) =
(∑N
i=1 λi
)
G(p) and the properties of the marginals are passed onto the offer
function. Therefore, if the problem is regular the p∗i are unique and all equal to p∗. They
increase if the buyer switches his belief to a new belief that dominates the original one.
To give a better understanding of the different mechanisms, I use the examples pre-
sented in the previous section. I draw for each of them the regions of the signals space
where the sale takes place. Seller 2 sells his shares in the region filled with vertical lines
whereas seller 1 in the one filled with horizontal lines. Both sellers sell their shares in
the gridded region. The shaded areas represent the regions where efficiency requires a
seller to sell, but where the monopsonist proposes a too low price for the transaction to
take place.
Example 3. In the example with linear utility functions, I can derive with mathematica
the cumulative distributions of the vi for a large range of parameters15 and show that
they are log-concave functions. As the signals, the valuations are distributed on [0, 1]2
and have a mean of 0.5. In Figure 1 represents the selling mechanism for α1 = 0.6, in
the case where the buyer’s valuation is w = 0.4. The other cases can easily be pictured.
If w increases, all curves move up. We zoom in the graph, cropping out the part outside
the unit square. If w decreases, all curves move down. With θ = 0.8 the optimal price is
p∗ ≈ 0.23 and the regions where the sale takes place are delimited by the solid lines. The
dashed lines delimit these regions in the two limit cases where the signals are independent
(θ = 0)16and where they are equal 17.
Example 4. In the second example, with log-linear valuations, the distribution of the
valuations is log-concave. Indeed, the buyer’s belief follows a normal distribution and,
therefore, u1(y1, y2) = exp (β1y1 + (1− β1) y2) follows a log-Normal distribution. Figure
2 represents the second example when β1 = 0.6. It supposes that the sellers believe
the signals are correlated with a ρi = 0.5 and that the standard deviation of their own
14The converse property holds if p∗i ≤ p∗. Nahata et al. (1990) have a similar statement.
15for all θ ≤ 2/3 or α1 ∈ [1/3, 2/3] or θ + α1 ≤ 1.5 or θ − α1 ≤ 0.5
16α = min{α1, 1 − α1}. If w ≤ 3/2(1 − α), p∗ = 2/3w. If w ∈ [3/2(1 − α),−1/2 + 5/2α], p∗ =
w/2 + 1/4 ∗ (1− α).
17p∗ = w/2 if w ≤ 1. It cannot be described by A.M.H. copula. θ = 1 implies a correlation of 0.48
only.
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x1
x2
w/(2α1)
2w/(3α1)
w/α1
1w/(1− α1)
v1(x) = w
v2(x) = w
v2(x) = p∗
Figure 1: Linear utilities with a constant posted price
signals is 10% smaller than the other’s one. The figure is drawn for a buyer’s valuation
w = 1. His belief about the sellers’ signals follows log-normal distribution with parameters
µ = (0, 0), σ = 1 and ρ = 0.5. The mode of his belief is 1 and its mean 1.64. The mean
of the valuations is 1.46 and the optimal price p∗ ≈ 0.58. The dashed curves represent
the cases where ρ = 0 and ρ = 1. As in the first example, if w increases all curves move
up and we zoom in the graph. If σ decreases, the buyer is more confident in his belief
and the price rises towards 1.
In the two examples, changing the parameter regulating the correlation of the signals
does not dramatically change the mechanism. Indeed, the degree of dependence of the
signals influences the price chosen only through the movements of probability masses
between the shaded and the hashed area that it triggers.
In this subsection, I presented how a set-up with interdependent valuations and cor-
related signals changes the classical problem of a monopsonist posting a constant price.
In the next subsection, I study the other extreme case where neither the pricing nor the
communication between the buyer and the sellers is restricted.
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x1
x2
1
1
v1(x) = w
v2(x) = w
v2(x) = p∗
Figure 2: Log-linear utilities with a constant posted price
4.2 Optimal Mechanism Without Regulation
In this section, I derive the optimal ex-post mechanism allowing for price and quantity
discrimination. Any solution of the problem 1 is feasible under the constraints imposed
in this subsection. Therefore, the resulting profit constitutes a upper bound of the profit
that can be achieved in the original problem. This subsection is an extension of Segal
(2003) to cases where the valuation functions are interdependent. Denoting Qi the set
of functions from X to {0, 1, ..., λi} and C the set of functions from X to R, I can write
the problem of the buyer as solving the following maximization problem:
max
(qi,ci)n∈(Qi×C)n
∫
X
N∑
i=1
[qi(x)w − ci(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i, x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi:
ci(x)− qi(x)vi(x) ≥ ci(z, x−i)− qi(z, x−i)vi(x)ci(x)− qi(x)vi(x) ≥ 0
If the problem is regular for seller i given X−i, I define si(w, x−i) = max{xi | mi(x) = w},
the signal of i such that his virtual valuation is equal to w18.
18I extend si outside the support of mi|x−i by 0 and x¯.
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Proposition 2. If the problem is regular for any seller i given X−i19, the optimal mech-
anism with no regulation is the following:
q∗i (x) =
λi if mi(x) ≤ w0 otherwise c∗i (x) =
λip
0
i (w, x−i) if mi(x) ≤ w
0 otherwise
Where the price per share offered p0i (w, x−i) = vi (si (w, x−i) , x−i).
This proposition follows from the taxation principle stated in the first theorem of
Chung and Ely (2002) or from a adaptation of Myerson (1981). The proof is presented
in the appendix. Compared to Segal (2003), F (vi | v−i) is simply replaced by G(vi | x−i).
Note that si(w, ·), respectively xi(w, ·), draws the indifference hypermanifold of mi(x),
respectively vi(x), going through w.
wvi(0, x−i)
vi(0, x−i)
mi(x¯, x−i)
vi(x¯, x−i)
p0i (w, x−i)
Figure 3: Posted price as a function of w
As in other set-ups with bayesian constraints or independent valuations, the optimal
mechanism is a posting price mechanism. The buyer solves the problem of a monopsonist
who can discriminate between the different sellers as well as for each seller between the
different realizations of the others’ signals.
Proposition 3. If the problem is regular i knowing X−i, p0i (w, x−i) solves the problem of
a monopsonist posting the optimal price per share for seller i knowing the others’ signals.
p0i (w, x−i) = arg max
p∈R
{(w − p)Gi(p | x−i)}
The formal proof is in the appendix. The buyer is facing as many markets as there are
vectors (i, x−i) with a demand function Gi(p | x−i)f(x−i) on each of these markets. It
implies that comparing the efficiency of the two benchmarks is equivalent to the question
19If it is not the case something similar as Maskin et al. (1989) can be constructed.
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of the efficiency of third degree price discrimination in a monopoly setting. Unfortunately,
I cannot draw any result for the general case from this literature. The sufficient conditions
presented in Aguirre et al. (2010) for an increase or decrease in efficiency are not verified
aside from the trivial case where the distribution of vi is independent of x−i.
Corollary 4. • For all i, the optimal price posted to i with discrimination, p0i (w, x−i),
crosses the optimal constant price posted to i, p∗i , on a x−i inside the support of
x−i | vi = p∗i .
• If the signal of j is positive for i in p0i (w, x−i), p0i (w, x−i) is increasing in xj.
The formal proofs are in the appendix. In the terminology of the third degree
price discrimination literature, all x−i such that p0i (w.x−i) < p∗i are the strong mar-
kets, whereas the rest of the signals are the weak markets. Therefore, if the signals are
positive, the strong markets are the one with low x−i, and the weak markets are those
with high x−i. In the previous sections, I showed that in the two examples the prob-
lems were regular and the signals were positive for all positive correlation parameters.
Therefore, all the previous propositions apply.
Example 5. Figure 4 represents the first example with the same parameters as in the
previous subsection. If the signals are independent and w < (1 − α1), I can show that
the mechanism without regulation is more efficient than the mechanism with a constant
posted price. The demand for each market is linear. Allowing discrimination opens all the
markets where x1 ∈ [2/3.w/(1−α1), w/(1−α1)] 20. On the contrary, if w ≥ 3/2.(1−α1),
all markets are served with a constant posted price. Schmalensee (1981) showed that
discrimination reduces welfare, in this case.
Example 6. Figure 5 represents the second example with the same parameters as in the
previous subsection. Adapting the proof of Cowan (2016), I can show that the expected
sold quantity rises with discrimination for all parameters. However, I cannot conclude
on the overall efficiency gain because sellers with low valuations sell less often and sellers
with high valuations more often.
In this section, I presented how the optimal mechanism looks when the price must
be independent from the sellers’ identity and reports and when the regulator allows for
price discrimination. I transposed in my set-up results of the literature and use them as
building blocks and benchmarks in the remaining of the paper. In next section, I present
20p0i (w, xj) = min{w+(1−α1)xj2 , (1− α1)xj + α1} and the welfare increases by a factor w3/(648.α1.(1−
α1))
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x1
x2
p0(w, 0)/α1
w/(2α1)
w/α1
1
v2(x) = w
v2(x) = p0(w, x1)
Figure 4: Linear utilities without regulation
x1
x2
1
1
v2(x) = w
v2(x) = p0(w, x1)
Figure 5: Log-linear utilities without regulation
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new results and study a case closer to the motivating example. I construct the optimal
mechanism when the regulator forbids price and quantity discrimination, but allows the
posted price to change with the sellers’ reports.
5 Optimal Uniform Posted Price
Before studying the problem presented in section 3, I explore the implications of lim-
iting the buyer’s choice to mechanisms with a uniform posted price. Contrary to the
problem with constant posted price presented in subsection 4.1, the players can commu-
nicate before the announcement of the price. Therefore, the price posted may depend
on the sellers’ private information. However, contrary to the problem without regulation
presented in subsection 4.2, the price offered must be the same for all sellers. In this
case, the buyer solves the problem presented in problem 1 with the additional constraint
that Λ(x) = 0. It amounts to finding the function p(x) belonging to C that solves the
following maximization program:
max
p(x)∈C
∫
X
ΛT (p(x), x)[w − p(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i ≤ N , x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi:
1{p(x)≥vi(x)}[p(x)− vi(x)] ≥ 1{p(z,x−i)≥vi(x)}[p(z, x−i)− vi(x)]
I cannot derive the solution using the classical techniques of the mechanism design lit-
erature as in the previous section. The buyer’s objective cannot be split in as many
independent problems as there are sellers as in the proof of proposition 2. Indeed, the
sellers’ incentive compatibility constraints are linked through the common price function
p(x). However, considering separately the incentive constraint of a seller given the others’
signals, I can infer some simple properties that the price function must verify.
Proposition 4. The price offered, p(x), satisfies seller i’s incentive constraint given x−i
if and only if:
• p(x) ≤ max{p(0, x−i), vi(0, x−i)} for all xi
• p(x) = p(0, x−i) for all xi such that vi(x) ≤ p(0, x−i)
Proof. I will work only with the incentive constraint of seller i and keep the private
information of the others x−i fixed. I denote p0 = p(0, x−i) and will prove first the
necessity part.
Suppose p0 > vi(0, x−i). For all xi such that vi(x) < p0, the incentive constraint of
seller i implies that p(x) = p0. Otherwise, if p(x) < p0, when seller i’s information is xi,
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he would lie, report 0 and sell for a strictly higher profit than if he would have reported
truthfully. On the contrary, if p(x) > p0, seller i would lie in 0, report xi and make a
strictly higher profit. For the same reason, for all xi such that vi(x) ≥ p0, p(x) ≤ p0.
Suppose p0 ≤ vi(0, x−i). For all xi, the constraint implies that p(x) ≤ vi(0, x−i).
Otherwise, seller i would lie in 0 and report xi.
Suppose now that the two conditions hold. If seller i sells in x, he can only have a
weakly lower price by changing his report. If he is not selling in x, vi(x) ≤ p0 and he
cannot make a strictly positive profit because the price is always smaller that p0.
xixi(p(0, x−i), x−i)0
p(x)
vi(x)
(a) p(0, x−i) > vi(0, x−i)
xi0
p(x)
vi(x)
(b) p(0, x−i) ≤ vi(0, x−i)
Figure 6: individual IC with a uniform price
In the plane going through (0, x−i) parallel to xi axis, the proposition implies that
the price and seller i’s valuation must belong to one of the two cases presented in figure
6. This simple restriction on p(x) becomes very strong when applied for all sellers and
signals. Moving figure 6 in the set of the possible signals narrows down a lot the possible
price functions. In general, the price must be constant on every segment of the signal
space where only the signals of sellers tendering shares change. The next lemma uses
this property recursively to show that the prices in two points are the same if I can go
from one to the other by following only such segments.
Lemma 1. For all x ∈ X, J ⊂ N , if there is k(·), an ordering of the sellers in J , such
that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |J |, vk(j)(xN−J , xk(1), .., xk(j), 0) < max{p(x), p(xN−J , 0)}21, then
p(x) = p(xN−J , 0).
Proof. If p(x) ≤ p(xN−J , 0), the proof consists of iteratively using figure 6a of proposition
4 for seller k(1) until k(|J |) along the path:
(xN−J , 0), (xN−J , xk(1), 0), ..., (xN−J , xk(1), .., xk(|J−1|), 0), (x)
21with weak inequality if p(x) ≥ p(xN−J , 0)
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Because vk(1)(xN−J , xk(1), 0) < p(xJ , 0) and vk(1) is increasing, vk(1)(xN−J , 0, 0) < p(xJ , 0)
and figure 6a of proposition 4 implies that p(xN−J , 0) = p(xN−J , xk(1)0). The following
inequalities together with figure 6a of proposition 4 and the fact that vk(2) is increasing
implies that p(xN−J , 0) = p(xN−J , xk(1), 0) = p(xN−J , xk(1), xk(2), 0).
vk(2)(xN−J , xk(1), xk(2), 0) < p(xN−J , 0) = p(xN−J , xk(1)0)
vk(2)(xN−J , xk(1), 0) < p(xN−J , xk(1)0)
Repeating this on until k(|J |) proves that p(xN−J , 0) = p(x).
If p(xN−J , 0) ≤ p(x), iteratively using figure 6a starting in point x with seller k(|J |)
and price p(x) until point (xN−J , 0) with seller k(1) proves that p(xN−J , 0) = p(x).
The maximum in the formulation is to be understood as an " or ". The path can start
either from (xN−J , 0) with price p(xN−J , 0) or from x with price p(x). The following
corollary illustrates more precisely how it restricts the possible price functions. The
first bullet point states that if all sellers tender their shares in the origin, the price is
constant on all points where all sellers tender their shares. Indeed, in such a point, setting
sequentially all coordinates to 0 is a path verifying the condition of lemma 1. The second
bullet point states that if a seller is more pessimistic than the sellers with a signal equal
to 0, the price posted will be independent of this seller’s information.
Corollary 5. • For all x ∈ X such that maxi vi(x) < p(0), p(x) = p(0).
• If vi(0, x−j) ≤ vj(0, x−j) for all j ∈ N and x−j ∈ Xj, the information of i is
useless.
The second item follows from the fact that the information of i may be useful only
in a point where somebody sells, i.e. in x such that p(x) ≥ minj vj(x). Denoting
j0 = arg minj{vj(x)}, lemma 1, starting in x with k(2) = j0 and k(1) = i, implies that
p(x) = p(x−{i,j0}, 0). If this condition is verified for all sellers, allowing the buyer to
communicate with the sellers before announcing the price will be useless. In this case, he
would simply act as the classical monopsonist of subsection 4.1 and post a price solely
according to his prior belief about the sellers’ valuations. This is actually the case in the
first example if αii ≤ αij and in the second example for all parameters.
Example 7. In the example with linear utilities, if α1 ≤ 1/2, i.e. when the sellers value
the other’s signal more than their own, corollary 5 applies and communication is useless.
The optimal uniform posted price mechanism can be represented by Figure 1 where the
two axes have been swapped.
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Example 8. Corollary 5 always applies in the example with log-linear valuations and
communication is useless. Figure 2 represents also the optimal mechanism when the
buyer is allowed to communicate with the sellers before setting the price.
If the valuation functions are close enough one to another, the connected paths pre-
sented in lemma 1 appear easily. The price in one point may then restrict the price on
entire regions of the signals’ space. When n = 2, it will be the case if the valuations at
the origin are equal. For n > 2, I extend this assumption and suppose the following:
Definition 3. The valuations are symmetric on the axes’ intersections if and only
if for all sellers (i, j) and x−{i,j} ∈ X−{i,j}, vj(0, 0, x−{i,j}) = vi(0, 0, x−{i,j}).
The symmetry is only required on a set of probability zero. Outside the axes where
two sellers’ signals are equal to 0, their valuations can be arbitrary asymmetric. The
symmetry in these boundary points concerns how two sellers value the others’ signals.
It doesn’t require that the others’ signals be permutable or that sellers value their own
signals in a similar way. It requires rather that the sellers with the lowest possible
signal have a common valuation. It is a weaker requirement than the classical symmetry
hypothesis where for every agent i, vi(x) = v(xi, x−i). As in the second example, it will
be verified if receiving the lowest signal triggers the lowest possible valuation. The next
proposition shows that the symmetry on the axes’ intersections implies that the price
and the number of sellers increase as the number of signals equal to 0 increases.
Lemma 2. If the valuations are symmetric on the axes’ intersections and seller i sells
in x ∈ X, then every seller j sells in (0, 0, x−{i,j}) and, therefore, p(x) = p(0, x−i) ≤
p(0, 0, x−{i,j}).
Proof. Figure 6a and the monotonicity of vi implies that: p(x) = p(0, x−i) ≥ vi(x) ≥
vi(0, 0, x−{i,j}). Therefore, the symmetry assumption implies that:
p(0, x−i) = p(0, xj , x−{i,j}) ≥ vj(0, 0, x−{i,j})
Together with figure 6a drawn in (0, 0, x−{i,j}) along the axis j, it implies that j must
sell in (0, 0, x−{i,j}) and, therefore, that p(0, 0, x−{i,j}) ≥ p(0, x−i).
The proof of this lemma shows why the symmetry assumption is important. It ensures
that a price independent of two sellers’ information cannot separate the support of their
valuations. The symmetry assumption excludes the cases where some sellers’ valuations
are so high that the buyer can exclude them and use their signals to set a more precise
price. In a sense, it rules out the cases where the buyer can use the information of some
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sellers for free. It implies for instance that w > maxi vi(0). The results of this section
are robust to mild violations of this hypothesis. When n = 2, proposition 6 shows that
the results hold for a larger class of valuation functions and details what happens outside
this extended set. In the first example, this extension includes a large set of parameters.
If n > 2, the problem is not fundamentally different and the intuition stays the same.
The following corollary illustrates more precisely how lemma 2 restricts the possible price
functions. The first bullet point follows from repeatedly using this lemma. It states that
the price in the origin is an upper bound on all relevant prices. The second bullet point
is a direct consequence of the first one. It states that a sale can only take place if a seller
has a lower valuation than the price at the origin.
Corollary 6. • For all x ∈ X such that a sale takes place, p(x) ≤ p(0).
• For all x ∈ X such that mini vi(x) > p(0), no sale takes place.
To ease the exposition, I present in the core of the paper only the case where n = 2.
The generalization to cases where n > 2 can be found in the appendix. For all p ∈ R,
I denote Uj(p) = {x ∈ X : vj(x) ≤ p}, the half space where the valuation of j is
below p. I also denote Dj(p) = {x ∈ X : vi(xi, 0) > p and vj(x) ≤ p}, the subset of
Uj(p) such that seller i doesn’t sell for all signals of j. The next proposition shows that
the mechanism imposes different price structures on these different regions. Figure 7
represents these regions for the first example. The gridded area depicts ∪iUi (p∗ (0)) \
∪iDi (p∗ (0)), the region where the price posted must be equal to the price in the origin.
In D1 (p∗ (0)), hashed horizontally, the buyer posts the minimum between the price at
the origin and the optimal discriminatory price for 1 given x2 derived in the previous
subsection. Symmetrically, in D2 (p∗ (0)), hashed vertically, the buyer posts the minimum
between the price at the origin and the optimal discriminatory price for 2 given x1. In
the remaining area no sale takes place.
Proposition 5. If the problem is regular for every seller i given X−i and the valuations
are symmetric on the axes’ intersections, the optimal mechanism is such that p∗(0) > v(0)
and:
• In x ∈ ∪iUi (p∗ (0)) \ ∪iDi (p∗ (0)), the buyer posts a price p∗(x) = p∗(0), and both
sellers may sell.
• In x ∈ Dj (p∗ (0)), the buyer posts a price p∗(x) = min{p∗(0), p0j (w, xi)}, and only
j may sell.
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Figure 7: Linear utility with a uniform price
• In x /∈ U1 (p∗ (0))∪U2 (p∗ (0)), the buyer posts a price p∗(x) = min{p∗(x1, 0), p∗(0, x2)}
and nobody sells.
Proof. The second item of corollary 6 implies that for any incentive compatible price
function p(x), nobody sells in U2 (p (0)){ ∩ U1 (p (0)){. It implies first that p∗(0) > v(0),
otherwise the profit would be 0. Besides, it implies that it is incentive compatible and
optimal to set the price to min{p(x1, 0), p(0, x2)} in this region. The problem reduces
then to:
max
p(x)∈C
∫
∪iUi(p(0))
ΛT (p(x), x)[w − p(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i ≤ N , x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi :
1{p(x)≥vi(x)}[p(x)− vi(x)] ≥ 1{p(z,x−i)≥vi(x)}[p(z, x−i)− vi(x)]
Let p(x) be an incentive compatible price belonging to C. Let x be in the interior of
∪iUi (p (0)) \ ∪iDi (p (0)). There is a seller i such that vi(x) < p(0) and vj(xj , 0) < p(0).
Hence, there is a path from 0 to x verifying the conditions of lemma 1 and p(x) = p(0).
The border of ∪iUi (p (0)) \ ∪iDi (p (0)) is of mass 0, because f(·) has no mass point22.
Therefore, the price charged in these points is irrelevant, as long as the resulting price
22If it were not the case, the property would not fundamentally change, but the border would have to
be studied separately and new cases distinctions introduced.
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function is incentive compatible. In particular, setting p(x) = p(0) on the border is
incentive compatible. The buyer can then reduce the set over which he maximizes to
functions that are constant on ∪iUi (p (0)) \ ∪iDi (p (0)).
Let x be in Dj (p (0)). If the buyer buys from i, lemma 2 implies that p(0) ≥ p(x) =
p(0, xj) ≥ vi(x) ≥ vi(0, xi) which contradicts vi(x) > p(0). Hence, seller i does not
tender his shares in Dj (p∗ (0)). Moreover, if j sells in x, lemma 2 implies that the buyer
proposes a price p(x) = p(xi, 0) ≤ p(0). Therefore, I can further reduce the set over which
the buyer maximizes. Splitting the problem on these three regions and I can rewrite the
problem as:
max
p(0)∈R
p(x1,0)≤p(0)
p(0,x2)≤p(0)

∫
x∈∪iUi(p(0))\∪iDi(p(0))
ΛT (p (0) , x) [w − p(0)]f(x)dx+ λ1
∫
x∈D1(p(0))
1{p(0,x2)≥v1(x)}[w − p(0, x2)]f(x)dx
+λ2
∫
x∈D2(p(0))
1{p(x1,0)≥v2(x)}[w − p(x1, 0)]f(x)dx

Maximizing first over (p (x1, 0) , p (0, x2)) given p(0) and taking the maximum over p(xi, 0)
in the integral over xi, I can rewrite the problem as:
max
p(0)∈R
{
λ1
∫
x∈U1(p(0))\D1(p(0))
[w − p(0)]f(x)dx+ λ2
∫
x∈U2(p(0))\D2(p(0))
[w − p(0)]f(x)dx
+ λ1
∫
x2∈XD1(p(0))
max
p(0,x2)≤p(0)
[w − p(0, x2)]G1 (p (0, x2) | x2) f2(x2)dx2 (2)
+ λ2
∫
x1∈XD2(p(0))
max
p(x1,0)≤p0
[w − p(x1, 0)]G2 (p (x1, 0) | x1) f1(x1)dx1
}
Where XDi (p (0)) = {xj ∈ Xj : (0, xj) ∈ Di (p (0))}. The two subproblems inside the
integrals are the same as the unregulated problem stated in proposition 3. Therefore, the
regularity of the problem for every seller i given X−i implies that for all x ∈ Dj (p∗ (0)),
p∗(x) = p∗(xi, 0) = min{p∗(0), p0j (w, xi)}.
The generalization of proposition 5 can be found in the appendix. The principle
is strictly the same. In a point where a seller has a higher value than the price in 0,
the buyer may use this seller’s information to post a smaller price to the others. The
definition of the regions is the direct generalization of the one presented above. The proof
of proposition 5 used the symmetry on the axes’ intersections only through the lemma
2, to ensure that the two sellers sell in 0. The next proposition uses this fact to enlarge
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the set of valuations for which property 5 holds when n = 2. Even if the idea generalizes
to the case where n > 2, the proof is beyond the scope of this paper23.
Proposition 6. When n = 2, if the problem is regular but v2(0) > v1(0):
• Proposition 5 holds if and only if the solution of problem 2 is strictly greater than
v2(0). Otherwise, the buyer posts p∗(x) = min{v2(0), p01(w, x2)} and only 1 may
sell.
• In particular, proposition 5 holds if p01(w, 0) > v2(0) or if w is big enough and
v1(x¯, 0) > v2(0).
Proof. Let v2(0) > v1(0). I split the problem in two and first find p(1)(x), the incentive
compatible function such that v2(0) ≥ p(0) that maximizes the profit. The monotonicity
of v2 implies that v2(x) > v2(0) ≥ max{v1(0), p(0)} for all x2 > 0. Proposition 4 implies
that max{v1(0), p(0)} ≥ p(x1, 0) and, therefore, v2(x) > p(x1, 0). If seller 2 sells in x2 >
0, proposition 4 implies that p(x1, 0) = p(x) ≥ v2(x) which contradicts the last inequality.
Hence, seller 2 never sells. Besides, Figure 6b implies that v2(0) ≥ p(0, x2) and, therefore,
for all x such that 1 sells p(x) = p(0, x2) ≤ v2(0). Finally, because the signals such that
x2 = 0 are of mass 0, p(1)(x) maximizes the unregulated program for seller 1 with the
additional constraint that p(x) ≤ v2(0). So p(1)(x) = p(1)(0, x2) = min{v2(0), p01(w, x2)}
and I denote the resulting profit Π1. I want now to find p(2)(x), the incentive compatible
function such that p(0) > v2(0) that maximizes the profit. The two sellers sell in 0,
therefore, corollary 6 holds and I can rewrite the proof of proposition 5. Finally, p(2)(x)
is the solution of the problem 2 with the additional constraint that p(0) > v2(0). Besides,
the objective of problem 2 is continuous in p(0), equal Π1 in v2(0) and increasing in p(0)
for p(0) < v2(0). Therefore, the solution of problem 2 is strictly greater than v2(0) if and
only if proposition 5 holds.
I will now prove the second item. p01(w, 0) > v2(0) together with the first item imply
that p∗(0) ≥ v2(0). Because p01(w, ·) and v2(0, ·) are continuous, there exists xl > 0 such
that for all x2 < xl, p01(w, x2) > v2(0, xl). The regularity of the problem implies that for
all v < p01(w, x2), (w − v)G1(v | x2) increases. Therefore, for all x2 < xl and p(x2) ≤
v2(0), p01(w, x2) > v2(0, xl) > p(x2) and I have: (w − v2 (0, xl))G1 (v2 (0, xl) | x2) >
[w − p(x2)]G1 (p (x2) | x2). The profit of the buyer when p(0) = v2(0) can then be
23to prove the first item p(0, 0, x−{i,j}) should be replaced in the proof in the appendix and in lemma
2 by min{p(0, 0, x−{i,j}), vi(0, 0, x−{i,j})}.
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written as:
Π1 = λ1
∫
max
p(x2)≤v2(0)
[w − p(x2)]G1 (p (x2) | x2) f2(x2)dx2
< λ1
∫
x2≤xl
(w − v2 (0, xl))G1 (v2 (0, xl) | x2) f2(x2)dx2
+
∫
x2≥xl
max
p(x2)≤v2(0)
[w − p(x2)]G1 (p (x2) | x2) f2(x2)dx2

< λ1
∫
x∈U1(v2(xl,0))\D1(v2(xl,0))
(w − v2 (xl, 0))f(x)dx
+
∫
x2∈XD1(v2(xl,0))
max
p(x2,0)≤v2(xl,0)
[w − p(x2, 0)]G1 (p (x2, 0) | x2) f2(x2)dx2

Where the last line comes from the fact that U1(v2 (xl, 0)) \ D1(v2 (xl, 0)) = {x ∈ X :
v2(0, x2) ≤ v2(0, xl) and v1(x) ≤ v2(0, xl)}, XD1(v2 (xl, 0)) = {x2 ∈ X : v2(0, x2) ≥
v2(0, xl) and v1(x) ≤ v2(0, xl)}, the max is increasing in the upper bound and v2(0, xl) >
v2(0). Finally, the last line is smaller than the objective of problem 2 in p(0) = v2(0, xl)
and, therefore, p∗(0) > v2(0). If w is high enough, p01(w, 0) approaches v1(x¯, 0) > v2(0)
and the property is verified.
The optimal price at the origin p∗(0) is difficult to derive, even in the simple examples
presented in this paper. This complicates a lot the general analysis of the mechanism.
The next corollary provides a simple test to see if the optimal mechanism uses the sellers’
reports. It also formally proves that if the buyer doesn’t discriminate at the optimum,
the optimal mechanism will be the same as the one with optimal constant price.
Corollary 7. • If the optimal mechanism doesn’t use the reports, the buyer posts p∗
on the entire signals’ space as in section 4.1. In particular, the reports will be used
if the buyer can discriminate when p(0) = p∗.
• When n = 2, the buyer never uses i’s reports if for all xi ∈ Xi, p0j (w, xi) ≥ vi(xi, 0).
• When n = 2, p∗1 ≥ p∗2 and w is small enough, if seller 1’s information is nega-
tive for 2 and seller 1 is strictly more optimistic than 2’ when x2 = 0, the buyer
discriminates for some signals.
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Proof. To prove the first part, I denote Πnc(p) the profit function of the buyer without
discrimination when he charges p. Similarly, I define Π(p) the objective function inside
the first maximum in (2) and p∗(0) the price at the origin. If the optimum mechanism
cannot discriminate, Π (p∗ (0)) = Πnc (p∗ (0)). Moreover, Π(p∗) ≥ Πnc(p∗) because post-
ing a constant price equal to p∗ is also feasible when communication is allowed. Finally,
Πnc(p∗) ≥ Πnc (p∗ (0)) because p∗ is the optimal price without communication. Therefore,
Π(p∗) ≥ Π (p∗ (0)) and setting p∗ = p∗(0) is optimal. If the buyer can discriminate when
p(0) = p∗, Π (p∗ (0)) > Πnc(p∗). This is impossible if there is no price discrimination.
For the second part, the posted price is a function of xi only when when vi(xi, 0) >
p∗(0) and p∗(0) ≥ p0j (w, xi). This is impossible if p0j (w, xi) > vi(xi, 0). Therefore, the
buyer will never use i’s report.
Let n = 2 and p∗1 ≥ p∗2. Proposition 1 implies that p∗ ≥ p∗2. If information of 1 is
negative for 2, corollary 4 implies that p02(w, x1) crosses p∗2 only once and from above in
the support of x1 | v2 = p∗2. Therefore, because v2 is increasing, p∗ > p02(w, x1) for high
signals in the support of x1|v2 = p∗. Besides, if seller 1 is more optimistic than 2 when
seller 2’s signal is 0: for all x1, v1(0, x1) > v2(0, x1). Therefore, if w is small enough, p∗
approaches v(0) and D2(p∗) is non empty. Finally, XD2(p∗) contains some signals where
p∗ > p02(w, x1) because it contains the highest signals on the support of x1 | v2 = p∗.
Therefore, the buyer discriminates for some signals when p(0) = p∗.
Finally, I use a well-known result of the discrimination literature to derive a simple
test to check if communication reduces welfare.
Corollary 8. If p∗(0) ≤ p∗, allowing the players to communicate before the buyer posts
the price reduces welfare.
Proof. If p∗(0) ≤ p∗, all sellers face a lower price for all signals when beforehand com-
munication is allowed. The quantity sold in each market decreases and, following Varian
(1985), welfare decreases.
Example 9. In the first example, the weak symmetry around 0 imposes that α10 = α20. If
the signals are independent, proposition 6 extends the result to all cases where min{αjj , w−
αi0} ≥ αi0−αj0 ≥ −min{αii, w−αj0}. As in the previous section, I focus on the symmetric
cases. I already showed that the optimal mechanisms with a uniform and a constant
price are the same if α1 ≤ 1/2. Similarly, when the signals are independent and w ≥
3α1− 1, vi(xi, 0) < p0j (w, xi) and corollary 7 implies that beforehand communication will
be useless. Actually, with the help of mathematica, I can prove that reporting signals
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significantly raises the profit of the buyer, only if the parameters belong to the gridded
area of figure 14, i.e.when α1 is close enough to 1 and w close enough to 0 .
Figure 8 represents the first example with independent signals, α1 = 5/6 and w = 1/4.
Allowing the buyer to collect reports rises the price at the origin: p∗(0) = 0.171 > p∗ =
1/6. The buyer buys from 2 in the vertically hashed area and from 1 in the horizontaly
hashed one. The buyer uses the information of a seller to post a lower price to the other
in the shaded area. On the remaining areas, the price posted is equal to p∗(0). Allowing
beforehand communication increase the profit by 1.1%. The potential gain from removing
all regulations as in subsection 4.2 amounts only to 8.3%. Figure 9 draws the profits
for the constant price (black) and for the uniform price (red) as a function of the price
posted in 0. The comparison with the previous mechanisms in terms of efficiency is not
obvious. For the signals where p∗(x) < p∗, the surplus is lower than the surplus without
communication. In the remaining signals’ space, the price increases, so the quantity sold
increases and the surplus increases. However, in this case, the price in 0 does not rise
enough to compensate for the first loss. The welfare surplus is 0.6% smaller than with
a constant posted price. The welfare with no regulation is in comparison 2.5% smaller
than with a constant posted price. In this case, imposing a uniform price mitigates the
consequences of deregulation. In particular, the surplus of the sellers decreases by 3.2%
compared to the case with no communication. Without regulation, it decreases instead by
18%.
If the sellers are not symmetric, the picture does not change fundamentally. If the
signals are correlated, the picture changes as in the previous subsection. Depending on
where the correlation takes place on the x1 axis, it may help or not the buyer to achieve a
higher profit. For n > 2, the weak symmetry on the axes’ intersections imposes additional
restrictions on the possible αij. The αii, how much a seller weights his own signal, can
still be freely chosen. But the (αji )j 6=i, how the others value his signal, must be equal.
In this section, I proved that forbidding price and quantity discrimination may still
let enough flexibility for meaningful communication to take place before the biding price
is announced. In particular, it may happen when the sellers’ valuations are far away one
from another. In such cases, allowing communication may enable the buyer to identify
sellers with high valuations. He may then use their information to post a lower price
to the remaining sellers. When the conditions for meaningful communication are not
fulfilled, the buyer can do no better that use his prior about the sellers’ valuations to
post the optimal constant price of the classical monopolist. In the following part, I study
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Figure 8: Linear utilities with a uniform price
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Figure 9: Profit with a uniform price
whether allowing the monopolist to set a lower bound on the quantity traded allows him
to do better.
6 Optimal Uniform Posted Price and Demand Lower Bound
When the buyer cannot use price and quantity discrimination but can link his offer with
a minimum on the quantity traded, Section 3 showed that the problem of the buyer can
be described as finding two functions belonging to C, p(x) and Λ(x), solving the following
maximization program:
max
(p(x),Λ(x))∈C2
∫
X
1{ΛT (p(x),x)≥Λ(x)}ΛT (p (x) , x) [w − p(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i ≤ n, x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi:
1{ΛT (p(x),x)≥Λ(x)}1{p(x)≥vi(x)}[p(x)− vi(x)] ≥
1{ΛT (p(z,x−i),x)≥Λ(z,x−i)}1{p(z,x−i)≥vi(x)}[p(z, x−i)− vi(x)]
Where ΛT (p, x) =
∑n
i=1 λi1{p≥vi(x)} is the number of shares tendered in x when the
price offered is p. In the following, I denote ICi(z, x), the incentive constraint of seller
i in x ∈ X when he reports z ∈ Xi. I also define S(p, x) = {i : p ≥ vi(x)}, the set of
sellers who tender their shares in x when the price offered is p. ΛT (p, x) and S(p, x) are
increasing in p and decreasing in x. Therefore, ΛT (p(z, x−i), x) is decreasing in xi.
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First, I show that the buyer can restrict his attention to incentive compatible mech-
anisms where Λ(x) = ΛT (p(x), x). In the spirit of the revelation principle, I show that
for any incentive compatible mechanism (p(x),Λ(x)), there is an incentive compatible
mechanism, (p′(x),Λ′(x)) with Λ′(x) = ΛT (p′(x), x), such that the buyer’s profit is the
same in any point of the signals’ space.
Proposition 7. The buyer can w.o.l.g. restrict to incentive compatible mechanisms
where Λ(x) = ΛT (p (x) , x).
Proof. Let (p (x) ,Λ (x)) be incentive compatible. I will show that a function p′(x) ∈ C
exists such that (p′ (x) ,ΛT (p′ (x) , x)) is incentive compatible and the buyer’s profit in
x doesn’t change. I denote U = {x ∈ X : ΛT (p (x) , x) ≥ Λ(x)} the set of signals such
that a sale takes place. I define p′(x) as the price function such that p′(x) = p(x) for
all x ∈ U and p′(x) = 0 otherwise. Hence, for all x ∈ U , the sale takes place in both
mechanisms at the same price. Whereas for all x /∈ U , no sale takes place in both
mechanisms. Therefore, for all x, the buyer’s profit is the same in the two mechanisms.
It remains to show that the new mechanism is incentive compatible. For all x ∈ X, i,
and zi ∈ Xi, the left hand side of ICi(zi, x) doesn’t change. It stays to 0 if x /∈ U and
the price doesn’t change otherwise. If (zi, x−i) ∈ U , the new quantity lower bound rises
because Λ′(zi, x−i) = ΛT (p (zi, x−i) , zi, x−i) ≥ Λ(zi, x−i). Therefore, the right hand side
of ICi(zi, x) decreases. If (zi, x−i) /∈ U , ΛT (p′ (zi, x−i) , zi, x−i) = 0, and the right hand
side of ICi(zi, x) also decreases. In any case, the slack of ICi(zi, x) increases with the
new mechanism.
In the rest of the article, I suppose that Λ(x) = ΛT (p (x) , x). This proposition
simplifies a lot the problem and allows me to focus on only one variable, the price function.
Besides, it shows that the quantity lower bound is never violated in equilibrium. So this
additional tool might only be used to control out of equilibrium behaviors. As in section
5, I consider the incentive constraint of one seller fixing x−i and see how it restricts the
price function p(·, x−i) that can be offered by the buyer. I first show that as in figure 6b,
if seller i doesn’t sell in x, he won’t sell for any higher signal.
Proposition 8. If p(x0i , x−i) ≤ vi(x0i , x−i), the incentive constraint of seller i implies
that for all xi > x0i , p(x) ≤ vi(x0i , x−i).
Proof. The proposition comes directly from IC(xi, x0i , x−i) when xi > x0i . Indeed, if
seller i makes no profit in (x0i , x−i) and p(x) > vi(x0i , x−i), seller i would lie in (x0i , x−i).
He would report xi and make positive profit because ΛT (p (x) , ·, x−i) decreases and,
therefore, ΛT
(
p (x) , x0i , x−i
) ≥ ΛT (p (x) , x) = Λ(x).
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Figure 10: Price function with p(x0i , x−i) ≤ vi(x0i , x−i)
The lower bound on the quantity of the transaction extends the possible price func-
tions that the buyer can implement. p(x) doesn’t have to be flat for all signals where
seller i sells anymore. Instead, the next proposition shows that the buyer is now able to
implement a weakly decreasing step function in these points. Starting from xi = 0 with
p0 = p(0, x−i) > vi(0, x−i), the price must be constant for all signals where the number
of shares tendered, ΛT (p0, x), is constant. But as one seller drops out of S(p0, x), the
buyer is able to set a new price p1, weakly lower than the precedent. If seller i tenders
his shares with this new price, the p(x) must once again be constant until a new seller
drops out of S(p1, x). This pattern carries on until seller i stops tendering his shares at
the price proposed. Setting the right Λ(x) is crucial to be able to set a p1 strictly lower
than p0. Indeed, to prevent a seller i facing p1 in xi to report a lower zi and get p0, the
buyer must set Λ(zi, x−i) higher than ΛT (p0, x), the number of shares tendered by the
sellers in x when they face p0. This is only possible if the price change happens exactly
when one seller drops out of S(p0, x).
Proposition 9. If p(0, x−i) > vi(0, x−i), the incentive constraint of seller i implies that
there exist K + 1 prices p(0, x−i) = p0 ≥ p1... ≥ pK such that p(x) = pk ≥ vi(x) for all
xi ∈ (xki ;xk+1i ]. Where x0i = 0, and xk+1i is the first signal after xki such that S(pk, x)
strictly decreases. Moreover, p(x) ≤ vi(xK+1i , x−i) for xi > xK+1i 24.
Proof. Let x ∈ X such that p(x) > vi(x). IC(x′i, xi, x−i) implies that p(x) ≥ p(x′i, x−i)
for all x′i ≥ xi. Indeed, if p(x) < p(x′i, x−i), because ΛT (p (x′i, x−i) , ·, x−i) decreases,
ΛT (p (x′i, x−i) , xi, x−i) ≥ ΛT (p (x′i, x−i) , x′i, x−i) = Λ(x′i, x−i), and seller i would lie in
x, report x′i and make a higher profit.
Together with p(0, x−i) > vi(0, x−i) and the monotonicity of vi, it implies that there
is a xKi > 0 such that p(x) is decreasing and strictly greater than vi(x) for all xi < xKi .
24if vi(xK+1i , x−i) = pK any p(x
K+1
i , x−i) ≤ vi(xK+1i , x−i) is IC and the last interval is open.
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Figure 11: p(0, x−i) > vi(0, x−i)
This implies in turn that ΛT (p (·, x−i) , ·, x−i) decreases also on the same set. Moreover, it
must be a decreasing step function because it takes its value in a discrete set. Therefore,
there exist K different signals, x1i , ..., xKi , where it jumps.
IC(xi, x′i, x−i) implies that for all xi, x′i ∈ (xki , xk+1i ), p(x) = p(x′i, x−i). Let x′i ≥
xi. The first paragraph implies that p(x) ≥ p(x′i, x−i). xi, x′i ∈ (xki , xk+1i ) implies
that ΛT (p (x′i, x−i) , x′i, x−i) = ΛT (p (x) , x) = Λ(x). Moreover, if p(x) > p(x′i, x−i),
ΛT (p (x) , x′i, x−i) ≥ ΛT (p (x′i, x−i) , x′i, x−i) and seller i would lie in (x′i, x−i), report xi
and make a higher profit.
Let pk be the price on (xki , xk+1i ). xk+1i is the last signal after xki such that ΛT (pk, ·, x−i)
is constant. Otherwise, if there is xi < xk+1i < x′i such that ΛT (pk, x′i, x−i) = ΛT (pk, x) =
Λ(x), p(x) = pk > p(x′i, x−i) because ΛT (p (·, x−i) , ·, x−i) jumps in xk+1i . Therefore,
seller i would lie in (x′i, x−i), report xi and make a higher profit.
Finally, if p(xk+1i , x−i) > vi(xk+1i , x−i), p(xk+1i , x−i) = pk . Otherwise, xi ∈ (xki , xk+1i )
implies that ΛT (pk, xk+1i , x−i) = Λ(x). If pk > p(xk+1i , x−i), seller i would lie in (x′i, x−i),
report xi and make a higher profit.
As in the previous section, I show that the conditions stated above on p(·, x−i) and
Λ(·, x−i) imply that for all x ∈ X and zi ∈ Xi, ICi(zi, x) is verified.
Proposition 10. The conditions stated in propositions 7, 8, and 9 are sufficient condi-
tions for the mechanism to be incentive compatible.
Proof. If seller i reports zi > xi, he will get a lower price and his profit will de-
crease. If seller i reports zi < xi such that p(zi, x−i) > p(x), ΛT (p (zi, x−i) , ·, x−i) will
strictly decrease between zi and xi. Therefore, Λ(zi, x−i) = ΛT (p (zi, x−i) , zi, x−i) >
ΛT (p (zi, x−i) , x) and the number of shares tendered will be below the threshold set by
the buyer. The profit will be 0 for everybody.
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The mechanism spots the lie of the seller through the other sellers’ behaviors. The
lower bound on the quantity tendered works like a threat on the seller. It cancels the
sale if the reports contradict the number of shares tendered. The threat loosens the
restrictions imposed on the price by the incentive constraints compared with the previous
section. But these constraints are still linked through the price function. Applying
proposition 9 in x for all sellers in S(p(x), x), I can narrow down the possible price
functions on entire areas of the signals’ space. In general, the price must be constant on
every subspace where the set of sellers and the signals of non-sellers are constant.
Lemma 3. For all x ∈ X, J ⊂ S (p (x) , x) and x′J ∈ XJ : p(x) = p(xN−J , x′J), if there
is k(·), an ordering of the sellers in J , such that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |J |:
S (p (x) , x) = S
(
p (x) , xN\J , xk(1), .., xk(j−1), x′k(j), ..., x′k(|J |)
)
vk(j)(xN\J , xk(1), .., xk(j−1), x′k(j), ..., x′k(|J |)) < p(x)
Proof. The proof consists of iteratively using figure 11a for seller k(|J |) until k(1) along
the path (x), (xN\k(|J |), x′k(|J |)), ..., (xN\{J\k(1)}, x′k(2), ..., x′k(|J |)), (xN\J , x′J). Figure 11a
and the following equations imply that p(x) = p(xN\k(|J |), x′k(|J |))
k(|J |) ∈ S (p (x) , x) = S
(
p (x) , xN\k(|J |), x′k(|J |)
)
vk(|J |)(xN\k(|J |), x′k(|J |)) < p(x)
Similarly, figure 11a together with the following equations
vk(|J |−1)(xN\k(|J |)\k(|J |−1), x′k(|J−1|), x′k(|J |)) < p(x)
k(|J | − 1) ∈ S (p (x) , x) = S
(
p (x) , xN\k(|J |), x′k(|J |)
)
= S
(
p (x) , xN\k(|J |)\k(|J |−1), x′k(|J−1|), x′k(|J |)
)
imply that p(x) = p(xN\k(|J |)\k(|J |−1), x′k(|J−1|), x′k(|J |)). Proceeding like this until k(1)
shows that p(x) = p(xN\J , x′J).
This lemma is the equivalent of lemma 1 in the previous section. The first item of
corollary 5 still holds with the additional freedom given to the buyer.
Corollary 9. For all x ∈ X such that maxi{vi(x)} < p(0), p(x) = p(0).
Contrary to the corollary 5 of the previous section, if a seller is weakly more pes-
simistic than any other seller with a signal equal to 0, the information of i may be used
to set the price of some transactions. Therefore, allowing players to communicate before
the buyer posts the price may be useful in the first example when αii ≤ αij and in the
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second example. As in the previous section, I suppose that the valuations are symmetric
on the axes’ intersections to show that the price decreases as the number of non-zero
signals increases.
Lemma 4. If the valuations are symmetric on the axes’ intersections and seller i sells in
x ∈ X, then every seller j sells in (0, x−{i,j}) and, therefore, p(0, x−{i,j}) ≥ p(0, x−i) ≥
p(x).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of lemma 2. If seller i sells in x,
applying proposition 9 gives that p(0, x−i) ≥ p(x) ≥ vi(x) ≥ vi(0, x−{i,j}) = vj(0, x−{i,j}),
where the last equality comes from the symmetry on the axes’ intersections. But if
p(0, xj , x−{i,j}) = p(0, x−i) ≥ vj(0, x−{i,j}), proposition 8 implies that seller j must sell
in (0, x−{i,j}). Applying once again proposition 9 along the j axis, gives p(0, x−{i,j}) ≥
p(0, x−i) ≥ p(x).
The properties stated in the corollary 6 are still valid in this problem.
Corollary 10. • For all x ∈ X such that a sale takes place, p(x) ≤ p(0).
• For all x ∈ X such that mini vi(x) > p(0), no sale takes place.
Compared to the previous section, the main change is the definition of the region
where the price is constant and where the buyer can use the sellers’ information. The
lower bound on the total quantity of the transaction increases the areas where the buyer
can price discriminate. As in the previous part, I restrict to the case where n = 2 in
the core of this article. The generalization is not presented in the appendix but follows
the same lines as the one of the previous section. The buyer can now price discriminate
on Ui (p∗ (0)) \ Uj (p∗ (0)). On this space, he proposes a lower price to i using seller j’s
signal. Figures 15 and 17 present the regions of the signals’ space where the mechanism
imposes different restrictions on the price structure for the two examples. The gridded
areas represent U1 (p∗ (0))∩U2 (p∗ (0)), the regions where the price must be equal to the
price in the origin. The vertically hashed areas represent U2 (p∗ (0)) \ U1 (p∗ (0)), the
regions where the buyer can use seller 1’s information to post a lower price to seller 2.
The horizontally hashed areas represent U1 (p∗ (0)) \ U2 (p∗ (0)), the regions where the
buyer can use seller 2’s information to post a lower price to seller 1. Finally, in the
remaining areas, the sale never happens.
Proposition 11. If the problem is regular for every seller j given Xi and the valuations
are symmetric on the axes’ intersections, the optimal mechanism is such that p∗(0) > v(0)
and:
38 Chapter I. Optimal Uniform Price Mechanisms with ex-post Constraints
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v2(x) = p∗(0)
Figure 12: Linear utilities with a uniform price and a demand lower
bound
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v2(x) = p∗(0)
Figure 13: Log-linear utilities with a uniform price and a demand lower
bound
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• In x ∈ U1 (p∗ (0))∩U2 (p∗ (0)), the buyer posts p∗(x) = p∗(0), Λ∗(x) = λ1 + λ2 and
both sellers sell.
• In x ∈ Uj (p∗ (0)) \ Ui (p∗ (0)) the buyer posts p∗(x) = min{p∗(0), pj(w, p∗(0), xi)},
Λ∗(x) = λj and only seller j may sell. pj(w, p, xi) is the optimal price for j
knowing xi and vi(xi, xj) ≥ p. In particular, pj(w, p, xi) = p0j (w, xi) if x ∈ Dj(p)
and pj(w, p, xi) > p0j (w, xi) otherwise.
• In x /∈ U1 (p∗ (0)) ∪ U2 (p∗ (0)), nobody sells. In particular, it is optimal for the
buyer to post p∗(x) = 0 and Λ∗(x) = 0.
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows the same lines as the proof of proposition 5.
Let p(x) be an incentive compatible price function. Proposition 7 implies that the buyer
can restrict to mechanisms where Λ(x) = ΛT (p (x) , x). Moreover, the second item of
corollary 10 implies that nobody sells in x /∈ U2 (p (0)) ∪ U1 (p (0)). Therefore, the set of
possible price functions can be restricted to C′, the set of functions from X to R such
that for all x /∈ ∪iUi (p (0)), p(x) = 0. And the problem reduces to:
max
p(x)∈C′
∫
∪iUi(p(0))
ΛT (p (x) , x) [w − p(x)]f(x)dx
s.t. for all i ≤ N , x ∈ X, z ∈ Xi :
1{p(x)≥vi(x)}[p(x)− vi(x)] ≥ 1{p(z,x−i)≥vi(x)}[p(z, x−i)− vi(x)]
Let p(x) be an incentive compatible price in C′. Let x be in the interior of U1 (p (0)) ∩
U2 (p (0)). Corollary 9 implies that p(x) = p(0). The border of U1 (p (0)) ∩ U2 (p (0)) is
of mass 0 because f(·) has no mass point25. Therefore, the price charged in these points
is irrelevant as long as the resulting price function is incentive compatible. In particular,
setting p(x) = p(0) in these points is incentive compatible. The buyer can then reduce
the set over which he maximizes to functions that are constant on U1 (p (0))∩U2 (p (0)).
Let x ∈ Uj (p (0)) \ Ui (p (0)). If the buyer buys from i, lemma 4 implies that p(0) ≥
p(0, xj) ≥ p(x) ≥ vi(x) which contradicts x /∈ Ui (p (0)). Hence, seller i does not tender
his shares in Uj (p (0)) \ Ui (p (0)). Moreover, if j sells in x and (xi, x′j) ∈ Uj (p (0)) \
Ui (p (0)), lemma 3 implies that p(x) = p(xi, x′j) and lemma 4 implies that p(x) = p(x′) ≤
p(xi, 0) ≤ p(0). Therefore, I can further reduce the set over which the buyer maximizes.
25If it were not the case, the property would not fundamentally change, but the border would have to
be studied separately and new cases distinctions introduced.
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Splitting the problem on these three regions, I can rewrite the problem as:
max
p(0)∈R
p2(x1)≤p(0)
p1(x2)≤p(0)
(λ1 + λ2)
∫
x∈U1(p(0))∩U2(p(0))
[w − p(0)]f(x)dx+ λ1
∫
x∈U1(p(0))\U2(p(0))
1{p1(x2)≥v1(x)}[w − p1(x2)]f(x)dx
+λ2
∫
x∈U2(p(0))\U1(p(0))
1{p2(x1)≥v2(x)}[w − p2(x1)]f(x)dx

Maximizing first over (p2 (x1) , p1 (x2)) given p(0) and taking the maximum over pj(xi)
in the integral over xi, I can rewrite the problem as:
max
p(0)∈R
{
(λ1 + λ2)
∫
x∈U1(p(0))∩U2(p(0))
[w − p(0)]f(x)dx
+λ1
∫
x2∈XU1\U2(p(0))
max
p1(x2)≤p(0)
[w − p1(x2)][F1 (x1 (p1 (x2) , x2) , x2)− F1
(
x21 (p (0) , x2) , x2
)
]+dx2
(3)
+λ2
∫
x1∈XU2\U1(p(0))
max
p2(x1)≤p(0)
[w − p2(x1)][F2 (x2 (p2 (x1) , x1) , x1)− F2
(
x12 (p (0) , x1) , x1
)
]+dx1
}
Where:
XUj\Ui (p (0)) = {xi ∈ Xi : ∃xj ∈ Xj : x ∈ Uj (p (0)) \ Ui (p (0))}
xij (p (0) , xi) = sup {xj ∈ Xj : vi(x) ≤ p(0)}
Dividing the objective of the two subproblems by Fj
(
xij (p (0) , xi) , xi
)
= Gi (p (0) | xi),
they become:
max
pj(xi)≤p(0)
[w − pj(xi)]Gj (pj (xi) | xi, vi ≥ p (0)) (4)
It is the same problem as the unregulated one stated in proposition 3 where the dis-
tribution of vj | xi is replaced by the distribution of vj | xi, vi ≥ p(0). Therefore,
defining pj(w, p, xi) as the optimal price for j knowing xi and vi(xi, xj) ≥ p implies
that p∗(x) = min{p∗(0), pj(w, p∗(0), xi)}. The regularity of the problem for every seller
i given Xj implies that for all x ∈ Dj(p), pj(w, p, xi) = p0j (w, xi). Otherwise, because
Gi (p (0) | xi) > 0 and because the FOC of the original problem crosses 0 only once
from above in p0j (w, xi), the FOC of the maximization problem is strictly negative for all
p ≤ p0j (w, xi). Therefore, pj(w, p, xi) > p0j (w, xi).
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The generalization of proposition 11 to more than two sellers follows the same prin-
ciple as the one presented in the appendix for proposition 5. In the regions where some
sellers don’t sell, the buyer uses their information to post a lower price to the rest. The
definition of the subspace is the direct generalization of the one presented here. How-
ever, to properly write the upper bound on the price in the generalization of problem 4,
I would have to introduce cumbersome notations to generalize the function xij (p (0) , xi).
This is the main difference with the proof of the previous section and the reason why I
am not presenting it in the appendix. For the same reason as in the previous section,
I can enlarge the set of valuations for which property 11 holds when n = 2. As before,
the generalization of proposition 12 to the case where n > 2 is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Proposition 12. When n = 2, if the problem is regular but v2(0) > v1(0):
• Proposition 11 holds if and only if the solution of problem 3 is strictly greater than
v2(0). Otherwise the buyer posts p∗(x) = min{v2(0), p01(w, x2)} and only 1 may
sell.
• In particular, proposition 11 holds if p1(w, x2) > v2(0) or if w is big enough and
v1(x¯, 0) > v2(0).
Proof. The proof of the first item is exactly the same as the proof of the first item of
proposition 6. As before, if v2(0) ≥ p(0), proposition 8 and 9 imply that seller 2 cannot
sell in x for all x2 > 0. But if only one seller sells, there is no difference between the
two sections for v2(0) ≥ p(0). The rest of the proof holds because problem 3 is also
continuous in p(0) equal Π1 in v2(0) and is increasing before.
The proof of the second item is also almost the same as in the previous section. xl is
defined in the same manner. If p(0) = v2(0, xl), for x2 < xl, and x1 ≥ x21 (v2(0, xl), x2),
p(x) = min{v2(0, xl), p1(w, v2(0, xl), x2)} = v2(0, xl) because
p1(w, v2(0, xl), x2) ≥ p01(w, x2) > v2(0, xl)
Therefore, the prices posted are the same as in the previous section for p(0) = v2(0) and
for p(0) = v2(0, xl). So the profit are the same and the proof of the previous section
holds.
The optimal p∗(0) is still complicated to derive even for the examples presented in
this paper. The corollary 7 is still verified. Besides, the set of valuations for which
beforehand communication makes a difference strictly increases when the buyer can set
a lower bound on the quantity of the transaction.
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Corollary 11. If the optimal mechanism doesn’t use the reports, the buyer posts p∗ on
the entire signals’ space as is section 4.1 with constant price. In particular, the reports
are used if the buyer can discriminate when p(0) = p∗ or if it is already the case without
lower bound in section 5.
Proof. If the buyer can price discriminate when Λ(x) = 0, Π (p∗ (0)) > Πnc(p∗) which is
impossible if there is no price discrimination.
Corollary 8 still holds. The next proposition gives also some sufficient conditions for
the price at the origin to be greater that the optimal constant price. These conditions
open, therefore, some room for the welfare to increase. It generalizes some special cases
of the examples presented in this paper. I denote Wi(p) seller i’s signals such that
discrimination takes place when p(0) = p. It corresponds to the subset of XUj\Ui(p)
where pj(w, p, xi) < p.
Proposition 13. • If p∗(0) ≤ p∗, allowing beforehand communication reduces wel-
fare.
• When n = 2, p∗(0) > p∗ if for all p ≤ p∗ and xi ∈ Wi(p): Gj(· | xi, vi ≥ p) is
log-concave and if there is v¯ ∈ (pj(w, p, xi); p] such that gj(v¯ | xi) ≥ max{gj(p |
xi), gi(p | xi)}.
Proof. The proof of the first item is the same as in the previous section. The proof of
the second item can be found in the appendix. I provide only an intuition here. The
first condition ensures that the problem stated in equation (4) has a unique and interior
solution. Raising the price at the origin p(0) has two contradictory effects on the size of
the region where the buyer discriminates using i’s information. It increases it through
the increase of Uj(p(0)) and decreases it through the increase of Ui (p (0)). The second
condition ensures that the positive effect wins and that the overall size of the region
increases.
The conditions of the second item are verified in the two examples when signals are
not too negatively correlated and each seller trusts the other’s signal more than his own.
It corresponds to the cases where α1 or β1 are below 1/2 and w is low enough 26.
26In these cases, the distribution of vi | xi is a spread (not necessarily mean preserving) of the distri-
bution of vj | xi. gj(v | xi) is above gi(v | xi) if and only if v ∈ [vl(xi); vh(xi)] and both are decreasing
after vh(xi). Moreover, xi ∈Wi(p) if and only if Gj(p | xi) ≥ Gi(p | xi) and, therefore, only if p ≥ vl(xi).
Finally, if w is low enough, pj(w, p∗, xi) ≤ vh(xi) for all xi because Gj(· | xi, vi ≥ p) is log-concave
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Example 10. As in the previous section, I focus on the symmetric case. It can be
extended to asymmetric cases as long as min{αjj , w − αi0} ≥ αi0 − αj0 ≥ −min{αii, w −
αj0}. Figure 14 presents the set of parameters (α1, w) such that the buyer can use the
information of one seller to post a price to the other. In the gridded region, the buyer can
use price discrimination without lower bound. Corollary 11 ensures that I can do it also
with a lower bound on a bigger set of signals. The vertically hashed region represents the
parameters for which the buyer can use price discrimination only if he can set a lower
bound on demand. For parameters in the shaded area, the buyer posts p∗ for any signals
because pj(w, xi) > p∗(0) on the set of signals where the buyer could price discriminate.
α1
w
1/2
3/4
1
1/3 2/3 1
Figure 14: Parameters and discrimination with linear utilities
In the gridded area, the consequences of allowing a strictly positive lower bound are
very limited. The black circle in figure 14 shows the parameters of figure 8. In this last
figure, the area where the lower bound allows additional price discrimination is the small
triangle between the shade and the gridded area. The increases of the price in the origin
and of the profit are negligible.
On the contrary, the effects of allowing a strictly positive lower bound can be quite
large in the vertically hashed area of figure 14. Figure 15 represents the optimal mecha-
nism when the parameter are α1 = 1/6 and w = 2/3, i.e. in the red circle of figure 14.
In the gridded area, the buyer buys from both sellers at price p∗(0) = 0.422 > 0.375 = p∗
and Λ(x) = 2. In the shaded and vertically hashed area, the buyer buys from seller 2
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at price p∗(x) = α1 + (1 − α1)x1 and Λ(x) = 1. In the clear vertically hashed area,
p2 (w, p∗ (0) , x1) > p∗(0) and the buyer buys from seller 2 at price p∗(0). Symmetrically,
the buyer buys from seller 1 at price p∗(x) = α1 + (1− α1)x2 in the shaded horizontally
hashed area and at price p∗(0) in the remaining horizontally hashed area.
x1
x2
0
1
p∗(0)/(1− α1) w/(1− α1) 1
v1(x) = w
v2(x) = p∗(0)
v2(x) = p2(w, x1)
Figure 15: Linear utilities with a uniform price and a demand lower
bound
Figure 16 represents the profit of the buyer as a function of the price at the origin.
Compared to the profit with a constant price, the expected profit for the buyer in this
new mechanism is 17% higher whereas its potential gain from removing all regulation
amounts to 52%. Contrary to the previous section, in this case, the price in 0 rises
enough to compensate the sellers’ surplus losses on the region where the buyer can price
discriminate. Compared to the constant price mechanism, the surplus of the sellers is
77% higher whereas when there is no regulation it falls by 15%. Finally, summing both
effects, the total welfare is 37% higher than with a constant price whereas when there is
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Figure 16: Profit with a uniform price and a demand lower bound
no regulation it rises only by 29%. Asymmetries and correlation have the same effects as
in the previous section.
Example 11. As in the first example, the new mechanism differs from the one with
a constant posted price only when the valuation functions are asymmetric enough. I
cannot explicitly derive the price function with no regulation and, therefore, neither do
it in the case studied in this section. However, I can calculate numerically the price
without communication p∗. If for p(0) = p∗, the contour plot of the first order condition
for pj(w, p∗, xi) passes through Uj(p∗) \ Ui(p∗), corollary 11 implies that the buyer uses
the information of i to set the price for j. When µ1 = 0 and σ1 = 1, this is the case if
β1 < 1/3 and ρ > 0, or if β > 2/3 and w < 1/2− 3/2(1−β1) or if ρ ∈ (0, 2β− 1). When
the parameters verify one of these conditions, the graph describing the mechanism is
similar to figure 15 or figure 8. On the contrary, when β1 > 1/2 and ρ < −(1−β)/β, the
information of one seller is negative for the others. Moreover, xij(p, xi) goes to 0 when xi
goes to infinity. I can rewrite the proof of corollary 7 using limits and show that the buyer
uses price discrimination for high values of xi. Figure 17 shows that discrimination is
possible when p∗(0) = p∗, β1 = 5/6, w = 2 and ρ = −3/4. In this case, the optimal price
without communication is p∗ = 1.31.
These two examples illustrate how the buyer can use the quantity lower bound as a
threat to punish the inconsistent behaviors triggered by a lying seller. It shows also how
it allows more flexible prices in comparison to the previous cases. Besides, it highlights
that two phenomena drive the optimal mechanism away from the optimal constant posted
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Figure 17: Log-linear utilities with a uniform price and a demand lower
bound
price. First, it is necessary that the sellers’ valuations be not too correlated. Otherwise,
the sellers have almost a common value and the buyer in a sense faces only one market.
He either buys from all sellers or from nobody. Therefore, price discrimination requires
valuations that are asymmetric or private enough with not too correlated signals. But
being able to distinguish the sellers is not enough. The price posted must be a function
of the sellers or of their signals. If the valuations are symmetrically and independently
distributed, the information gathered is worthless. The buyer always posts the same
price. As in the classical price discrimination, the buyer posts different prices for different
sellers if the valuations are independent but asymmetrically distributed. The price is a
function of the signals if the valuations are correlated with the signals of the others. In
the next section, I first show the optimal mechanism can be implemented and then come
back to my motivating example. I also explain how the results can be extended to weaker
restrictions on quantity discrimination and address the law in force in the US
7 Implementation and Extension
In this section, I present a simple way to implement the optimal mechanism with a
uniform posted price and quantity lower bound when there are only two sellers. This
implementation allows me to discuss the consequences of additional restrictions imposed
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by the member states of the European Union. In a last part, I will try to see how the
result can be used to study the consequences of additional discrimination tools allowed
in the United States.
Proposition 14. If n=2, the optimal buying mechanism with a uniform price and a
demand lower bound can be implemented sequentially as follows:
1. The buyer posts a price p0. If all sellers or no seller tender their shares, the process
ends and the buyer buys the tendered shares.
2. If exactly one seller doesn’t tender his shares, the buyer collects his signal and uses
it to post a new price, p1, lower than the first one. The process ends and the buyer
buys the tendered shares.
Proof. I will show that, in equilibrium, the buyer posts the same price as in the previous
section and the sellers tender their shares exactly when the price proposed is above their
valuations. In the second round, every seller tenders his shares if and only if his valuation
is lower than the last posted price. I will show that this is also the case in the first round.
If vi > p0, seller i never makes a positive payoff because p0 ≥ p1. He won’t, therefore,
tender his shares directly. If vi ≤ p0 and vj ≤ p0, seller i will tender his shares directly
because p0 ≥ p1. If vi ≤ p0 and vj > p0, he may end up with a positive payoff if he
tenders his shares whereas the sale will end directly without transaction if he doesn’t.
Hence, if a seller doesn’t tender his shares in the first round, he won’t do it in the second
one. He will, therefore, report his information truthfully at the beginning of the second
round. I will now study the equilibrium strategy of the buyer. In the second round,
given that he posted p0 and that j tendered his shares in the first round, he posts a price
which solves the following problem:
max
pj(xi)≤p0
[w − pj(xi)]Gj (pj (xi) | xi, vi ≥ p0, vj ≤ p0)
Multiplying the objective by Gj(p0 | xi, vi ≥ p0) gives the same as the one of problem
4. Therefore, p1 = pj(w, x1, p0). Finally, given the equilibrium strategies in the second
round and the equilibrium strategies of the sellers in the first round, the buyer solves
problem 3 in the first round. Therefore, p0 = p∗(0).
Generalizing this proposition to more than two sellers requires additional work. The
prices that can be posted in the second round may have an upper bound strictly lower
than p0. In particular, if the number of sellers not tendering their shares belongs to
{2, ..., n − 1}, this upper bound will depend on these sellers’ identities and information.
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The price posted must be below all prices that the buyer would post if an additional
seller had tendered his shares. Therefore, the implementation may be facilitated if the
buyer can exclude only one seller in each round.
This implementation process has the big advantage to require little commitment
power from the buyer. Section 3 requires that the information exchange between the
players be contractible and that the buyer can commit to use predefined price and lower
bound functions. In comparison, in proposition 14, the information doesn’t need to be
contractible. Like in a usual procurement open auction, the buyer must only commit to
post descending prices because the regulation requires already the buyer to post uniform
prices. The report written by Marccus Partners and the Center for European Policy
Studies (2012) explicitly mentions that the directive allows upward and downward revi-
sions of the price and the acceptance level after an offer lapses. But national supervisory
authorities can impose restrictions on this matter. Posting sequentially decreasing levels
of acceptance is generally allowed by the European member states’ regulators. Actually,
according to Bonellierede et al. (2016), in France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and
the UK, the buyer must lower his level of acceptance if he wants to make a new offer
when the previous one lapsed. However, in all member states of the European Union
studied by these law firms, regulations explicitly forbid the buyer to post sequentially
decreasing prices. The implementation presented above is, therefore, ruled out. The
consequences of these additional regulations at the national level crucially depend on the
commitment power that the buyer may have. If the information exchange between the
players is contractible and the buyer can commit to use predefined price and lower bound
functions, the regulation has no bite. If the buyer decides to make an offer, the level of
acceptance will be reached at the price posted. If he cannot commit to the price and level
of acceptance functions, he has to give away potential profit and post the constant price
presented in subsection 4.1. This feature also provides a justification for the importance
of intermediaries in such transaction. Indeed, a bank specialized in such transaction may
have more commitment power due to reputation effects.
It is also interesting to see what would happen if the regulator allowed further quantity
discrimination. In particular, what would happen if the buyer could make a partial offer
as in the United States. In a partial offer, in addition to his price and level of acceptance,
the buyer submits a maximum amount of shares that he is ready to buy. Contrary to
the level of acceptance, the sale is not cancelled when the upper bound is reached. The
buyer must purchase the shares tendered on a "pro rata" basis. If ΛT is greater than
the announced upper bound L(x), each seller tendering his shares will be able to sell
λi ∗ΛT (x)/L(x). Such a tie-breaking rule doesn’t change the IR constraints. The sellers
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tender all their shares as soon as the price proposed is above their valuations. On the
contrary, it may weaken the IC constraints by reducing the attractiveness of higher prices.
If a seller lies to trigger a higher price, more sellers than expected will tender their shares.
If the upper bound is set to the expected amount of tendered shares, the sellers won’t be
able to sell all their shares. Therefore, they will receive a lower payoff than without upper
bound. This fact may allow the buyer to enlarge the set of possible prices presented in
figure 11. A price increasing in a seller’s signal may be incentive compatible. The buyer
could for instance choose a mechanism resembling the one presented in figure 8 with an
additional smaller fixed price around 0. The mechanisms resulting from allowing such
an additional tool are too complicated to be treated in this article. But its results shed
some light on what they could look like.
8 Conclusion
This article addresses the problem of a potential buyer facing many sellers with private
signals and interdependent valuations. Supposing that the buyer considers only mecha-
nisms respecting ex-post constraints, it studies the effect of imposing a uniform pricing
rule with different restrictions on quantity discrimination. It first derives the optimal
mechanisms in the two extreme cases where there is no regulation and where the buyer
must post a constant price for all signals’ realizations. These two benchmarks situate the
problem in the literature of mechanism design and price discrimination in a monopoly
setting. They offer also interpretation and derivation tools used throughout the paper.
The first contribution of this paper is to derive, in proposition 5, the optimal mechanism
when the buyer must post a uniform price to all sellers. In comparison to the benchmark
with the constant price, the price may depend on the sellers’ private information in some
regions of the signals’ space. I provide in corollaries 5 and 7 sufficient and necessary
conditions so that the buyer can profitably extract information from the sellers. All
the results rely on a regularity assumption and a weak symmetry assumption. The first
one is standard and its relaxation has been studied extensively in the mechanism design
literature. In proposition 6, I show how the latter can be relaxed in the case of two
sellers.
Using similar techniques, I am able to extend the study to the case where the buyer
can set a lower bound on the total quantity he is ready to buy. The optimal mechanism,
presented in proposition 11, simply uses the information of the agents, who are not selling,
to post a price to the rest. The lower bound on quantity is never violated in equilibrium.
It works as a threat that cancels the sale if the reports indicate a higher number of shares
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that the one tendered. This threat enables the buyer to post a price that increases when
the number of tendered shares increases. In corollary 11, I show that this additional
tool enlarges the set of valuation functions and signals’ distributions where the buyer
can collect meaningful information from the sellers. Even if discrimination is possible
without a lower bound on the demand, it can help to extract information on a bigger set
of signals. In the case of two sellers, the mechanism can be implemented by a sequential
game where the buyer collects the information of the sellers who opted out in the previous
round and post a new price lower than the previous one. This implementation doesn’t
require contractible information or strong commitment power.
The paper addresses also the comparison of these mechanisms in terms of efficiency.
As it is often the case in price discrimination settings, efficiency can increase or decrease
with price discrimination. I present a simple test to compare the efficiency of the uniform
posting price mechanisms. Two examples illustrate the mechanisms and show that the
most efficient mechanism can be in between the constant price and the unregulated
mechanism.
Finally, the results are used to get insight on the consequences of the takeover regu-
lation in the European Union. First, the efficiency analysis shows that forbidding price
discrimination is not " takeover deterrent ", contrary to the claim of the economic report
to the commission. Analyzing the consequences in terms of quantity traded would re-
quire to calibrate the distribution of valuations and signals on real world data. Moreover,
the paper provides a justification for the apparent simplicity of the real world takeover
processes. As in the optimal mechanism, it seems that the offered price rarely rises after
an offer lapses. On the other hand, regulations on the national level prevent price de-
crease. Together with weak commitment power, and contracting limitation, it provides
a justification for the importance of intermediaries and the fact that sellers rarely com-
municate their valuations to the buyer. The paper provides also insight on what might
be the consequences of a different regulation in forced in the United States.
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9 Appendix
Proof. Corollary 2. Let vi belong to the support of vi|x−i.
dxi
dv
(v, x−i) =
1
dvi
dxi
(xi (v, x−i) , x−i)
> 0
G(vi | x−i) = P (vi (x) ≤ vi | x−i) = F (xi (vi, x−i) | x−i)
G(vi | x−i)
g(vi | x−i) =
F (xi (vi, x−i) | x−i)
f (xi (vi, x−i) | x−i)
dvi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) = γi (xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) (5)
Therefore, Vi(v, x−i) = mi (xi (·, x−i) , x−i) crosses w at most once and from below if and
only if mi(·, x−i) crosses w at most once and from below.
Corollary 12. If the problem is regular for i given x−i ∈ X−i, the signal of j is positive
for i given x−i ∈ X−i if and only if the indifference curve vi(x) = w in the plane (ej , ei)
crosses from above the indifference curve of mi(·).
It means that if xj increases and xi moves along the indifference curve of mi(x),
vi(x) increases. In other terms, MRSj,ivi(x) ≥ MRSj,imi(x) and switching from true
to virtual valuations increases the relative importance of xj over xi. The property that
the signal of j ∈ J is negative for i given xJ ∈ XJ is defined similarly using generalized
Leibniz integral rule. The previous corollaries can be then adapted.
Proof. Let vi belong to the support of vi | x−i. The information of j is positive for i in
vi given x−i if and only if ddxj
(
G(vi|x−i)
g(vi|x−i)
)
≤ 0. Differentiating equation 5 gives:
dxi
dxj
(vi, x−i)
dγi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) +
dγi
dxj
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) ≤ 0
and because dxidxj (v, x−i) = −
dvi
dxj
(xi(v,x−i),x−i)
dvi
dxi
(xi(v,x−i),x−i)
≤ 0 and dvidxi (x) > 0, it implies that:
dvi
dxj
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
dγi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) ≥ dγi
dxj
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
dvi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
and because dγidxj (x) =
dmi
dxj
(x)− dvidxj (x):
dvi
dxj
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
dmi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) ≥ dmi
dxj
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
dvi
dxi
(xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
Finally, dmidxi (xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) > 0 because the problem is regular for i in vi knowing x−i.
Therefore, MRSj,ivi (xi (vi, x−i) , x−i) ≥MRSj,imi (xi (vi, x−i) , x−i)
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Proof. Proposition 1. If the problem is regular for all sellers, for each i, Gi(p) crosses
[w − p]gi(p) at most once and from below. Therefore, if p∗ ≤ mini{p∗i } the −Gi(p∗) +
[w− p∗]gi(p∗) are all positive and so is their sum and rising p∗ is profitable. Similarly, if
p∗ ≥ maxi{p∗i }, lowering p∗ is profitable.
Now if the buyer changes his beliefs about a seller i such that p∗i ≥ p∗, and switches
from Gi(v) to G+i (v) that dominates in term of reverse hazard rate the original one.
p∗i ≥ p∗ and the regularity of the problem imply that:
Gi(p∗)
gi(p∗)
≤ (w − p∗)
The reverse hazard rate domination implies that that for all v:
G+i (v)−Gi(v)
g+i (v)− gi(v)
≤ Gi(v)
gi(v)
Therefore, combining the two equations with v = p∗ and adding on each side the deriva-
tive of the profit on the other sellers in p∗:
−G+i (p∗) + [w − p∗]g+i (p∗) ≥ −Gi(p∗) + [w − p∗]gi(p∗)
−Q+(p∗) + [w − p∗](Q+)′(p∗) ≥ 0
So rising p∗ increases profit with the new belief. Moreover, jumping to any local maximum
p− lower than p∗ lower the profit. Indeed, denoting pij(p) the profit made with seller j
at price p, pi−i(p−) − pi−i(p∗) ≤ pii(p∗) − pii(p−) because p∗ is optimal with the original
distribution. In the previous equations p∗ can be replaced by any p ≤ p∗i . Therefore, for
all p ≤ p∗i , −G+i (p) + [w − p]g+i (p) ≥ −Gi(p) + [w − p]gi(p) and integrating between p−
and p∗ gives that pi+i (p∗) − pi+i (p−) ≥ pii(p∗) − pii(p−). Finally, the profit with the new
distribution is smaller in p− than in p∗.
Proof. Proposition 2. This is a adaption the proof of revenue equivalence theorem in
Perry and Reny (1999). If I define ui(x) = ci(x)− qi(x)vi(x), the incentive constraint is
equivalent to the following equation:
ui(x) = max
z∈Xi
ci(z, x−i)− qi(z, x−i)vi(x)
The function in the max is Lipschitz in xi because vi(·, x−i) is continuously differentiable
in xi. Because the sup of Lipschitz function is Lipschitz, u(x) must be Lipschitz in xi
and, therefore, it must be differentiable almost everywhere in xi. Taking z ≥ xi ∈ Xi,
x−i ∈ X−i and expressing the IC constraint in x and in (z, x−i), I can prove that qi(x)
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is decreasing in xi. Finally, letting z goes toward xi implies that:
dui
dxi
(x) = −qi(x)dvi
dxi
(x)
These two conditions also imply the original IC condition. Integrating with respect to
xi gives an expression for ui(x) that I can use to rewrite the objective function:
qi(x)w − ci(x) =qi(x)(w − vi(x)) +
∫ xi
0
qi(z, x−i)
dvi
dxi
(z, x−i)dz − ui(0, x−i)
Because the IC constraints for two different sellers are independent, by taking the sum
out of the integral, I can split the problem in as many problems as there are sellers. Each
of these problems can be written as the following:
max
(qi,ui(0,x−i))∈Qi×C−i
∫
X
(
qi(x)[w − vi(x)] +
∫ xi
0
qi(z, x−i)
dvi
dxi
(z, x−i)dz − ui(0, x−i)
)
f(x)dx
s.t. for all x ∈ X: ui(0, x−i) ≥
∫ xi
0
qi(z, x−i)
dvi
dxi
(z, x−i)dz
Therefore, at the optimum it must be that ui(0, x−i) =
∫ x¯i
0 qi(z, x−i)
dvi
dxi
(z, x−i)dz. Re-
placing it in the objective, and changing the order of integration gives 27:
max
qi∈Qi×C−i
∫
X
qi(x)
(
w − vi(x)− dvi
dxi
(x)F (xi | x−i)
f(xi | x−i)
)
f(x)dx
Finally, substituting withmi(x) and denoting for all i and x−i ∈ X−i such thatmi(0, x−i) ≤
w si(w, x−i) = max {xi ∈ Xi | mi(x) ≤ w}, the regularity of the problem implies that:
q∗i (x) =
λi if mi(x) ≤ w0 otherwise c∗i (x) =
λivi (si (w, x−i) , x−i) if mi(x) ≤ w0 otherwise
q∗i (x) is decreasing in xi because the problem is regular.
Proof. Proposition 3. If the problem is regular for seller i knowing x−i and w belongs
to the support of mi | x−i, qi(x) = λi if and only if xi ≤ si(w, x−i). Then monotonicity
of v(·, x−i) implies:
q∗i (x) =
λi if vi(x) ≤ p
0
i (w, x−i)
0 otherwise
c∗i (x) =
λip
0
i (w, x−i) if vi(x) ≤ p0i (w, x−i)
0 otherwise
27Because the set of signals where f(x) is of measure 0, I can choose qi(x) as I want on this set as long
as it is decreasing.
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Because the problem is regular for i given X−i, if w ∈ [v(0, x−i),m(x¯, x−i)] and the
optimal price posted by the monopsonist p must verify:
−Gi(p | x−i) + (w − p)gi(p | x−i) = 0
w −mi (xi (p, x−i) , x−i) = 0
Because p0i (w, x−i) = vi (si (w, x−i) , x−i), xi
(
p0i (w, x−i) , x−i
)
= si(w, x−i), and p0i (w, x−i)
is the unique solution of the problem.
If w ≤ v(0, x−i), p∗ = v(0, x−i) and if w ≥ m(x¯, x−i), p∗ = v(x¯, x−i) are solutions.
Deriving p0i (w, x−i) = vi (si (w, x−i) , x−i) with respect to w, I can show that the price
is increasing in w and that if the cumulative distribution of vi | x−i is log-concave in
p0i (w, x−i), the derivative is smaller than 1.
Proof. Corollary 4. Suppose that p∗i > p0i (w, x−i) for all x−i on the support of x−i | vi.
The regularity of the problem for i given X−i and the definition of p0i (w, x−i) implies
that:
Gi(p∗i | x−i) + (w − p∗i )gi(p∗i | x−i) < Gi
(
p0i (w, x−i) | x−i
)
+ [w − p0i (w, x−i)]gi
(
p0i (w, x−i) | x−i
)
< 0
Multiplying by f(x−i) and integrating over Xi gives:
Gi(p∗i ) + (w − p∗i )gi(p∗i ) < 0
which contradicts the definition of p∗i . p∗i < p0i (w, x−i) for all x−i on the support of x−i|vi
leads in the same way to a contradiction.
Proof. Corollary 4. If w belongs to the support of mi | x−i, mi (si (w, x−i) , x−i) = w.
Moreover, the regularity of the problem for i given x−i implies that:
dsi
dxj
(w, x−i) = −
dmi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dmi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dp0i
dxj
(w, x−i) =
dvi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dsi
dxj
(w, x−i) +
dvi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
= −dvi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dmi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dmi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
+ dvi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
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Moreover, xi(vi, x−i) = si(w, x−i) if the information of j is positive for i in vi =
vi (si (w, x−i) , x−i) and corollary 12 implies that :
dmi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dmi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
≤
dvi
dxj
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
dvi
dxi
(si (w, x−i) , x−i)
If w does not belong to the support of mi | x−i the derivative is equal to 0.
Proof. Proposition 5. Let p(x) be an incentive compatible price function, for J ⊂ N I
denote:
DJ
((
p
(
xN\J\{i}, 0
))
i∈N\J
)
=
{
xN\J ∈ XN\J s.t. for all i ∈ N \ J ,
vi
(
xN\J , 0
)
> p
(
xN\J\{i}, 0, 0
)}
the set of signals in XN\J such that no i in N \ J sells at the price proposed in the
hyperplane (xN\J\{i}, 0).
I will first show that for all j ∈ N and given the N−1 price functions p
(
x−{j,i}, 0, 0
)
,
only seller j can sell in all x ∈ Dj ×Xj and that if the sale takes place the buyer must
propose any price p(0, x−j) ≤ mini 6=j p(xN\{j,i}, 0, 0). Lemma 2 implies that if i 6= j sells
in x, p(x) = p(0, x−i) ≤ p(0, 0, x−{i,j}) which by definition of Dj is strictly smaller that
vi(0, x−j) which by monotonicity is smaller than vi(x). Therefore, p(x) < vi(x) and for
all i 6= j, i cannot sell in x. If j sells in x, then lemma 2 implies that p(x) = p(0, x−j) ≤
mini 6=j p(0, 0, x−{i,j}).
If x /∈ B1 = ∪j{Dj × Xj} and the buyer buys in x, there must exist two sellers
(i, j) such that p(x) = p(0, 0, x−{i,j}). Let j be the seller who sells, it must hold that
p(x) = p(0, x−j). Because x /∈ Aj ×Xj there must exist i 6= j such that p(0, 0, x−{i,j}) ≥
vi(0, x−j) ≥ vi(0, 0, x−{i,j}). Figure 6a of proposition 4 implies that the buyer buys from
i in (0, x−j) and (0, 0, x−{i,j}) and that p(0, 0, x−{i,j}) = p(0, x−j) = p(x).
As in the case where n = 2, I will rewrite the maximization problem in a recursive
way. I will split the integral between the Dj × Xj and the rest. On each of this space
I will maximize over p(0, x−j) given all prices on the subspaces of dimension lower than
n− 2. Taking this maximum in the intergral give n maximizations of the form:
λj
∫
x−j∈Dj
(
(p(x−{i,j},0,0))i 6=j
)maxp(x−j ,0)≤mini 6=j{p(x−{i,j},0,0)}[w − p(x−j , 0)]Fj (xj (p (x−j , 0) , x−j) , x−j) dx−j
The objective in the maximum is the same as the objective the unregulated problem
stated in proposition 3 and, therefore, the regularity of the problem for every seller j given
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x−J , implies that for all j ∈ N , x ∈ Dj
((
p
(
x−{i,j}, 0
))
i 6=j
)
×Xj , p∗(x) = p∗(x−j , 0) =
min
{
mini 6=j
{
p∗
(
x−{i,j}, 0
)}
, p0i (w, x−j)
}
.
Defining by induction Bj+1 = Bj ∪J⊂N :|J |=j+1 DJ × XJ , I will prove by induction
on j, that for all J ⊂ N if x ∈ DJ ×XJ \ Bj the buyer can sell at most to sellers in J
at price p(0, xN−J) and that if x /∈ Bj+1 and the buyer buys in x, there must exist an
ordering of j + 1 sellers verifying the condition of lemma 1.
Let J ⊂ N such that |J | = j and x ∈ DJ ×XJ \Bj .
Because x ∈ DJ × XJ and lemma 2 implies that for all k ∈ N \ J and J ′ ⊂ J ,
k cannot sell in (xN\J , xJ ′ , 0). Otherwise repetitively using lemma 2 would imply that
vk(xN\J , xJ ′ , 0) ≤ p(xN\J , xJ ′ , 0) = p(xN\J\{k}, 0, xJ ′ , 0) ≤ p(xN\J\{k}, 0). Moreover,
vk increasing would imply vk(xN\J , 0, 0) ≤ vk(xN\J , xJ ′ , 0). But these two inequalities
together contradict the fact that x ∈ DJ ×XJ . In particular, the buyer can sell at most
to sellers in J in x.
Because x /∈ Bj and because of the induction hypothesis, if somebody is selling in
x, there exists an ordering of j sellers verifying the condition of lemma 1. Beside the
previous paragraph ensures that this ordering is a reordering of J . The price offered will
be, therefore, p(x) = p(xN\J , 0).
Let x /∈ Bj+1 = Bj ∪J⊂N :|J |=j+1 DJ × XJ such that the buyer buys in x. Because
x /∈ Bj there must exist J ⊂ N such that a reordering of these sellers verifies the
condition of lemma 1. But because x /∈ DJ × XJ there must exist k ∈ N \ J such
that p(xN\J\{k}, 0) ≥ vk(xN\J , 0), and figure 6a of proposition 4 implies that the buyer
buys from k in (xN\J , 0) and (xN\J\{k}, 0) and that p(xN\J\{k}, 0) = p(xN\J , 0) = p(x).
Adding this seller in front of the pervious ordering gives the new one.
Finally, I rewrite once again the problem recursively. Having determined the profit
on Bj as a function of the price p(xN\J , 0), I can pin down the price p(xN\J , 0) and the
profit in DJ×XJ as a function of the price p(xN\J\{k}, 0))k∈N\J) by solving the following
problem:
∑
j∈J
λj
∫
xN\J∈DJ
(
(p(xN\J\{k},0,0))k∈N\J
)maxp(xN\J ,0)≤mink∈N\J{p(xN\J\{k},0,0)}[w − p(xN−J , 0)]Gj
(
p
(
xN\J , 0
)
| xJ
)
dxN\J
+ ΠBj
(
p
(
xN\J , 0
))
The objective in the maximum is here the objective of a monopsonist who have to
post a fixed price to buy from the sellers in J knowing the signals of the sellers in N \ J .
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The second term is in general also a function of p(xN\J , 0, 0), because the constraints in
the maximization problem for the previous set of sellers are in general be binding.
Proof. Proposition 13. To prove the second bullet point let p ≤ p∗. Let us denoteWi(p)
the subset of XUj\Ui(p) such that pj(w, p, xi) ≤ p, Πdj (p, xi) = (w−p)Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
+
[w − pj(w, p, xi)][Fj (xj (pj (w, p, xi) , xi) , xi)− Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
] the profit earned from
buyer j when xi ∈Wi(p) and Πncj (p, xi) = (w−p)Fj (xj (p, xi) , xi) the profit from buying
from j when xi ∈ Xi \Wi(p). Evaluating the derivative of problem (2) in p gives:
dΠ
dp
(p) =
∑
i
∫
Xi\Wi(p)
dΠncj
dp
(p, xi)dxi +
∫
d
dp
Wi(p)
Πncj (p, xi)−Πdj (p, xi)dxi +
∫
Wi(p)
dΠdj
dp
(p, xi)dxi
Besides, pj(w, p, xi) = p on ddpWi(p). Indeed, if xi is on the border of XUj\Ui(p) either
vi(0, xi) > p = vj(0, xi) or vi
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
= p = vj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
and for all xj <
xij(p, xi), vj(x) < p and vi(x) ≤ p. In either case, (w − p)Gj(p | xi, vi ≥ p) = 0 and the
maximum must be greater than p. Therefore, Πncj (p, xi) = Πdj (p, xi). Finally, because
pj(w, p, xi) is the price maximizing (w − s)[Fj (xj (s, xi) , xi) − Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
], I can
rewrite:
dΠ
dp
(p) =
∑
i
∫
Xi\Wi(p)
dΠncj
dp
(p, xi)dxi
+
∫
Wi(p)
[pj(w, p, xi)− p]f
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
) dxij
dp
(p, xi)− F
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
dxi
On the other hand:
dΠnc
dp
(p) =
∑
i
∫
Xi\Wi(p)
dΠncj
dp
(p, xi)dxi +
∫
Wi(p)
dΠncj
dp
(p, xi)dxi
=
∑
i
∫
Xi\Wi(p)
dΠncj
dp
(p, xi)dxi +
∫
Wi(p)
(w − p)f (xj (p, xi) , xi) dxj
dp
(p, xi)
− Fj (xj (p, xi) , xi) dxi
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Therefore, because p∗ is the maximum of Πnc, p∗(0) ≥ p∗ if for all xi ∈Wi(p):
(w − p)f (xj (p, xi) , xi)dxj
dp
(p, xi)− Fj (xj (p, xi) , xi) ≤
[pj(w, p, xi)− p]f
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
) dxij
dp
(p, xi)− Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
(6)
Let xi ∈Wi(p) and v¯ such that p ≥ v¯ > pj(w, p, xi) and gj(v¯ | xi) ≥ max{gj(p | xi), gi(p |
xi)}. Because v¯ > pj(w, p, xi) and gi(p | xi)/gj(v¯ | xi) ≤ 1, I can find a p¯ ≤ p such that:
v¯ ≥ p′ = p¯− gi(p | xi)
gj(v¯ | xi)p+
gi(p | xi)
gj(v¯ | xi)pj(w, p, xi) ≥ pj(w, p, xi)
These two inequalities together with the fact that Gj(v | xi, vi ≥ p) is log-concave and
the problem described in equation (3) imply that
w − p′ ≤ Gj(p
′ | xi, vi ≥ p)
gj(p′ | xi) ≤
Gj(v¯ | xi, vi ≥ p)
gj(v¯ | xi)
Replacing p′ and Gj(v¯ | xi, vi ≥ p) = [Fj (xj (v¯, xi) , xi)−Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
]/fi(xi) gives:(
w − p¯+ p gi(p | xi)
gj(v¯ | xi) − pj(w, p, xi)
gi(p | xi)
gj(v¯ | xi)
)
gj(v¯ | xi) ≤ Gj(v¯ | xi, vi ≥ p)
(w − p¯)gj(v¯ | xi)−Gj(v¯ | xi, vi ≥ p) ≤ [pj(w, p, xi)− p]gi(p | xi)
(w − p¯)f (xj (v¯, xi) , xi) dxj
dp
(v¯, xi)− Fj (xj (v¯, xi) , xi) ≤
[pj(w, p, xi)− p]f
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)dxij
dp
(p, xi)− Fj
(
xij (p, xi) , xi
)
Because gj(v¯ | xi) ≥ gj(p | xi), and p ≥ p¯, the last inequality implies (6).
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Chapter II
House Allocation with Limited
Externalities
Based on Frys (2018a).
1 Introduction
This paper studies the allocation of houses to students, when students have preferences
not only over the houses they receive but also over where their friends live. I consider
the case in which the set of students can be partitioned into groups of friends who care
about each other assignment. So if A and B are friends, both care about where they
both end up. While I impose the assumption that these preferences are common, so that
friends agree on how to rank different allocations, I don’t require friends to prefer to be
assigned to the same house.
For example, there might be one house on the campus that has access to a pool,
while another has access to a tennis court. Two friends, A and B, might prefer to be
assigned separately, one in each of the houses, so that both can enjoy the pool as well as
the tennis court. On the contrary, A and B might prioritize convenience and prefer to
live together in the house with the pool. If there is not enough slots left in this house,
they might prefer to be assigned separately in the two houses rather than to be assigned
together in a third house with no facilities. What I do rule out are situations in which A
wants to live close to B, while B wants to live far away from A. Otherwise, if preferences
of friends would not coincide, aspects of the roommate problem, which I abstract from
here, would reappear. In practice, a student’s utility could be affected by the presence
in a house of other students who are already assigned and remain there with certainty.
The presence of such existing tenants can be treated as a characteristic of the house and
abstracting from it is harmless. Fundamentally, I call friends people who are able to
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construct a common preference ordering over their allocation and can commit to stick to
it during the duration of the game. We can even imagine that students who particularly
dislike each other form a group to be sure to be allocated far from each other.
This set-up can be transposed to other one sided matching markets. A particularly
relevant market is the allocation of refugees’ families to countries or geographical regions.
Such matching mechanism would be a good complement to the quotas system that some
members of the European union would like to implement. It could also be used to allocate
time slots of sport facilities or to allocate tasks to working groups.
A common mechanism used to assign students’ accommodation is known in the liter-
ature as the random serial dictatorship (RSD). In this mechanism, students are ordered
randomly and choose in that order their most preferred room among the ones still avail-
able. In my setting, I show that the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game induced by
this mechanism fails to be efficient. Because students can only express preferences over
houses, this procedure is not a direct mechanism. To implement it as a direct mecha-
nism, the students would instead have to report their ranking of the assignments of their
friends to all houses.
Therefore, I present a modification of RSD, which I call the random serial group
dictatorship (GD). In this mechanism, friends report their friendship. They are then
treated as a single agent in the RSD and asked for their preferences over joint assignments.
This procedure was used, for example, at King’s College, at Cambridge University and
at Harvard College. Conditional on groups of friends having been truthfully reported,
submitting truthful preferences over allocations is a dominant strategy for each group.
However, I show that there are cases in which students may strictly benefit from lying
about their friendship and that these strategies form a new Nash equilibrium. Because
a group of friends is treated as a single agent, splitting the group increases the number
of draws a group have in the lottery. Some groups may then use this strategically and
let the first subgroup block an allocation for the rest of the group. Similarly, two groups
of students may merge and report themselves as only one group to avoid the ordering
of the groups that lead to bad outcome for them. However, to exploit these incentives,
students need a lot of information. Indeed, if enough singles are telling the truth and
if there is enough demand for the most preferred houses, I show that reporting a group
truthfully is never stochastically dominated.
The weak incentives properties of the GD mechanism stem partly from the depen-
dence of the lottery on the submitted information. I propose a new direct mechanism,
which I call the random serial bossy (RSB) mechanism. This mechanism asks each agent
to report her preferences over assignments and ranks them individually. The agents’
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preferences are then considered in that order. Whenever it is an agent’s turn, the best
feasible allocation according to that agent’s reported preferences is implemented. I show
that RSB is both efficient and strategy-proof. However, as for the GD mechanism, a
group of students may collectively deviate from truth-telling to an other Nash equilib-
rium that is stochastically strictly better. This happens for all market’s sizes and for
almost all relevant preferences’ profile of the students. In the light of their respective
properties, I discuss the pros and cons of implementing each mechanism in practice.
The next subsection discusses related literature. In Section 3, I present the basic
model and definitions as well as the restrictions on the set of admissible preferences.
Section 4 analyzes the performance of the standard random serial dictatorship in my
setting. Section 5 introduces and discusses the random serial group dictatorship mecha-
nism. Section 6 presents the random serial bossy mechanism and its properties. Section
7 concludes.
2 Literature Overview
There are a number of papers analyzing matching problems with externalities between
agents. In particular, a part of the literature on two-sided matchings studies the problem
of matchings with couples. In the mechanism matching new doctors to hospitals in the
U.S., Roth and Peranson (1999) noted that the increasing share of couples of doctors
led to a decrease in the use of the centralized algorithm, because couples were unable to
identify themselves as such. Even after the market has been redesigned to allow couples
to express their joint preferences over pairs of jobs, the existence of a stable matching
cannot generally be guaranteed, Roth and Sotomayor (1992). Klaus and Klijn (2005)
showed that a restriction of the domain of preferences can ensure the existence of a
stable matching even when couples are present. This restriction essentially states that
couples cannot have preferences such that they prefer to be matched to similar geographic
areas. This preference for closeness, however, appears to be the main feature of couples’
preferences empirically. In addition, Klaus et al. (2007) noted that the Roth-Perranson
algorithm developed in Roth and Peranson (1999) may fail to find a stable matching even
under responsive preferences. They also showed that couples might have an incentive
to misreprort their preferences. Under the assumption of weakly responsive preferences,
Klaus and Klijn (2007) constructed an algorithm to obtain a stable matching from an
arbitrary matching even in the presence of couples. Finally, Kojima et al. (2013) showed
that when there are relatively few couples and the size of the market tends toward infinity,
the probability that a stable matching exists tends to one.
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Sasaki and Toda (1996) considered a general model of two-sided matching markets
with externalities. In this general case, agents have preferences over the entire set of
matchings. Their definition of stability supposed that two matched agents considering a
deviation are pessimistic and compare the actual matching to the worst in their expecta-
tion sets. They showed that if the expectation sets don’t depend on agents’ preferences,
the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed only if a deviating pair considers that all
matchings where they are together can arise after the deviation. They defined rational
expectations as the case where a pair considers that a matching is possible only if it is
stable in the subgame where they are matched together. They showed that this reduced
game consistency guarantees the existence of a stable matching only when agents have
weak externalities. Hafalir (2007) emphasized the lack of rationality of the players in
Sasaki and Toda’s solution. He defined an intermediate notion of rational set of expecta-
tion that ensures the existence of a stable matching. However, this definition seems too
complicated to find real world application. Ultimately, he showed that the presence of ex-
ternalities in matching problems makes them unsolvable in general. Externalities create
cycles of couples that break matchings one after the other. The only way to circumvent
the problem is hence to focus on narrowed set-up such as mine.
House allocation problems in which groups of students are to be allocated have been
mentioned in some previous papers. Collins and Krishna (1997) analyzed the house
allocation procedure in Harvard College. A feature of that house allocation procedure
is that groups of students are allocated together. However, they ignored this aspect
of the procedure, which hints at the presence of externalities, but focused instead on
an empirical examination of the extent to which students make rational choices. Che
and Kojima (2010) noted that the mechanism used at Columbia University to allocate
rooms explicitly allows groups of agents to report joint preferences. They noted that one
advantage of random serial dictatorship over the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism of
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) is that it easily allows groups to apply jointly. Under the
PS mechanism agents reserve shares of houses at a constant speed. The share of a house
reserved by an agent represents the probability of obtaining this house. It is difficult to
extend the PS mechanism to cases where agents have externalities. It is indeed not clear
how to construct lotteries over matchings in a way that is consistent with the expected
allocation of all participating agents.
Finally, a part of the literature on allocation mechanism considers problems where
multiple goods can be allocated to the same agent. This problem is the same as the
one presented in this article if the compositions of the groups of friends are known. In
this case, a group of k friends could be seen as an individual agent choosing k rooms.
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If the goods are heterogeneous and the preferences over sets of goods are strict, Pápai
(2001) showed that an allocation rule is strategy-proof, nonbossy and satisfy citizen
sovereignty if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. However, in the model presented
in the next section, there are multiple units of goods, preferences displays indifferences
and the k friends can at most receive k goods. In a more recent article, Budish et al.
(2013) extended the pseudo market mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) to the
case where students may receive multiple goods and where goods may have multiple
exemplars. However, they suppose that a good can fulfill different "roles", that students
have cardinal utilities for each role of each good and that these utilities are additive. In
the model presented in the next section, I impose less structure on the set of possible
preferences.
3 The Model
I consider a house allocation problem, which consists of i) S, a finite set of students; ii)
H, a finite set of houses; and iii) (qh)h∈H , a vector listing the number of rooms available
in each house. A matching µ is defined as mapping from the set of students to the set of
houses such that for every s ∈ S and h ∈ H:
1 µ(s) ∈ H ∪ ∅
2 µ−1(h) ⊆ S
3 |µ−1(h)| ≤ qh
A matching µ associates to each student either a house h in the set of houses, or no
house, which I denote by ∅. Furthermore, for µ to be a matching, each house must be
assigned to less students than its capacity. I denote the set of all matchings by M. I
denote Q the set of transitive and complete preference relations overM. Each students
has an ordinal preference relation over the set of matchings, <s∈ Q. I denote by s and
∼s the strict and indifferent preference relations of student s and <∈ Q|S| the preference
profile of all students.
To compare probability distributions over matchings, I will use the partial order
induced by first order stochastic dominance. A probability distribution ∆ over the set
of matchings is weakly preferred to another probability distribution ∆′ by student s,
∆ <sds ∆′, if renaming the matching according to the preferences <s, we have that for
all n ≤ |M| ∑ni=1 δ(µi) ≥ ∑ni=1 δ′(µi). It is equivalent to suppose that for all cardinal
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utilities compatible with <s, if s is expected utility maximizer, s prefers ∆ to ∆′. I use
sds when there is a n such that the inequality is strict and µn s µn+1.
I will say that two students are friends if they have the same preferences. In usual
housing markets, two agents with the same preferences want to be allocated to the same
houses and are therefore in competition for theses houses. Because the preferences here
are on the set of matchings, agents with the same preferences are not competing against
each other but are promoting the same outcome. So even if they are not friends in real
life, they are in practice allied when they face the allocation problem. It could also
be interpreted in a different way. A group of friends would be fundamentally a set of
students who are able to express common preferences. Friends have more power on each
other. They are, therefore, able to better negotiate with each other to define common
preferences before the beginning of the game and can commit to stick to it during its
entire duration.
Definition 4. The group of friends of student s, denoted L(s), is the set of students
such that: for all s′ ∈ L(s), <s=<′s.
This definition has straightforward consequences. There is no disagreement about
friendship. There is no case where s1 is a friend of s2 but the inverse doesn’t hold.
Moreover, each group of friends forms a clique. Each of its members is a friend of all
other members and no other student. In particular, this rules out continuous networks
of friendship.
Remark 1. The sets of groups of friends forms a partition of S:
• Friendship is reciprocal: for all s, s′ ∈ S, if s′ ∈ L(s) then s ∈ L(s′)
• Friendship is transitive: for all s, s′, sˆ ∈ S, if sˆ ∈ L(s′) and s′ ∈ L(s) then sˆ ∈ L(s).
N is the number of (mutually exclusive) groups of friends. A typical group of students
is denoted by gi. I denote by G the set of groups, so we have N = |G| and ∑i |gi| = |S|.
Similarly, for all S′ ⊂ S, I denote L(S′), the set of groups of friends that have a member
in S′.
I haven’t yet restricted the class of preference relations that I want to consider. I
want to study a market with a specific type of limited externalities, where students do
not care about the allocation of every other participant but only about the allocation of a
defined closed set of students. I will suppose that students only care about the allocation
of their friends. This hypothesis is the major restriction of the model.
Assumption 1. For all i ≤ N , µ ∼gi ν if for all s ∈ gi, µ(s) = ν(s).
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This first assumption restricts a lot the possible externalities. A student is allowed to
have preferences over another student’s allocation only if these preferences coincide with
her own preferences. It is the smallest step away from a selfish agent model. Letting
people express such preferences seems a priori harmless.
A second assumption on the preferences ensures that the model is a generalization of
the classical case of selfish agents with strict preferences. I will suppose that groups of
friends have strict preferences over the set of houses they are assigned to.
Assumption 2. For all i ≤ N , µ ∼gi ν implies that for all h ∈ H, |µ−1(h) ∩ gi| =
|ν−1(h) ∩ gi|.
It implies in particular that if a student has no friend, she must have strict preferences
over the set of houses. This assumption allows a group of friends to be indifferent between
two different matchings of its members. Because friends agree on preferences, they might
be able to reshuffle their allocation after the mechanism. They might, therefore, be
indifferent between all allocations that give them the same set of houses.
These assumptions allow for two special cases. One in which L(s) = {s} for all s,
we are then back in the standard case without externalities. The other when L(s) = S,
meaning that all students are friends of each other and agree on the ranking of the
matchings. It also implies that students cannot be friends accidentally. Students know
their group of friends because they know their preferences. They would in particular
be able to report their group of friends if they have to. I denote the set of preferences
for which assumptions 1 and 2 hold by P ⊂ Q|S|. I assume throughout the paper
that the preference profile belongs to P. While I have made a number of restrictions
concerning the shape that externalities can take, it still leaves a fairly large space of
possible preferences to consider. I don’t request that friends prefer to be allocated to the
same house, as it has been the case for problems of allocation of couples. Instead, the
restrictions fix the set of people over whose assignment an agent cares. Hence, an agent
may care about the allocation of another agent even when this agent is not allocated
to the same house. I will use this fact to recover the group of friends associated with a
preference order over matchings.
Definition 5. The group of friends associated with <∈ Q, denoted L(<), is the
set of students s ∈ S such that: for all µ, ν ∈ M with µ(s′) = ν(s′) for all s′ 6= s and
µ(s) 6= ∅ = ν(s), either µ  ν or ν  µ.
If a preference profile < belongs to P, the group of friends associated with a student’s
preferences coincides with her group of friends defined in definition 4. To simplify the
analysis, I will first consider direct mechanisms.
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Definition 6. A (Random) Direct Mechanism Ψ is a mapping from the set of pref-
erences to the set of probability distributions over the set of matchings, i.e. Ψ : Q|S| →
∆(M).
I allow students to report preferences outside of P. Otherwise, the set of admissible
preferences for each student would depend on the preferences reported by her friends. I
next define desirable properties that direct mechanisms should satisfy.
Definition 7. A matching µ is Pareto efficient if there does not exist µ′ ∈ M \ {µ}
such that for all s ∈ S, µ′ <s µ and for at least one s ∈ S µ′ s µ.
The definition of Pareto efficiency then extends easily to direct mechanisms:
Definition 8. A direct mechanism Ψ is (ex-post) Pareto efficient with respect to the
reported profile <∈ Q|S| if all matchings in the support of Ψ(<) are Pareto efficient.
I next introduce two notions of truth-telling incentives for students. A mechanism is
strategy-proof if for each student, reporting her true preferences is a dominant strategy.
Definition 9. A random direct mechanism Ψ is strategy-proof if for all s ∈ S, <∈ P,
<′∈ Q|S|, Ψ(<s,<′−s) <sds Ψ(<′).
A weaker notion than strategy-proofness is that truth-telling forms a Nash equilib-
rium. It means that no student has an incentive to lie about her preferences given that
all other students report their preferences truthfully.
Definition 10. Truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of a random direct mechanism
Ψ if for all <∈ P, and for all s ∈ S and <′s∈ Q, Ψ(<) <sds Ψ(<′s,<−s).
These definitions are using the first order stochastic partial order. Therefore, I can
define a weak version of each notion requiring that there be no report strictly preferred
than telling the truth. One interpretation of definition 4 is that friends are able to
negotiate to submit common preferences. Therefore, we should expect some students to
be able to coordinate their actions. I thus introduce a notion of truth-telling that allows
students to consider joint deviations.
Definition 11. Truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of a random direct mechanism Ψ
robust to coalitions of l groups of friends if truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium and
for all coalition S′ ⊂ S such that |L(S′)| ≤ l, for all <∈ P, there is no <′S′∈ Q|S
′| such
that:
• Ψ(<′S′ ,<S\S′) <sdg Ψ(<) for all g ∈ L(S′), with strict inequality for one g ∈ L(S′)
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• Ψ(<′S′ ,<S\S′) <sdg Ψ(<′S′\g,<g,<S\S′) for all g ∈ L(S′),
A Nash equilibrium is robust to coalitions of l groups of friends if no coalition of less
than l groups of friends can trigger a better outcome for them by jointly reporting a
stable deviation from truth-telling. This definition departs from classical definitions of
coalition-proofness through three weakening restrictions. First, the size of the coalition is
limited. If l = 1, we consider only joint deviations of members of the same group of friends
and truth-telling must be a weak Nash Equilibrium for groups of friends. Second, the
first bullet point requires that lying do not stochastically dominate truth-telling, rather
than requiring that truth-telling stochastically dominate lying. Finally, the second bullet
point requires the deviation strategy to be credible or stable in the sense that a group of
friends taking part in the lying coalition never wants to jointly switch back to the truth.
If truth-telling is a strictly dominant strategy, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium
robust to all sizes of coalitions. There is no direct relation with simple strategy-proofness.
However, in strategy-proof mechanisms, truth-telling is not robust to coalitions of size l
only if at the report dominating truth-telling, every student is indifferent between telling
the truth and not. Therefore, the mechanism must be bossy, i.e. a student changing his
report can change another student’s allocation without changing its own. In the case
without externalities and strict preferences, truth-telling in RSD is a strict dominant
strategy and therefore weakly coalition-proof. A random mechanism that would not
verify this definition for a small l would be very sensitive to joint deviations. A small
subset of students would be able to deviate to get a strictly better outcome only through
cheap talk, with no commitment power.
However, given the size of the preferences set, direct mechanisms are unlikely to
be used in practice. The size of the preferences that students would have to report
might be too large. If all houses have more than k slots, a group containing k members
would have to report a ranking of |H + 1|k alternatives. Therefore, I will also study
indirect implementations of the mechanisms studied. In most of the cases developed in
the following sections, the strategy space in each information set will consist of reporting
information contained in the preferences of the student. This would in particular be the
case when students have to report their groups of friends or to choose the best allocation
among a set. I could also say that students face a partition of P and have to report
the set to which their preferences belong. In these cases, I can extend the incentive
definitions by saying that a report is truthful if a student reports the true set. If the
game is sequential, I will use perfect Nash equilibrium instead of simple Nash equilibrium.
I will also extend the efficiency property to these types of indirect mechanisms. I will
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say that it is Pareto efficient if the outcome of truthful strategies is a distribution over
Pareto efficient matchings.
4 Random Serial Dictatorship Revisited
In the standard case, where students have preferences over the set of houses, random serial
dictatorship (RSD) is a direct mechanism. It works as follows: each student reports
a ranking of houses, a lottery is drawn to order the students and they are allocated
sequentially according to their lottery number to their most preferred house in the set
of the remaining houses. In the standard case, it can also be implemented by ordering
the students directly and letting them choose sequentially their match. I will call this
game the sequential RSD. In this game, the students know the complete ranking of
the students and the match of the preceding students at the time of their decision.
Without externalities, each game has a unique equilibrium in dominant strategy. The
two equilibrium strategies are linked by a bijective function and lead to the same outcome.
This equivalence breaks down in the presence of externalities, even if they respect
assumption 1 and 2. In different information sets of the sequential RSD, the relative
ordering of two houses may vary as the preferences over these houses depends on which
students are likely to be allocated to them. There is no bijection between the optimal
ranking of houses in RSD and the optimal strategy in the sequential RSD. Moreover,
I will show that the two mechanisms can implement different matchings. In the first
mechanism, no information is revealed to the students before they submit their prefer-
ences. In the second one, students are aware of the choices of all students who were
ahead in the lottery. Hence, they will find it optimal to condition their choice on the set
of houses available, on the actions of their friends already allocated and on the ranking
of the students who will move after her.
In the present setting with externalities, the two implementations of RSD are no
longer direct mechanisms. They do not take students’ preferences as an input. They
restrict students to report rankings of houses instead of rankings of matchings. It rules
out any incentive properties defined in section 3. I cannot interpret the strategy spaces
as a collection of subsets of P forming a partition to extend these notions. Actually, there
may be no Nash equilibrium of the classical RSD. However, I can still say something about
efficiency. For the two versions of RSD, if the resulting game has a Nash equilibrium, I will
show that the equilibrium outcome may not be a Pareto efficient matching. Therefore,
the direct mechanisms implementing the Nash equilibrium of RSD mechanisms are not
Pareto efficient.
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Proposition 1. RSD may have no Nash equilibrium. If a Nash equilibrium exists, it
may implement Pareto inefficient matchings.
Proof. For the first part, it is sufficient to find an house allocation problem and a pref-
erence profile in P such that RSD has no Nash equilibrium. Let us consider a problem
with three students 1, 2, 3 and two houses, h1 and h2, with capacities q1 = 2 and q2 = 1.
{1, 2} forms a group of friends and the agents’ preferences are given by:
(1, 2) : (h1, h1)  (h1, h2)  (h2, h1)
3 : h1  h2
Reporting her true preferences is a dominant strategy for 3. If the couple reports that
they both prefer h1 over h2, they will end up with probability 1/3 in each of their possible
match. If 2 reports instead that she prefers h2 over h1, they will end up with probability
one in (h1, h2). Both strategies are weak Nash equilibrium but none of them is a Nash
equilibrium.
In the appendix, I present also another example where couples are indifferent when
we reshuffle their allocation. This game has a Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium
distribution over matchings puts positive mass on Pareto inefficient matchings.
In the sequential RSD, on the contrary, there is always a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium because there is no uncertainty at the points where the players move. But
as before, the resulting matching may not be Pareto efficient.
Proposition 2. Sequential RSD does not implement Pareto efficient outcome in perfect
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. I keep the same problem as in the example of the appendix but suppose the
preferences are the following:
(1, 2) : (h2, h2)  (h1, h1)  (h2, h1)  (h2, h3)
(3, 4) : (h1, h1)  (h2, h2)  (h2, h3)  (h1, h3)
5 : h1  h3  h2
If we consider the order (1, 3, 2, 5, 4), the outcome of the prefect Nash equilibrium is the
matching µ ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5)) = (h1, h1, h2, h2, h3). It is strictly dominated by µ′ ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5)) =
(h2, h2, h1, h1, h3). The exact calculations are detailed in the appendix.
This section highlighted the weakness of these classical implementations of RSD. In
the next section, I will propose another mechanism inspired from RSD that will have
improved incentive and efficiency properties.
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5 The Random Serial Group Dictatorship Mechanism
In this section, I present a modified version of RSD, which allows students to submit
preferences over the matchings. The lottery used in the mechanism does not produce a
priority order over students, but instead a priority order over sets of students. It allows
students of the same group of friends to move together to choose their most preferred
allocation among the available ones after the groups with higher priorities made their
choices. The following mechanism implements this procedure as a direct mechanism. I
will call this mechanism the random serial group dictatorship mechanism and denote it
ψGD.
Definition 12. The random serial group dictatorship mechanism, ΨGD, asso-
ciates for each profile of reported preferences, <∈ Q|S|, the outcome of the following
algorithm:
• Step 0: For all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ L(<s), if s /∈ L(<s′) assign s to ∅. Define the
groups as the set of students who are connected through a chain of friendship.
• Step 1: Randomly draw a priority ordering of the groups.
• Step 2: Allocate the students in g1 according to one the most preferred matchings
of one of its members. Reduce the set of feasible matchings to those respecting these
allocations.
• Step k: Allocate the students in gk−1 according to one of the most preferred match-
ings of one of its members among the set of feasible matchings. Reduce further the
set of feasible matchings to those respecting these allocations.
The procedure terminates when the group with the lowest priority has chosen its assign-
ment.
Step 0 ensures that the friendships are reciprocal. No student can report herself as a
member of a group without the consent of a member of this group. However, the reported
preferences may not belong to P. Later on, I will show how modifying this step changes
the properties of the mechanism.
As for RSD, I will define a similar sequential GD mechanism. In step 0 of this indirect
mechanism, students report only their group of friends. As in the direct mechanism, it
allocates students reporting a non-reciprocal friendship to the empty set, constructs and
orders the groups in the same manner. After learning the outcome of the lottery and
the allocation of the preceding groups, a member of the next group will choose a slot
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among the available ones for each member of this group. This indirect mechanism is a lot
easier to implement in practice. Students don’t have to rank all the possible matchings,
which could quickly amount to an impractical number. Reporting a group of friends and
picking an allocation for a subset of students amount to choose a set in a partition of P.
Therefore, I can extend the properties of direct mechanisms as explained in section 3. I
will show that the results of this section are also valid for the sequential GD mechanism.
Proposition 3. The GD mechanism is Pareto-efficient with respect to any reported
preference profile in P.
Proof. The GD mechanism is efficient in this set-up for the same reasons as the RSD
mechanism when there are strict preferences and no externality. Suppose by contradiction
that there exist <∈ P , ν ∈ M and µ in the support of ΨGD(<), such that ν Pareto
dominates µ. Let’s order the groups of friends g1, ..., gN according to one of the draws
leading to µ. Definition 4 implies that there is a first group gi such that all students in gi
strictly prefer ν over µ and such that all students of the preceding groups are indifferent
between the two matchings. Therefore, assumption 2 implies that all groups before gi are
matched with the same set of houses under µ and ν. Hence, ν is feasible when the turn
of gi arrives. Assumption 1 implies that all groups weakly prefer µ over all matchings
feasible when their turn arrives. Therefore, µ <gi ν which is a contradiction.
The next proposition addresses the question of the incentives of the students. First,
I will show that a student has an incentive to report truthfully her preferences over
matchings if all other students report truthfully.
Proposition 4. Truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of the GD mechanism.
Proof. Consider <∈ P and a student s ∈ S. If s lies such that the group of friends
associated with her preferences doesn’t change, her reported preferences will be used
with positive probability and the outcome will be dominated. If she reports as a friend a
student outside her true group of friends, the friendship won’t be reciprocal, she will be
allocated to the empty set and the outcome will be dominated. Finally, if she excludes
a true friend from her reported group of friends, this student will be allocated to the
empty set and because of assumption 2, the outcome will be dominated for s.
This proof shows why the step 0 is important in the procedure described above. It
ensures that a group of friends cannot be hijacked by another one. A student cannot
pretend to be part of another group of friends without their consent. Note that if a
member of a couple lies and reports herself as single, the other member of that couple
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has an incentive to lie also to avoid being allocated to the empty set. Hence, truthful
reporting of the preferences cannot be a dominant strategy and therefore the mechanism
is not strategy-proof.
Remark 2. In the sequential game, if the group of friends of a student has been reported
truthfully, it is a dominant strategy for her to report her preferences over matchings
truthfully.
This result seems appealing, especially when the mechanism designer already knows
the groups of friends. It might be true if these groups are used also for other purposes,
forcing students to report them truthfully. In this case, I could delete step 0 of the GD
mechanism and ask students to report their preferences before or after the ordering of
groups and the mechanism would be ex-post efficient and truth-telling would be a strictly
dominant strategy. This is usually the mechanism the literature refers to as the extension
of RSD to groups of agents.
However, in the general case, there is no reason why the mechanism should exclude
the reporting of groups of friends from students’ strategy space. As we will see in the next
proposition the students can indeed use the reports of groups strategically to improve
their distribution over the possible matchings. The example below shows that the mem-
bers of a group may have an incentive to split in smaller groups. Because lotteries are
taken over groups, splitting a group increases the number of draws of the groups. More-
over, the subgroup choosing first may be able to secure slots for the subgroups coming
afterward. The combination of these two features may help the group to stochastically
improve its allocation.
Proposition 5. The GD mechanism is not strategy-proof and truth-telling is not a Nash
equilibrium robust to coalitions of size 1.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that there exist a house allocation problem, <∈ P , gi ∈ G
and <′gi∈ Q|gi| such that: ΨGD(<′gi ,<G\gi) stochastically dominates ΨGD(<) and the
new strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
Consider a house allocation problem with two houses with two slots each, h1 and h2,
and four students. The students are composed of two couples, which have the following
preferences: g1: (h1, h1)  (h2, h2)  (h1, h2)
g2: (h1, h1)  (h2, h2)  (h1, h2)
Suppose that the groups report their preferences truthfully. Each group is allocated to
(h1, h1) with probability one half and to (h2, h2) with probability one half. However, if
g1 does not report itself as a group but as two singles who prefer h1 over h2, they will
5. The Random Serial Group Dictatorship Mechanism 73
be allocated to (h1, h1) with probability two third and to (h2, h2) with probability one
third. This last probability distribution stochastically dominates the first one. Besides,
the new reports form a Nash equilibrium.
This proposition highlights also the importance of the punishment procedure in step
0.
Corollary 1. Truth-telling is not a weak Nash-equilibrium of the mechanisms where
there is no punishment procedure in step 0 and where groups are defined as either:
• The sets of students who are connected through a chain of reciprocal friendships
• The sets of students who have the same preferences over matchings.
Proof. In the mechanism without the punishment procedure, the previous example still
works if one student of g1 reports h1  h2 and the other one tells the truth.
On the contrary, making the punishment procedure stricter and forcing the students
to report preferences in P doesn’t solves the problem. Finally, this counter example
works also for the sequential GD mechanisms.
Corollary 2. The sequential GD mechanism is not strategy-proof and truth-telling is not
a Nash equilibrium robust to coalitions of size 1.
Splitting groups is not the only incentive to lie coordinately for groups of people.
Students may also have an incentive to merge their groups of friends to get a better
outcome as the following example shows.
Example 12. Consider a house allocation problem with three houses with one slot each,
h1, h2 and h3 and three students. Students are singles and have the following preferences:
1 : h1  h2  h3 2 : h1  h3  h2 3 : h3  h1  h2
Suppose that the students report their preferences truthfully. Students 1 is allocated to
h1 with probability one half and to h2 with probability one half. Student 3 is allocated to
h3 with probability 5/6 and to h2 with probability 1/6. However, if 1 and 3 collude and
report themselves as a couple preferring (h1, h3) over (h2, h3) over the other matchings,
student 1 won’t change her distribution over houses and student 3 will be allocated to h3
with probability one. These strategies form a Nash equilibrium of the one shot game as
of the sequential one. Indeed, 3 cannot do better, and 2 gets the same outcome if she
breaks the coalition and kicks 3 out of the game, whereas if she doesn’t break the group,
she cannot achieve a better outcome by changing her reports.
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In this example, student 3 doesn’t get her first choice only in the draw where student
2 already chose it. Therefore, the preferences of students 1 and 3 are never conflicting
and they can form a stable coalition. Such incentive can also stem from the ordinally
inefficiency of RSD. Indeed, if two groups can improve their ex-ante allocation by ex-
changing some probabilities of allocation in some slots, they may be able to do so by
merging before the start of the mechanism and submit common preferences. However,
these coalitions may not verify the stability condition. This is for instance the case in
the example presented in the introduction of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
In general, it seems that the students need a lot of information to use profitably the
weak incentive properties of the GD mechanisms. In the next subsection, I will study this
point in greater details. I will derive sufficient conditions on the structure of the house
allocation problem and on students’ preferences so that these bad incentives disappear
when the market is big enough.
5.1 Truth-telling in Large Markets
In several real matching markets, even if the mechanism is not strategy-proof, it can
perform well in some markets because the incentives to lie disappear as the market
increases in size. There are many different manners to define a large market. In my
case, it could either have very large capacities qhi and a small number of houses or a
large number of houses but small capacities. On the students’ side, I face the same
problem. I could have a small number of very large groups or a very large number of
small groups. In the matching market literature most of the problems fit well to the first
solution with large capacities. It’s also simpler because students’ preferences stay the
same as the size of the market increases. Whereas if I add houses, markets with different
sizes have different preference profiles. Moreover, if I keep small capacities, I can built
a counterexample for any market size by repeatedly duplicating the counterexample of
proposition 5. It creates an artificial global market made of infinity many small markets.
In such a market, each group has still an incentive to lie on its composition to get a
better probability distribution over matchings.
Nevertheless, in our case, it makes less sense to let the houses’ capacities tend to
infinity. First of all, on the students’ side of the market, it seems natural to let the
number of groups tend to infinity and not the number of students per group. Apart from
the fact that reporting a close to infinite number of friends seems unrealistic, I supposed
that friends negotiate to agree on a common preference order. This hypothesis is less
realistic when there is a very large number of students in each group of friends. But if
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groups of friends are finite, it also makes more sense to have small capacities for houses.
If the sizes of the groups of friends were negligible compared to the sizes of the houses,
there may be few benefits for friends to be in the same house. If they end up in the same
house but in rooms far from each other, the positive externality may disappear. The
solution would be then to divide the big houses in smaller areas so that friends could live
in the same area of the house. But it would be equivalent to the case of an large number
of houses.
The counterexample constructed by duplicating the market presented in the proof of
proposition 5 shows that I need additional hypotheses to ensure that truth-telling is a
Nash equilibrium robust to coalitions of size one. In particular, the demand for slots in a
house desired by a group of friends must be high enough, even when this house is almost
full. Therefore, I will suppose that there are enough singles also desiring a slot in this
house.
Proposition 6. For N large enough, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium robust to coali-
tions of size one if for each group gi with more than two students, there are ki sets of
houses Hi,1, ...,Hi,ki with a total of qi slots such that:
1. gi prefers being allocated together in one of the Hi,j over all other matchings.
2. The number of singles preferring a slot in Hi,1, ...,Hi,ki over the rest, αi(N), is
such that N = o(αi(N)2) and qi = o( αi(N)
2
N ln(αi(N))).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for N large enough the students of a same group of
friends have a higher probability to be allocated together in one the Hi,j when they say
the truth than when they split. The proof is rather technical and can be found in the
appendix. The intuition why the strategies used in the proof of proposition 5 don’t work
is rather simple. If there are enough singles, when a group splits in two parts, the highest
ranked subgroup cannot block with high probability slots in one of the best houses for
the lowest ranked subgroup. The singles will fill these slots before the second subgroup
can make its choice.
Condition 1 ensures that for each group I am be able to separate H into a small set
of good houses and a big one of bad houses. The requirement on the group’ preferences
allows for two special cases. One in which ki = 1 and |Hi,1| = 1, the group prefers then to
be allocated together in one house. The other in which ki = 1 and Hi,1 = H, the group
prefers then to have all its members allocated rather than having one member matched
to ∅. In each case, the number of singles with similar preferences must be large enough
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in comparison to the number of groups and size of the set of good houses. Hi,j can be
interpreted as a meta-house to which the members of gi want to be allocated together. In
practice, Hi,j might be a campus with different dormitories or a dormitory separated in
different areas. In the case of refugees allocation, Hi,j might be a country with different
cities or a city with different accommodation centers. If µ allocate all members of gi
together in Hi,j and ν allocates them together in Hi,j′ , the order of preference between
them is not restricted. It is also true if none of these matchings allocate them together
in one of the Hi,j . The conditions stated in the previous proposition rules out markets
where the popular houses for couples and singles are different. Indeed, if a dormitory
has for example only double beds rooms, couples have a clear incentive to split. If the
first partner choose their most preferred double bed room, and nobody until the other
partner have an interest to choose the remaining slot in this room.
Corollary 3. For N large enough, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of the GD mech-
anism robust to coalitions of size one if the fraction of singles is bounded away from 0
and either:
• The number of rooms is smaller than N/ ln(N)2 and all rooms are desirable.
• There is a set of houses with less than N/ ln(N)2 rooms where all groups prefer
being allocated together rather than having one member outside.
The conditions presented in proposition 6 are not sufficient to ensure that truth-
telling is a Nash equilibrium robust to coalitions of size 2. Indeed, the counterexample
constructed by duplicating the markets presented in example 12 verify these conditions.
To ensure that the market is not a simple aggregation of small markets, I need some
sort of correlation in the preferences of students. However, there is no clear definition
of correlations as the groups are composed of different numbers of students. To do so,
I will use the restriction of the previous proposition and suppose that the collection of
meta-houses defined before must be the same for all groups of students.
Lemma 1. In the GD mechanism, no coalition formed of l merged groups of students is
stable if there are k sets of houses H1, ...,Hk with a total of q slots, such that:
1. All groups prefer being allocated together in one of the Hj over all other matchings.
2. For all k 6= k′, the number of singles preferring the houses in Hk over the houses
in H ′k, α(k, k′), is bigger than q.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that for N large enough, if l groups merge, one of them
has a higher probability to see all its members allocated together in one of the Hj when
she switches back to the truth. The intuition why the strategies used in the example
12 aren’t stable is the following. Under the given hypothesis, when two groups merge,
for some order, they won’t agree on how to allocate the slots that are still available.
Therefore, each group has an incentive to deviate from the first lie and not to report its
coalition partner as a friend. By doing so, it will allocate its partner to ∅ and will be able
to improve its allocation for the draw where there is a disagreement without changing
the allocation for the other draws.
These two conditions includes the cases described in corollary 3 with weaker restric-
tions on the number of singles and slots. If k = 1, there is a set of houses such that all
groups prefer to have all their members allocated in one of its slots rather than having
one member allocated outside. In this case, the condition 2 reduces to the requirement
that the number of singles is bigger than the number of slots in H1. If k > 1, the restric-
tions impose that the preferences of the singles over the houses in H1, ...,Hk are diverse
enough.
Proposition 7. Let r < 1. For N large enough, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium
of the GD mechanism robust to coalitions of size r ∗ α(N) if there are k sets of houses
H1, ...,Hk with a total of q slots such that:
1. All groups prefer being allocated together in one of the Hj over all other matchings.
2. The number of singles, α(N), is such that N = o(α(N)2) and q = o( α(N)
2
N ln(α(N))).
3. For all k 6= k′, the number of singles preferring the houses of Hk over those of H ′k,
α(k, k′), is bigger than q + l.
Proof. Let l ≤ r ∗ α(N) with r < 1. For N large enough, the number of singles not
colluding is such that N = o(α(N)2) and q = o( α(N)
2
N ln(α(N))). Therefore, proposition 6
ensures that all students of the same group report themselves as part of the same group.
In particular, all groups reported in the coalition must be the result of the merging of
true groups. Lemma 1 guarantees that all merged groups have an incentive to switch
back to the truth because among the α(k, k′) singles, the number not colluding is bigger
that q. Therefore, in large markets, telling the truth is a Nash equilibrium robust to size
l coalitions.
Corollary 4. Under the same hypotheses as proposition 7, truth-telling is a Nash equi-
librium of the sequential GD mechanism robust to coalitions of size r ∗ α(N).
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Proof. In the proof of proposition 6 and lemma 1, the groups’ strategies can actually
depend on the draw they received and on the choices of the preceding groups.
6 The Random Serial Bossy Mechanism
To address the shortcomings of the random serial group dictatorship mechanism identified
above, I propose a new mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof. This mechanism
can be seen as another natural extension of the random serial dictatorship to the domain
of preferences studied. As in the RSD, the lottery used by the mechanism designer
produces a priority order over students. When the turn of a student arrives, she is made
a full dictator again and can choose one of her preferred outcomes among the feasible
ones. The following mechanism implements this procedure as a direct mechanism. I will
call it the random serial bossy mechanism and denote it ψRSB.
Definition 13. The random serial bossy mechanism, ΨRSB, associates for each
profile of reported preferences, <∈ Q|S|, the outcome of the following algorithm:
• Step 0: Randomly draw a priority ordering of the students.
• Step 1: Consider the highest ranked student s1. Allocate the students of L(<s1) ac-
cording to one of its most preferred matchings. Reduce the set of feasible matchings
to those respecting these allocations.
• Step k: Consider the kth highest ranked student sk. If sk has been allocated in
an earlier step, move to step k + 1. Otherwise, allocate the students of L(<sk)
according to one of its most preferred matchings among the feasible ones. Reduce
further the set of feasible matchings to those respecting these allocations.
The procedure terminates when all students have been assigned.
As before, I will define a sequential RSB mechanism that will be easier to implement
in practice. In this mechanism, students don’t report their preferences but choose se-
quentially the allocation of all the students they care about. I will show that the results
of this section are also true for this sequential mechanism. For the same reason as for
the GD mechanism, the RSB mechanism is efficient in my set-up.
Proposition 8. The RSB mechanism is Pareto-efficient with respect to any reported
preference profile in P
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Proof. The proof is almost the same as the proof of proposition 3. Suppose by contra-
diction that there exist <∈ P , ν ∈ M and µ in the support of ΨSRB(<), such that ν
Pareto dominates µ. Let’s order the groups of friends g1, ..., gN according the draw of
their first member in one of the orderings that lead to µ. Definition 4 implies that there
is a group gi whose members strictly prefer ν over µ and such that all students of the
preceding groups are indifferent between the two matchings. Therefore, assumption 2
implies that all groups before gi are matched with the same set of houses under µ and
ν. Hence, ν is feasible when the turn of gi arrives. Assumption 1 implies that all groups
weakly prefer µ over all matchings feasible when their turn arrives. Therefore, µ <gi ν
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 9. The RSB mechanism is strategy-proof.
Proof. Consider <∈ P , student s ∈ S and <′∈ Q|S|. If s is ranked lower than any s′ such
that s ∈ L(<′s′), then s can only be weakly worse off by lying. Otherwise, the report that
s makes is irrelevant to the resulting allocation and s is indifferent between truth-telling
and lying. Thus, telling the truth sd-dominates any other reports.
As the GD mechanism, the RSB mechanism is a bossy mechanism: a student can
change the allocation of another student without changing its own. But contrary to
the GD mechanism, the RSB mechanism doesn’t ask for the consent of these students.
This is innocuous when students tell the truth because assumption 1 ensures that a
students wants only to allocate another student if they share the same preferences. But
if this assumption is slightly violated, it may create inefficiencies as the first student may
choose a Pareto dominated matching among the set of her most preferred matchings or a
matching that is not individually rational for all students. If I want to ensure the consent
of the people allocated, it would come at the expense of strategy-proofness, since student
s may decide to acquiesce to the lie of one of her friend to be allocated with her.
Contrary to the RSB mechanism, the GD mechanism uses a two-steps procedure,
where the priority ordering depends on information contained in the preferences. It
allows the students to affect the lottery with their reports, which creates incentives to
deviate from truth-telling. These incentives are not present in the RSB mechanism.
Proposition 10. Truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of the RSB mechanism robust to
coalitions of size one.
Proof. Consider <∈ P , a group gi ∈ G and <′∈ Q|gi| such that all members of the group
are strictly better off. Fix the order of the students and denote s1 the first student of
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gi. Because all other groups tell the truth, no student of gi has been allocated before
s1. Because all members of the coalition have the same preferences as s1, she can only
make them weakly worse off by reporting <′s1 independently of their reports. Thus, for
any order, misreporting can only make all members weakly worse off. Therefore, the
resulting distribution cannot strictly first order stochastically dominate the distribution
resulting from truth-telling.
But again, students have an incentive to jointly misreport their preferences. This
incentive comes from the bossiness of the mechanism and the fact that forming a bigger
group allows students to achieve a better position in the lottery. Since each member of a
group of friends has a draw in the lottery, larger groups are likely to choose earlier their
allocation than smaller groups.
Proposition 11. In any house allocation problem:
• Its is a dominant strategy for all students to report a larger group of friends
• Truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium robust to coalitions of size two if and only if for
all g ∈ G, once g has chosen its allocation, the remaining students agree on the
most preferred feasible matching.
Proof. Let N , H, S be a house allocation problem and <∈ P the preference profile of
the students. For all gi ∈ G, gi is weakly better off by submitting preferences <′gi where
the indifferences in <gi are resolved according to the preferences of s′ /∈ gi.
To prove the sufficient part of the second item, suppose that g1 and g2 contemplate to
form a coalition. Fix the order of the students. If g1 and g2 don’t choose first, both get
their most preferred matching given the choice of the first group. Therefore, a coalition
can only make them weakly worse off. If gi chooses first, to strictly improve the allocation
of gj , gi must change the number of seats chosen in one house. But assumption 2 implies
that it will be strictly worse off. To make up for this loss, gj must change the number of
seats chosen in one house in an order where it chooses first. Finally, the coalition can at
best exchange some of the orders in which they get their first choice and none of them
can be strictly better off.
To prove the necessity part of the second item, suppose that there is g1 ∈ G such that
when it chooses first, the remaining students don’t agree on the most preferred feasible
matching. There is a group g2 whose allocation strictly worsens when the order changes
from g1 first and g2 second to g1 first and g2 last. Therefore, if the two groups report
the deviation explained in the first paragraph, the allocation of the deviating coalition
will be strictly improved.
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Corollary 5. The previous propositions are also verified by the sequential RSB mecha-
nism.
Corollary 6. Under the assumptions described in lemma 1 or proposition 6 or 7, truth-
telling is not robust to coalitions of size two.
Proof. Because the number of singles preferring one of the most popular houses is bigger
than the capacity of this set of houses, the singles don’t agree on the most preferred
matching once a single has made her choice.
The deviation strategies are very robust. They form a new equilibrium in dominant
strategy. Even more problematic, any two groups can form a coalition and weakly im-
prove the allocation of their members for any realizations of the lottery. Therefore, the
information needed to implement this strategy is quasi null. In the sequential mechanism,
the groups don’t even need to know each other’s preferences. The first group chooses
its best matching and names any group as its direct follower. These incentives to merge
groups of friends appear in practice in virtually all house allocation problems of interest.
Some modification of this mechanism might mitigate the incentive to build coalitions.
A first solution would be to check that the submitted preference profile belongs to P.
However, such a test would be not implementable in practice due to the size of the
set. Another solution would be to add a punishment procedure, similar to the step 0
of the GD mechanism. A third solution would be to let random friend of sk choose the
allocation when sk’s turn arrives. It would incentivize groups of a coalition with partially
conflicting preferences to break it. The mechanism would lose its strategy-proofness, but
truth-telling would be still a Nash equilibrium robust to coalitions of size one. However,
example 13 shows that two groups might sill improve their allocation by building a stable
coalition, and that the incentive might still be stronger than in the GD mechanism.
Example 13. Consider once again the house allocation problem presented in example
12. There are three houses with one slot each, h1, h2 and h3 and three students. Students
are singles and have the following preferences:
1 : h1  h2  h3 2 : h1  h3  h2 3 : h3  h1  h2
In the GD mechanism only (1, 3) had an incentive to lie. In the RSB mechanism without
a punishment procedure, (1, 2) and (2, 3) also have an incentive to report themselves as
a couple. The random allocation when they tell the truth is the same as before:
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h1 h2 h3
1: 1/2 1/2 0
2: 1/2 1/3 1/6
3: 0 1/6 5/6
If 1 and 3 report themselves as a couple with the following preferences (1, 3) : (h1, h3) 
(h2, h3), the resulting random allocation is the following:
h1 h2 h3
1: 2/3 1/3 0
2: 1/3 2/3 0
3: 0 0 1
The new random assignment is strictly better for both of them. Contrary to the coalitions
(1, 2) and (2, 3), the coalition (1, 3) is stable even if we add a punishment procedure or if
the friends of a student choose her allocation. Besides, the incentive to lie is even greater
than in the GD mechanism.
7 Conclusion
This paper extends the classical house allocation problem to a restrictive case of non-
selfish agents. An agent can express preferences over another student’s allocation only if
they share the same preferences over matchings. The focus is set on the random serial
dictatorship and on how it can accommodate this set-up.
Modifying this mechanism to allow agents to form a group and to participate as such
in a random serial dictatorship is a natural extension. It has already been mentioned in
the literature, but never analyzed in detail. In particular, the fact that groups have to
be reported to the mechanism has been overlooked. I show that this procedure, which
I call the random serial group dictatorship, is efficient and that truth-telling is a Nash
equilibrium of the induced game. However, this last property relies on a punishment
procedure whose implementation might be questioned. Moreover, the mechanism in-
centivizes students to collectively lie to improve their allocation. But I show that these
incentive problems disappear in large markets if there is enough competition for the most
preferred houses. Therefore, they may be irrelevant in practice.
I also present a new mechanism, which pushes the power of the dictator to the limit
and allows her to select the set of matchings she likes the most. This mechanism has
stronger incentive properties when only agents with the same preferences can collectively
deviate. However, increasing the number of agents he cares about is a weakly dominant
strategy for all students and is a profitable deviation for two agents in almost all markets
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of interest. This could offset its first advantage over the random serial group dictatorship
and could explain the large prevalence of the latter in real life.
This kind of externalities occurs in several matching markets. The market for stu-
dents’ accommodation used throughout the paper is a good illustrative example. Another
relevant case is the allocation of asylum-seeker to different regions of a larger geographic
area. The European Union is trying to reform its asylum policy and to create quotas of
refugees for each of its members. This would require an allocation mechanism. But a
country offering asylum to someone has to offer also asylum to his family. The two prob-
lems are then equivalent if we replace the groups of friends by asylum-seekers’ families
and houses by the member states or smaller geographic areas. Because the family ties
are in this case often difficult to prove, the reporting of the groups would be a relevant
step of this mechanism. Besides, the number of participants and the popularity of a few
geographic regions likely guaranty that the conditions for the large market results hold.
This would support the application of the random serial group dictatorship.
A lot of questions remain open and would require further investigations. The paper
highlights the importance of the procedure punishing non consistant reports and the
lottery ordering the students. These two aspects open the door to new mechanisms that
could outperform those presented here. Finally, it would be interesting to study how
the definition of large market of this paper relates to the more classic ones and how
envyfreeness can be extended beyond the equal treatment of equal, which is obviously
verified here.
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8 Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1. Let us consider an environment with five students 1, 2, 3, 4,
5 and three houses, h1, h2 and h3 with capacities q1 = 2, q2 = 2 and q3 = 1. There
are two couples {1, 2} and {3, 4} and a single 5. The agents’ preferences are given by:
(1, 2) : (h2, h2)  (h1, h3) ∼ (h3, h1)  (h2, h3) ∼ (h3, h2)
(3, 4) : (h1, h1)  (h2, h2)  (h1, h2) ∼ (h1, h2)  (h1, h3) ∼ (h1, h3)
5 : h1  h2  h3
I will show that the following reports form a Nash equilibrium:
1, 2: h2  h1  h3 3, 4, 5: h1  h2  h3
Reporting h1  h2  h3 is a best reply for 5 because she has no externality and
truthful report is then a dominant strategy.
Reporting h1  h2  h3 is a best reply for 3 and 4. It leads to the follow-
ing distribution over matchings: P (h1, h1) = 1/3, P (h1, h2) = P (h2, h1) = 2/15 and
P (h1, h3) = P (h3, h1) = 1/5. If one of them reports h3 before h1 or h2, for some lot-
tery outcomes, she will receive h3 instead of h1 or h2. So the probability to end up in
(h1, h1), (h2, h2) or (h1, h2) will decrease. The resulting distribution will be stochasti-
cally dominated. If 3 exchanges h1 and h2, the outcome is equivalent to the previous
one where I permute h1 and h2 as well as the players (1, 2) and (5, 4). The probability
that 3 or 4 ends up in h3 stays the same, the probability to end up in (h1, h1) is 1/15,
and P (h1, h2) = P (h2, h1) = 2/15. Therefore, the resulting distribution is stochastically
dominated by the original one.
Reporting h2  h1  h3 is a best reply for 1 and 2. It leads to the following
distribution over matchings: P (h2, h2) = 3/5 and P (h2, h3) = P (h3, h2) = 1/5. Because
they never get h1, exchanging it with h3 doesn’t change the distribution. If one of them
reports h3 first, she will with probability one end up in h3 and the outcome will be
stochastically dominated. If 1 reports h1  h2  h3, the probability to end up in (h2, h2)
is 1/5, P (h1, h3) = 1/10 and P (h3, h1) = 0. Therefore, the resulting distribution is
stochastically dominated by the original one.
But if I consider the order (5, 3, 4, 1, 2), the resulting matching µ ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5)) =
(h2, h3, h1, h2, h1) is strictly dominated by µ′ ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5)) = (h1, h3, h2, h2, h1).
Proof. Proposition 2. Here, the strategies consist of the choice of a house for each
history of the game, i.e. for each lottery outcome and choice of the preceding students.
A backward induction shows that for each lottery outcome there is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. I will describe the one following the lottery outcome 1, 3, 2, 5, 4. The
first thing to notice is that if 1 chooses h2, 3 will also choose h2 because her partner 4 is
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so low ranked that she wont succeed to secure a place in their preferred house h1. Indeed,
when 1 chooses h2, if 3 chooses h1, 2 will choose h2, 5 will choose h1 and 4 will end up
in h3. Hence, (3, 4) will be assigned to (h1, h3). Whereas if 3 chooses h2, 2 will choose
h1, 5 will choose h1, and 4 will end up in h3. Hence, (3, 4) will be assigned to (h2, h3)
and (1, 2) to (h2, h1). On the other hand, if 1 chooses h1, 3 will choose h2, 2 will choose
h1. Hence, (1, 2) will end up with (h1, h1) and (3, 4) with (h2, h2). This last matching is
better for 1 so it will be the equilibrium matching.
I will first show proposition 6 with stronger assumptions and generalize the result
afterwards. I will first suppose that:
Assumption 3. For N big enough:
1. There is a house h1 with max
i∈GN
|gi| ≤ qh1 such that all groups prefer being together
in this house over all other alternatives.
2. There is α > 0 such that the fraction of singles α(N)/N ≥ α and qh1 = o( α(N)ln(α(N)))
Proof. Lemma 1. I want to prove that for N large enough, the students of a same group
of friends have a higher probability to be allocated to their top choice when they say the
truth than when they split and report then selves in different groups.
Consider a group g who splits in l ∈ {2, ..|g|} groups {g1, ..., gl} which report them-
selves as part of l groups {g11 ∪ g1, ..., gll ∪ gl}. Fix the order of all other reported groups
O−1. I will denote kO−1(|g|) the biggest draw such that there are |g| free slots in h1. If g
switches back to the truth, {g11, ..., gll} will be allocated to ∅ because of step 0 and the
probability for all students of g to end up in h1 is:
PT (h1) =
∑
O−1
PT (h1 | O−1) ∗ P (O−1)
=
∑
O−1
kO−1(|g|)
N − l + 1 ∗ P (O−1)
If g sticks to her lie, the strategy that maximizes the chance of all students of g to be
allocated together in h1 is for {g11∪g1, ..., gll∪gl} to rank allocations where the students
of gi end all in h1 in the first position. The probability for g to end up in h1 is then:
PL(h1) =
∑
O−1
PL(h1 | O−1) ∗ P (O−1)
PL(h1 | O−1) =P ({g1 ∈ h1} ∩ ... ∩ {gl ∈ h1}|O−1)
The allocation of rank in the algorithm is equivalent to the following allocation of
rank: first randomly pick O−1, then randomly pick {r1, ..., rl} ∈ {1, ..., N − l + 1} with
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replacement and assign all gii∪gi and gjj ∪gj such that ri = rj , in a random order in the
rthi position in O−1. If all gi end up in h1, min{ri} ≤ kO−1(|g|). Otherwise, there are at
most |g| − 1 slots left in h1 when the turn of the first group arrives. Therefore, there will
be not enough slots left for the other ones when they have to choose later on. It must
also be that max{ri} ≤ SO−1(|g|), the rank of the (qh − |g|)th single in O−1. Otherwise,
there are not enough slots left when the turn of the last group arrives. Therefore, I can
write:
PL(h1 | O−1) ≤
(
SO−1(|g|)
N − l + 1
)l1− (1− kO−1(|g|)
SO−1(|g|)
)l
≤ kO−1(|g|) ∗ l ∗
SO−1(|g|)l−1
(N − l + 1)l
The last inequality comes from the factorization of an− bn and kO−1(|g|) ≤ SO−1(|g|). If
splitting the groups stochastically dominates truth-telling:
PT (h1)− PL(h1) ≤ 0∑
O−1
kO−1(|g|)
N − l + 1
(
1− l
(
SO−1(|g|)
N − l + 1
)l−1)
∗ P (O−1) ≤ 0
∑
O−1|1−l
(
SO−1 (|g|)
N−l+1
)l−1
≥L(N)
L(N) ∗ P (O−1)−
∑
O−1|1−l
(
SO−1 (|g|)
N−l+1
)l−1
<L(N)
(l − 1) ∗ P (O−1) ≤ 0
P
O−1 | SO−1(|g|) ≤ (1− L(N)l
) 1
l−1
(N − l + 1)
−
l − 1
L(N)P
O−1 | SO−1(|g|) > (1− L(N)l
) 1
l−1
(N − l + 1)
 ≤ 0 (1)
Where L(N) ∈ [0; 1). Moreover:
P
(
O−1 | SO−1(|g|) > f(N)
) ≤ P (O−1 | ∃ less than qh − |g| singles before rank f(N))
Define the set of events Ak as the set of all O−1 such that there are k singles before rank
f(N) when there are N groups and α(N) singles. If f(N)− k > N −α(N) or α(N) < k,
I have #(Ak) = 0. If k ≤ 1:
#(Ak) =
(
α(N)
k
)
∗
(
N − α(N)
f(N)− k
)
∗ f(N)! ∗ (N − f(N))!
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P (Ak) =
1
N ! ∗
(α(N))!
k!(α(N)− k)! ∗
(N − α(N))!
(f(N)− k)!(N − α(N)− f(N) + k)! ∗ f(N)! ∗ (N − f(N))!
=α(N) · · · (α(N)− k + 1)
k! ∗
(N − α(N)) · · · (N − α(N)− f(N) + k + 1)
N · · · (N − f(N) + 1)
∗ f(N) · · · (f(N)− k + 1)
≤1
k
(
α(N) ∗ f(N)
N − m¯(N)
)k ( N − m¯(N)
N + 1−
¯
m(N)
)
¯
m(N)
Where m¯(N) = max{α(N), f(N)} and
¯
m(N) = min{α(N), f(N)}. Besides, m¯(N) +
¯
m(N) = α(N) + f(N). The formula extends to k = 0 if the first term is replaced by 1.
In the case considered here, the number of groups is N − l, the number of remaining
singles α(N − l) and the limit rank f(N) = (1−L(N)l )
1
l−1 (N − l + 1). Because l ≥ 2,
I can pick L(N) ≥  > 0 such that (1−L(N)l )
1
l−1 (N − l + 1) = α(N−l)2 . It implies that
¯
m(N) = α(N − l)/2, m¯(N) = α(N − l) and therefore:
l − 1
L(N) ∗ qh ∗ P (Aqh) =
l − 1
L(N)e
qh ln
(
α(N−l)2
2(N−l−α(N−l))
)
−α(N−l)2 ln
(
1+ α(N−l)+22(N−l−α(N−l))
)
Which goes to 0 asN goes to +∞ because l ≤ qh = o(N), qh = o( α(N)ln(α(N))) and α(N)/N ≥
α > 0. Moreover, for N big enough, it is increasing in qh and finally:
P (O−1 | ∃ less than qh singles before rank f(N)) =
qh−1∑
k=0
P (Ak) < qh ∗ P (Aqh)
l − 1
L(N)P
O−1 | SO−1(|g|) > (1− L(N)l
) 1
l−1
(N − l + 1)
 −−−−→
N→∞
0
P
O−1 | S|g|O−1 ≤
(1− L(N)
l
) 1
l−1
(N − l + 1)
 −−−−→
N→∞
1
Which contradicts (1).
I can easily generalize this proof to the conditions presented in proposition 6 by
replacing kO−1(|g|) by the last draw such that there are |g| slots left in one of the Hk and
replace qh1 by the sum of the capacities in H1, ...,HK . The proof is also still valid in the
cases where the proportion of singles goes to 0 as long as α(N)2/N goes to infinity and
qh = o( α(N)
2
N ln(α(N))).
Proof. Lemma 1. I keep the same notations as in the proof of proposition 6. The only
change is that l groups {g1, ...gl}, with |g1| ≤ ... ≤ |gl|, merged to form a group g of size∑
i |gi|. If gi switches back to the truth all the other groups will be allocated to ∅ because
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of the punishment procedure. The probability for gi to be allocated to h1 is therefore:
PT (gi ∈ h1 | O−1) = kO−1(|gi|)
N − l + 1
If they all stick to their lie and merge, in the best case, if they have a draw be-
low kO−1(
∑
i |gi|) they all end up in h1. For each draw between kO−1(
∑
i |gi|) and
kO−1(
∑l−1
i=1 |gi|), at most l− 1 of them end up in h1. If their draw is between kO−1(|g2|+
|g1|) and kO−1(|g1|), g1 ends up alone in h1. Therefore:∑
i
PL(gi ∈ h1 | O−1) ≤l ∗ kO−1(
∑
i |gi|)
N − l + 1 +
l−1∑
i=1
i ∗ kO−1(
∑i
j=1 |gj |)− kO−1(
∑i+1
j=1 |gj |)
N − l + 1
≤
l∑
i=1
kO−1(
∑i
j=1 |gj |)
N − l + 1
If no group wants to switch back to the truth:∑
O−1
∑
i
(
kO−1(|gi|)
N − l + 1 −
kO−1(
∑i
j=1 |gj |)
N − l + 1
)
P (O−1) ≤0
∑
i
∑
O−1
kO−1(|gi|)− kO−1( i∑
j=1
|gj |)
P (O−1) ≤0
∀i ≥ 2 : P
O−1 | kO−1(|gi|) > kO−1( i∑
j=1
|gj |)
 =0 (2)
Because |gi| ≤∑ij=1 |gj | and kO−1(i+ 1) ≤ kO−1(i).
In particular, if there are s ≥ 2 singles among the l groups:
P
(
O−1 | kO−1(1) > kO−1(s)
)
= 0
If s > qh1 , it is impossible because kO−1(1) ≥ 1 > 0 = kO−1(s). Otherwise,
P
(
O−1 | kO−1(1) > kO−1(s)
) ≥ P (∃ a single in rank kO−1(s))
Besides, there must be at least α(N − l) − qh + s = α(N) − qh singles after kO−1(s).
Therefore:
P (∃ a single in rank in kO−1(s)) ≥
∑
k
α(N)− qh
N − l − k P (k = kO−1(s)) ≥
α(N)− qh
N − l
which is strictly positive. If there is less than one single in the group, I can rewrite the
same lines with |g1| instead of 1 and |g1| + |g2| instead of s. This contradicts (2). The
proof is valid as long as α(N) > qh.
I now extend the proof to the assumptions presented in lemma 1. To do so, I first
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replace kO−1(
∑i
j=1 |gj |)) by kO−1(|g1|, ..., |gi|), the last draw such that each g1, ...gi can
end up in of the Hk, and qh by
∑
k qHk . A group has an interest to switch back to the
truth as soon as there is an order such that for one i ≤ l, kO−1(|g1|, ..., |gi|) < kO−1(|gi|).
If there are s ≥ 2 singles among the l groups, P (O−1 | kO−1(1) > kO−1(1, ..., 1)) =
0. But as before, because α(N) > q, with positive probability, a single is in position
kO−1(1, ..., 1) and kO−1(1) > kO−1(1, ..., 1). So there must be less than one single among
the l groups.
If there is an order such that kO−1(|g1|, |g2|) ≤ kO−1(|g2|+1). Because α(N) > q, there
is an order keeping the same kO−1(|g1|, |g2|)−1 first groups with a single in the following
rank. For this order, there is a Hk with |g2| free slots after this single. Therefore, for all
orders, all Hk have less than |g2| slots free in kO−1(|g1|, |g2|).
Moreover, if for some order kO−1(|g1|, |g2|) = kO−1(|g2|, |g2|). Because α(N) > q, there
is an order keeping the same kO−1(|g1|, |g2|)−1 first groups with a single in the following
rank. For this order, there is a Hk with |g2| free slots after this single. Therefore, for
all orders, there exists a unique Hk with more than |g2| free slots in kO−1(|g1|, |g2|)). In
particular, |g1| < |g2|.
For all order there is H1 is the only set of houses with |g2| free slots in kO−1(|g1|, |g2|).
All other Hk have less than |g2| − 1 slots and at least one have more than |g1| slots.
Because α(N) > q, there is an order keeping the same kO−1(|g1|, |g2|) − 1 first groups
with a single in the following rank. All the remaining singles must prefer one slot in H1
over all slots remaining in the Hk. This contradicts item 2.
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Chapter III
University Entrance Test and
High Schools Segregation
Based on Foucart and Frys (2018).
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to study how the design of entrance university exams can be used
to influence the composition of high schools and universities, and ultimately a country’s
ability to educate students and select them in higher education. We identify situations
in which students face a trade-off between benefiting from peer effects in high school
and increasing their chance of getting into a prestigious institution of higher education.
In particular, if a segregated high school market is inefficient, forbidding comparison
of performance across high schools can restore efficiency. This policy may provide an
incentive based substitute to quotas policies in school choice problems. For desegregation
to happen, tests must be sufficiently precise for the high types to be willing to match
with the low types and lose some peer effects. It must also be sufficiently noisy for the
low types to accept a match with a high type, and lower her chance to be selected. In
addition, we show that forbidding comparison of performance across high schools doesn’t
always hurt the precision of the selection of students in higher education. If the available
testing technology is noisy or if the peer effects for high type students are low, selecting
the best students of each school maximizes the peer effects in high schools and picks
more often the best students than when comparison is also made across schools.
Across countries there are different ways to select the high school students who attend
the best universities. For the purpose of this introduction, we cluster them in three
groups. In centralized tests, all the students who compete for the same university’s slots
write the same exam at the same time and are accepted to university solely according
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to their score in this test. Such entrance university exams are used for example in
China, Turkey, Korea and France. On the other side of the spectrum are the purely
decentralized tests, where the students competing for the same university’s slots write
exams in their high schools and are accepted to university not solely according to their
test score but also according to their high school’s reputation, the one of the professor
who wrote their recommendation letter, or their results in external certifications. Such
entrance university exams are widely used in Anglo-Saxon countries but also in private
universities in other parts of the world. Our main focus in this paper is on intermediate
systems, in which students pass tests in their respective high school but are accepted
according only to their rankings within schools. Such a selection is in place in Texas and
was also recently introduced in some universities in France. The programs were openly
designed in order to desegregate universities, but the effect on the composition of high
schools only became a subject of study after the laws were voted (Cullen et al., 2013;
Estevan et al., 2017).
We build a model to understand the impact of such mechanisms on school choice, the
ability of a country to select the best students, but also to make the most of the peer
effects in secondary education. We make two major assumptions through the paper.
First, we assume that peer effects in high school exist, are important and cannot be
internalized by direct utility transfers. Peer effects imply that the educative achievement
of a student depends positively on the level of her high school peers (Hoxby, 2000; Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). In particular, we assume that the benefits from peer effects
display decreasing differences (Summers and Wolfe, 1977; Kang, 2007). This implies that
low ability students benefit the most from being surrounded by high ability students.
We know at least since Becker (1973) that, if utility is not perfectly transferable within
groups, decreasing differences may lead to inefficient matching. In our framework, we can
derive from Legros and Newman (2007) that the driving force behind such inefficiency
is the impossibility for low-ability students to compensate the high ability ones - for
instance using monetary transfers - for joining their group.1
Second, we assume that there exists an intrinsic benefit from joining a prestigious
institution. In the spirit of Spence (1973), being accepted in a good university can be
interpreted as a signal of high ability. In the US context, Zimmerman (2014) shows that
the marginal admission yields earning gains for 22% between 8 and 14 years after high
school completion.
1This restriction can be related to the borrowing constraint studied by Fernandez and Gali (1999), in
particular if we assume ability to be positively correlated with socio-economic background.
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In centralized tests, what matters the most is one’s absolute individual level of edu-
cation. Hence, students of high ability have no incentive to mix with the other ones and
one can expect the high school market to be segregated. In fully decentralized tests, if
what matters is a combination of individual achievements and high school reputation,
the effect is further exacerbated. In intermediate tests, however, students may face the
following trade-off: joining a school populated by privileged students allows to benefit
from peer effects, but if university admission depends on ranking within a high school,
it may be strategic to join one populated by students with non-privileged background.
Such a strategic effect has been measured in the state of Texas by Cullen et al. (2013)
and Estevan et al. (2017). Since 1997, this state has guaranteed school admission to
any in-state public higher education institution, including the flagships, to all students
in the top 10% of their high school.2 Students with high ability may hence be willing
to implicitly trade their peer effects against increased probability of being accepted in a
privileged institution.
Besides the case of Texas, features of this intermediate system are present in Germany
and France. In Germany, for the most demanded fields of study, a central clearinghouse
reserves 20% of the university slots for students who received the best Abitur grade, the
university entrance exam (Braun et al., 2010). This exam is different across the different
German states and until 2005 was even different across high schools in most of the states.
From 2005 on, some of the states introduced centralized tests, sometimes one subject at
a time each year. However, in most of the states, the exam is only a part of the final
grade (1/3 in Berlin, Bayern, Baden-wurtenberg, Hessen, Hamburg and Bremen)3 which
consists for the other part of the grades of the last two years in high school. Moreover,
even the centralized abitur are graded in a decentralized way. It is well documented
that the overall abitur grade is largely influenced by a frame-of-reference: a student with
the same ability would get a better grade in a school of lower average ability (see for
instance Neumann et al., 2011) and this effect is more important when the share of the
decentralized grade is more important (Schwerdt and Woessmann, 2017).
In France, students pass a centralized exam at the end of high school called the
baccalaureat. The exam and grading are fully centralized and therefore not subject to
frame-of-reference effects. Access to higher education is granted for students who passed
the exam. In general, the final grade doesn’t enter the selection process of the most
prestigious institutions of higher education. However, each student who is in the best
10% of her high school has priority over the others to enter some reserved slots at selective
2Texas House Bill 588
3Qualificationphase vs Abiturpruefung
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universities. The stated objective of this law4 was to increase diversity in university,
and promote “republican elitism”, the idea that anyone could succeed by thriving in
high schools, regardless of one’s background. Critics of the system, however, argue
that it actually favors socially privileged students, as it is not combined with any social
background criterion.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly relate our work to
the literature in Section 2. The basic setup is presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives
the equilibriums matchings in high schools. Section 5 studies the optimal decision of a
central planner. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature Overview
A model showing that a system similar to Texas’ “top 10 percent” can lead to high school
desegregation is provided in Section 2 of Estevan et al. (2017). In their model, students’
abilities are fixed and determine their valuations of the university whose admission pro-
cess is deterministic. High schools are segregated at the beginning of the game and good
students move at a cost to a bad high school to enter university. Our approach differs in
many dimensions: our high school market is smaller, modeled as a one sided matching
market with fixed capacities for high schools and we focus on the design of the tests, not
only on their (de)centralized nature. Besides, students’ abilities display peer effects and
while the university valuation is common to all students, the university entrance test is
random.
Our paper also relates to a literature on the role of decentralized matching and
education, going back at least to Benabou (1996) and Durlauf (1996), and showing that
a free market may lead to too much segregation. Pre-matching investment has been
studied among others by Hopkins (2012) and Hoppe et al. (2009). Our contribution is
also related to Gall et al. (2015), who study investment pre-college with affirmative action
and a local re-match policy. To the best of our knowledge, however, none of these paper
specifically study the effect of test designs. The role of institutions on decentralized
matching has been studied in a very different context by Booth and Coles (2010), on
the role of romance in marriage markets. Finally, the strategic effects we suggest have
also been measured in the presence of different “tracks” in high schools, with students
strategically choosing a school in which they could be on the good track, at the cost of
the other students of the school being of “lower” background (De Bartolome, 1990).
4Dispositif meilleurs bacheliers, article L.612.3.1 of the code of education.
5“Comment les meilleurs bacheliers sont poussés en prépa”, Challenges, March 1, 2013.
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3 The Model
The economy is composed of four students I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and two institutes of higher
education U = {u, o}, the university u and the outside option o which have two slots
each. Two students are of high ability θh whereas the two others are of low ability θl with
θh > θl. We call θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) the vector of abilities of the students and qo = qu = 2
the capacities of the university and the outside option. Finally there is a test designer
maximizing its objective function by choosing the university entrance exam. The type θ
is observable to the students but no to the test designer who has a uniform prior over
the possible θ.
3.1 Matching
Before passing the test, students form pairs to acquire a level of education. We call these
pairs high schools and denote µ the one sided matching function representing these pairs.
Hence, µ(i) denotes the student matched with student i. Education displays peer effects,
so that the level of education of a student i, ei, is a function of her type, θi, and of the
type of her match, θµ(i). We denote by e the vector of education. For each student a test
implemented by the test designer results in a two sided matching η and a probability of
entering university, P (η(i) = u) = pi(e, µ), function of the vector of education and of
the repartition in high schools. Students have additively separable utilities and value the
level of education acquired in high school as well as the possibility to secure a place at
the university. The utility function of student i can then be written as
ui = pi(e, µ).piu + v(ei)
piu is the monetary value of entering university and v(·) is the valuation function of the
student’s education. We suppose that v(·) and piu are constant across individuals, and
that v(·) is increasing and concave. We normalize the value of the outside option to 0.
v(e) can be interpreted either as the intrinsic value of education or as the increase in
productivity of a student who acquired a level of education e in high school in comparison
to a student with no education and hence can also have a monetary interpretation.
The separability assumption is relatively restrictive. In particular, it means that the
additional utility of being accepted in university for a student is independent of her
level of education in high school. This will for instance not be verified if firms can screen
students who attended university through a variable correlated to their levels of education
in high school, or if the tuition fees are a function of similar variables.
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The timing is the following. First, the test designer publicly announces which test she
commits herself to using later on. Then, students form two stable pairs, education levels
realize and the test designer learns who is matched with whom (but not their ability or
education). Finally, the test takes place, students are selected and utilities are realized.
3.2 Testing technology
We restrict the set of possible tests to two elements. The first test is centralized: all
students pass the same exam and the two best performing students are selected. It
models the tests used in China, Turkey, Korea and Japan, but also tests based on external
certifications. The probability of student i entering university, pci (e) = pc(ei, e−i), is
derivable, strictly increasing in ei, strictly decreasing and symmetric in e−i and such that∑
i p
c
i (e) = 2. It implies that this test is fair, i.e. that if e = λ.(1, 1, 1, 1) , pci (e) = 1/2
for all i. The second possible test is partially decentralized: students from the same high
schools write the same test and the best of each high school is selected by the university.
The probability of student i entering university, pdi (e) = pd(ei, eµ(i)), is derivable, strictly
increasing in ei, strictly decreasing in eµ(i) and such that pd(ei, eµ(i)) + pd(eµ(i), ei) = 1.
It also implies that this test is fair, i.e. that if e = λ.(1, 1, 1, 1), pdi (e) = 1/2. Moreover
to be able to disentangle the effects of the design of the test from the effects of its
precision, we suppose that the testing technology is the same for the two tests. The
only difference between the two tests are their perimeter (who takes the same exam)
and how the test scores are used to select students. The marginal probability that a
student with education e is better ranked than a student of education e′ is the same in
both test. Therefore, in partially decentralized tests, it makes no difference if students
from two different high schools take the same test or not. Hence, this test can model
the selection system in place in Texas as well as the French desegregation program. We
provide in Appendix an example of such test with all the properties described above. We
also discuss in appendix how to extend the model to the test in place in Germany where
the students pass different tests and the two best performers overall are selected, as well
as to the test where the university is completely free to choose its students.6
6If we want to model the tests in place in Germany the probability of being taken would not be
symmetric in e−i. If we define the test as the sum of the vector of education levels and a positively
correlated white noise for those who take the same exam, the probability of being taken depends on µ.
It will be “more decreasing” in eµi than in the others’ education. see Appendix
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3.3 Peer effects
The partner with whom a student is matched in a high school pins down her level of
education though the function e(θi, θµ(i)), where:
e(θh, θl) = θh
e(θh, θh) = θh + α
e(θl, θl) = θl
e(θl, θh) = θl + β
Education displays therefore peer effects. We assume that β > α > 0, so that the
outcome of the match displays decreasing differences. The peer effects are such that the
impact of being matched with a high type is higher for low type students than for high
type students. This is equivalent to saying that students’ types are strategic complements
or that the education function is submodular. We also assume that θl + β < θh, so that
the types are persistent or that a low ability student matched with a high ability one
remains of lower ability. Knowing how the test uses their level of education and the
composition of high schools to select who will attend university, students form stable
pairs. A student is free to pair with anyone she likes, as long as the other agrees to be
matched with her and cannot convince another student to form another school instead.
Crucially, we assume utilities to be non-transferable, so that a low ability student cannot
compensate a high ability one for joining the same school.
4 Equilibrium matchings
We focus on the case where the test designer can choose only between the two types of
test described in Section 3. We proceed backward and study first the different equilibria
arising in the upstream matching market as a function of the test implemented. We use
these results in Section 5 to study which of the two tests should the designer choose as
a function of her objective.
Because the four players have only two types, the game can induce only two feasible
matchings, a negative assortative matching and a positive assortative matching. The
negative assortative matching, µN , is the matching where every high type is matched
with a low type. The positive assortative matching, µP , is the matching where the
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students of the same types are matched together. Formally we have:µN (θl) = θhµN (θh) = θl
µP (θl) = θlµP (θh) = θh
They respectively give rise to the levels of education:e(θl, µN ) = θl + βe(θh, µN ) = θh
e(θl, µP ) = θle(θh, µP ) = θh + α
The decreasing differences hypothesis implies that µN leads to a higher average level
of education and is better in terms of education for the low type whereas µP is better in
terms of education for the high type.
Lemma 1. If the exam is centralized, the unique equilibrium is a positive assortative
matching, where high schools are segregated.
The formal proof is in Appendix. When the exam is centralized, the high types
refuse to be matched with a low type, because it both lowers their education level and
their chance of going to university. Indeed, in the positive assortative matching, a high
type student has the same education as the other high type student, and much higher
education than the low type ones. In the negative assortative matching, she still has
the same education as the other high type student – albeit lower than under positive
assortative matching – but the gap with the low type students is smaller. As the exam
is centralized, the probability of a high type being selected is thus lower. The result is
independent of the decreasing differences assumption: it is enough that some peer effects
exist for positive assortative matching to be the unique equilibrium. However, with
decreasing differences, the average level of education is lower in the stable equilibrium
matching than in the other possible matching.
Lemma 2. If the exam is partially decentralized, there exists p¯i and
¯
pi, with p¯i >
¯
pi >
0, such that negative assortative matching is the unique equilibrium if piu ∈ [¯pi; p¯i] and
positive assortative matching is the unique equilibrium otherwise.
The formal proof and the definition of the threshold values are in Appendix. When
the university selects the best student of each school and the value of going to university
is very high, i.e. piu > p¯i, the only equilibrium is positive assortative matching as for the
centralized test. Because the value of education is comparatively small, the low types
do not want to reduce their chance to go to university by competing with a high type
in the same high school in exchange for a higher education. When the value of going
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pi
pi p¯i
pd(θh, θl + β) = 3/4
No SegregationSegregation Segregation
pi
pi p¯i
pd(θh, θl + β) = 1
No SegregationSeg. Segregation
pi
pi p¯i
pd(θh, θl + β) = 2/3
Segregation No Segregation
Figure 1: Equilibria of the decentralized test, v(e) = e; α = 1, β = 3.
to university is very low, i.e.
¯
pi > piu, the only equilibrium is also positive assortative
matching. Here contrary to the first case, because the value of education is comparatively
high, the high types do not want to lower their level of education in exchange for a
higher probability of going to university. For the intermediate case, when the value of
going to university is between p¯i and
¯
pi, the good types are ready to exchange with the
bad types probabilities of getting into university against education, and the negative
assortative matching is stable. To do comparative statics, we normalize θl = 0 and
v(0) = 0. When θh rises, i.e. when the difference between the types increases, or when
pd(θh, θl + β) increases, i.e. when the precision of the test increases, the interval where
negative assortative matching is the equilibrium shifts to the left. When α rises,
¯
pi rises
whereas p¯i stays constant, and when β rises, the interval shifts to the right. In the limit
when the decreasing differences hypothesis is maximal, i.e. when α ≈ 0 and β ≈ θh − θl,
the interval is the whole positive real line. On the contrary, if the decreasing differences
hypothesis is very small, i.e. α ≈ β, the length of the interval is bounded below by a
positive amount, as long as the peer effects are strictly positive (α > 0) and the function
v(·) is strictly concave.
We illustrate the role of the precision of the test in Figure 1. In a decentralized
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test, when matching is positive assortative, the opponent of each student is of identical
ability. Therefore, the assumption on the testing technology implies that the probability
of being selected in university in equal to 1/2, independently of the precision of the
test. On the graph above, we present a case in which pd(θh, θl + β) = 3/4. This means
that the probability of a high type being selected increases by 1/4 whenever she accepts
to be matched with a low type. This also implies that the probability of a low type
going to university under negative assortative matching lower to 1/4. As we assume the
decreasing differences to be fairly high (β = 3, α = 1), there is a fairly large area in the
center corresponding to possible values of the university degree such that both types of
students prefer negative assortative matching.
The second figure starting from the top represents a dramatic increase in the precision
of the testing technology, so that in the case of negative assortative matching the high
type is absolutely certain to be selected, pd(θh, θl + β) = 1. In that case, the zone
where negative assortative matching is the equilibrium moves to the left. Only if the
value of going to university is low enough, the low type is willing to abandon all hope
to be selected. It must at the same time still be sufficiently high for the high type to
accept giving away education in exchange. Therefore, the area where negative assortative
matching is an equilibrium shrinks.
Finally, the third figure represents a much less precise technology, with pd(θh, θl+β) =
2/3. The area now translates to the right, as the benefits of university need to be
sufficiently high for the high type to accept the loss of peer effects in exchange for a
slightly higher probability of being selected.
Proposition 1. (i) For any given precision of the test, pd(θh, θ+β), there exists a value
of the university degree, piu, such that a partially decentralized exam leads to a negative
assortative matching.
(ii) If the value of the university degree is sufficiently high, piu > 2 (v(θh + α)− v(θh)),
there exists a level of precision of the test, pd(θh, θ + β), such that a partially decentral-
ized exam leads to the negative assortative matching. Otherwise, the positive assortative
matching is the unique equilibrium, regardless of the exam type.
The formal proof is in appendix. We illustrate the logic of the proposition in Figure
2. The first part is just a corollary of Lemma 2: because p¯i > pi, it is always possible to
find a value of piu between those two curves. On the contrary, it is not always possible to
reach the negative assortative matching by adjusting the precision of the test. For the
lowest values of piu, even promising a university slot to a high type student is not enough
to convince her to match with a low ability one. For all the other values, a test designer
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pi
p¯i
pd(θh, θl + β)
1/2 1
2(v(θh + α)− v(θh))
2(v(θl + β)− v(θl))
Figure 2: threshold values of pi, p¯i, v(e) = e; α = 1, β = 3.
able to choose the precision of the test can induce the desired matching by choosing
a partially decentralized one. In practice, the test designer biggest tools to influence
the net monetary value of attending university are probably university’s fees. Perhaps
surprisingly, increasing university fees can induce desegregation in the high school market.
While negative assortative matching is often attainable by a social planner with control
of the test precision and/or of the value of entering university, whether it is desirable
is a different question. In the next section, we take as given the precision of the test
and the value of a university degree, and study how the test designer’s preference for
centralization changes given her objective function.
5 Choice of the test
From the above section, we know that the choice of the test changes the nature of
the match and, therefore, the segregation in high school when the monetary value of
university piu is intermediate, i.e. belongs to [¯
pi; p¯i].
Using our results on the influence of the two tests on the composition of high schools,
we can determine which of the two tests should a designer choose as a function of her
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objective. A priori, defining the objective of the test designer is not a straightforward
question here. In reality, the entity defining the test varies and, therefore its objective,
across countries. In some cases, the state is designing the test and directly assigns
students to universities. In others, it defines the test but lets universities use it as they
want. It can also let each high school design a test but regulate how universities use them
to screen students. Finally, in other countries, universities and high schools are totally
unconstrained. We consider in this subsection three different objectives that epitomize
classical beliefs about the role of education. First of all, we determine which test is the
best when the designer social choice function is purely utilitarian, which here happens to
be the same as maximizing the average level of education of all students. Then, we study
the case where a “selective” test designer wants to maximize the average ability of the
students accepted to university. Finally, we study an “elitist” objective function in which
the test designer cares about the average level of education of the students selected by
the university.
5.1 Utilitarian social planner
Perhaps the most natural objective of a social planner is to maximize the sum of the
utilities of the students. The hypotheses imposed on utilities imply that maximizing this
objective is the same as maximizing the average level of education, which is a natural
goal in itself. The previous section tells us that the choice of one or the other test is
relevant to achieve this goal. Indeed, different tests imply different upstream equilibrium
matchings and therefore different levels of education through the peer effects. Our first
result shows that choosing the partially decentralized test maximizes the average level of
education for all values of the parameters.
Proposition 2. A test designer who wants to maximize the the sum of the utilities of
the students prefers the partially decentralized test rather than the centralized test for all
piu and strictly prefers it for piu ∈ [¯pi; p¯i].
The formal proof is in Appendix B. The fact that the assignment of university’s slots
to students is welfare irrelevant is rather extreme. It relies heavily on the hypothesis that
the additional utility of attending university for a student is independent of her level of
education and of her type. But Proposition 2 is robust to small variations in our model
and would still hold if the utility of attending university were slightly increasing with
the type or with the level of education of the students. Even if we go further away from
our stylized model, this proposition highlights an effect that would remain and probably
enter in a trade off with the efficiency of the allocation of university’s slots to students.
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From Proposition 1, we know that the condition on piu can easily be reached if the test
designer has some influence on the net monetary value of university or on the precision
of the test.
5.2 Selective social planner
We now turn to the case where the test designer is not an utilitarian social planner but
rather the university. Her objective focuses on the characteristics of the two students she
selects and disregards the students that do not attend university. The objective depends
on the economic meanings of the education level and of the type of the students as well
as on economic role of the university. We first consider the case where the university
wants to maximize the average type of its students.
This objective can be justified by a two stages screening model where the productivity
of a worker is determined solely by her type. Firms compete to attract the future students
of each university by proposing a wage, then universities compete to attract students by
choosing a test and advertising the highest wage proposed by the firms, and finally a
student goes to the university that advertised the highest wage and accepted her.7
To be able to compare the two tests, we have to impose further regularity on the
test. More precisely, we suppose that education improves the probability of being better
ranked than another student weakly uniformly, i.e. independently of the fact that these
two students are the best or the worst ranked. This assumption rules out for instance
cases where the bad type performs either very badly or very well whereas the good type
performs always well. The particular condition we need is that, regardless of whether
they are among the best or the worse performers of a test, a high type is on expectation
ranked better than a low type. The two tests presented in the appendix verify this
assumption. In the next lemma we present an important implication of this restriction
on the comparison of the centralized a partially decentralized tests. For any vector of
education e, we denote ri(e) the random variable describing the rank given by the test
to student with education ei.
Lemma 3. Let e1 = e3 = eh > e2 = e4 = el. We have pd(eh, el) > pc(eh, eh, el, el), if in
the centralized test:
P (r1(e) ≥ r2(e)|r1, r2 ∈ {3, 4}) > P (r2(e) ≥ r1(e)|r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2})
7It supposes that the academic degree is the only screening device that firms can use (no test scores),
that students are price taker on piu and that the number of students accepted by the university is
exogenously fixed. In this set up if the university does not choose the test that separate the most the
workers’ ability, another university would use it and offer an higher piu, throwing the first university out
of the market.
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Therefore, when the test verifies a weak uniformity assumption, a highly educated
student prefers to compete for one slot against a bad student rather than to compete for
two slots against two bad students and one good student. The chance of being better
ranked than a low ability student is the same in the two tests and the chance of beating
the other high type is one half. However, the chance of being selected in the market where
we duplicated the number of students and the number of slots are not the same. Indeed,
when the test changes from partially decentralized to centralized, the high type is worse
off in the case where she won against its low type high school partner but lose against
the two other. On the contrary, she is better off in the case where she arrived second
behind her high school partner. But the first case happens with higher probability than
the second one, making her globally worse off. In other words, the partially decentralized
test performs better in selecting the high types than the centralized test when students
are negatively assorted because the high school match has already partially sorted the
good and the bad students.
Our second result shows that the test maximizing the average type of the students
selected by the university changes as the parameters of the model changes.
Proposition 3. A test designer maximizing the average type of the students attending
university,
(i) prefers the centralized test rather than the partially decentralized test if piu ∈ [0; ¯pi]∪
[p¯i; +∞].
(ii) Otherwise, she prefers the centralized test when the peer effects for the low type are
important and the partially decentralized test when the peer effects for the two types
are small.
The formal proof is in Appendix. In the case where piu is intermediary, the designer
faces a trade off. By implementing the centralized test, she increases the difference be-
tween the level of education of the good and bad type and, therefore, helps the test
distinguish them more often. On the other hand, by implementing a partially decentral-
ized test, she partially delegates the sorting task to the students. Indeed, the students
facilitate the distinction of the types by sorting themselves into two pairs of different
types.
We can see directly that the optimal test changes if we enlarge the set of feasible
tests and allow the university use the rankings to select its students. Indeed, if she
implements a centralized test, the university knows that the high schools’ matching is
positive assortative in equilibrium, i.e. that the two high ability students are in the same
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high school. Using this particular prior on types distribution, if the best and the third
best ranked students are from the same school, the student with the third best score have
a higher probability of being of high ability than the student with the second best score.
The university will then deviate and select the best and third best students. Students
rationally anticipate this behavior and the incentive to have segregative equilibrium in the
high school market is reinforced. There is no such effect when the test designer chooses
a partially decentralized test. However, it would now be dominated by the improved
centralized test for all parameters.
5.3 Elitist social planner
The assumption that the productivity of a student is determined by her type and is
independent of her education level is extreme. Here, we suppose to the contrary that
the type reflects only the socio-economic status of the parents of a student. In this
case, education rather than ability determines the future productivity. The university,
for the same reason as in the previous proposition, is willing to maximize the level of
education of the average students it selects. In this model, v(e) may either represent
the intrinsic value for education, or the fact that in the long run a firm will be able to
screen a student’s productivity whether or not she went to university and pays her the
according wage. Our third result shows that the test maximizing the average education
of the selected students changes as the parameters of the model change.
Proposition 4. A test designer maximizing the average education of the selected stu-
dents,
(i) prefers the centralized test rather than the partially decentralized test if piu ∈ [0; ¯pi]∪
[p¯i; +∞].
(ii) Otherwise, she prefers the centralized test when the test is very accurate or when
the peer effects are all important; whereas she prefer the partially decentralized test
when the test is very inaccurate or when the peer effects are low or very decreasing.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. When piu is intermediary and the peer effects are
small, the education levels are close in both matching equilibria and lemma 3 implies that
the decentralized test is more accurate and therefore performs better. On the contrary
when the peer effects are important, the centralized test makes fewer mistake and the
test designer faces once again a trade-off. When the two tests select a student with the
highest education level, the one selected by the centralized test has a higher education
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level because α > 0. However, when the centralized test makes a mistake, the mistake is
worse than when the partially decentralized test make a mistake, because β > 0. Hence,
when α increases, pc(θh, µP ) increases and the centralized test performs better.
Increasing the precision of the test can change the nature of the optimal test, but
always increases the average education of the student selected. It helps the test make
fewer mistakes and incentivizes positive assortative matchings. Assume now the univer-
sity is forced to use a partially decentralized test. Following the logic of Proposition 1,
it is possible to induce positive or negative assortative matching by changing the net
monetary value of university and the precision of the test. If the university induces pos-
itive assortative matching, she receives a high ability and well-trained student and a low
ability and low trained student, so that the expected ability is equal to 12(θh +α+ θl) for
any test precision and value of being selected to university piu. If she induces negative
assortative matching, if the test is precise enough, she can get two high ability but low
trained students, with expected ability equal to θh. This may be worse than the central-
ized exam but is better than a decentralized exam with positive assortative matching.
Thus, a social planner who wants to implement a negative assortative matching only has
to impose the partially decentralized test and can let the university choose the precision
of the test and the university fee (seen as a way to choose piu).
As for proposition 3, the test chosen is not optimal anymore if we enlarge the set
of possible tests. Particularly, the centralized test is dominated by another test where
the university updates its prior about the vector of the education level of the students
taking into account the equilibrium matching in the high school market. As in the
discussion of the proposition 3, it would rather sometimes take two students from the
same school even if they are not the two best ranked students. This would not happen
for the partially decentralized test because when the equilibrium matching is negative
assortative, it is optimal to select one student from each school even when we update
the prior of the university. However, as before, this new test makes positive assortative
matching more attractive to the university and shrinks the parameters ranges in which the
partially decentralized test is optimal. When the test designer can only choose between
our two tests, the commitment in the first period to use a test in the second period is not
important because the test designer never wants to change the test ex-post. However, if
we enlarge the test space it would probably become an important question.
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6 Conclusion
The programs in France and in Texas were introduced to offer disadvantaged kid higher
chance of entering university. But in a a model with peer effects with decreasing dif-
ferences, they may serve efficiently also another objective namely to desegregate high
schools. The intuition that the test used by university to select students allows them to
imperfectly transfer the utility among each other is verified. The low ability students
and the high ability students are able to trade education against probability of entering
university to stabilize the desegregated equilibrium for some intermediate range of param-
eters. This range can always be reached by a social planner controlling the university’s
fees or, if university is attractive enough, by controlling the precision of the test. Even in
the case where the parameters fall outside of this range, the partially decentralized test is
optimal for an utilitarian social planner. Perhaps surprisingly, from a policy perspective,
it means that a government wanting to desegregate high school might consider rising
university fees or forbidding external certification tests. On the contrary, if the univer-
sity chooses the test and peer effects are high for both type, partially decentralized tests
and desegregated matchings never appear in equilibrium. In this case there is a trade-off
between the average level education in the economy (higher in the decentralized system)
and the ability of university to select the high type students (higher in the centralized
system). More interestingly, if the technology of the test is relatively bad in assessing the
education of the students or if the peer effects are weak or very decreasing with type, and
universities want to screen highly educated students, the trade-off disappears. The de-
centralized system performs better on both criteria (aggregate education and education
of the elite) and it can arise in equilibrium.
7 Appendix
A. Examples of testing technologies
Categorical random ranking
Denoting j = min{I/{1, µ(1)}}, we define the vector of education as:
e(θ, µ) = (e(θ1, θµ(1)), e(θµ(1), θ1), e(θjθµ(j))e(θµ(j), θj))
In the decentralized test, the probability of a student being selected is a Bernoulli dis-
tribution where the parameter is the relative level of education between the student and
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her opponent. We have then:
pd(ei, eµ(i)) =
ei
ei + eµ(i)
In the centralized test, the probability of a student being first is a categorical distribu-
tion where the parameter is the relative level of education between the student and her
opponents and the probability of a student being second is the same distribution where
the student arrived first has been withdrawn from the pool. We have then:
P (1st = i) = ei∑
j ej
P (2nd = i|1st = k) = ei∑
j 6=k ej
pc(ei, e−i) = P (1st = i) + P (2nd = i)
P (ei before eµ(i)) = pd(ei, eµ(i))
Therefore, the test verifies all the properties assumed in section 3. Moreover, it verifies
the property required in lemma 3. Indeed, if e1 = e2 = eh > eµ(1) = eµ(2) = el > 0:
pd(e1, eµ(1))− pc(e1, e−1) =
eh.el(eh − el)
(eh + el)(eh + 2el)(2eh + el)
> 0
Normal random score
We define the test score t as the sum of the vector of education e(θ, µ) and a error term ,
where  is a four dimensional random variable following a normal distribution of mean 0.
We denote Σc the covariance matrix if all students pass the same test and Σd if students
from different high schools pass different tests. The covariance matrices are the following:
Σc = σ2.

1 ρ ρ ρ
ρ 1 ρ ρ
ρ ρ 1 ρ
ρ ρ ρ 1
 Σd = σ2.

1 ρ 0 0
ρ 1 0 0
0 0 1 ρ
0 0 ρ 1

Two students who passed the same test have positively correlated scores. It reflects
the intuition that if a student received a low grade in comparison to her true level of
education, the other students who passed the same test probably received also a low
grade in comparison to their true level of education.8 This is consistent with the fact
8A negative correlation would mean that if test gives to a student a too high grade in comparison to
her true level of education, it would "compensate" and gives a too low grade in comparison to her true
level of education to the other students.
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that a test can be either to easy or too hard, i.e. biased in one or the other direction.9
As explained in section 3, it is irrelevant whether in the partially decentralized test
students of different high school pass the same test or not. We can pin down the proba-
bility of being selected in a partially decentralized test pd(e1, eµ(1)):
pd(e1, eµ(1)) = P (t1 > tµ(1)|e1, eµ(1)) = P (e1 + 1 > eµ(1) + µ(1)|e1, eµ(1))
= P (1 − µ(1) > −(e1 − eµ(1))|e1, eµ(1))
Formula about linear combination of jointly normal distribution gives us that 1 − µ(1)
follow a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance σ2(2− 2ρ). Therefore :
pd(e1, eµ(1))

= 1/2 if e1 = eµ(1) and constant for all ρ, σ
> 1/2 if e1 > eµ(1) and increasing (decreasing) with ρ (σ)
< 1/2 if e1 < eµ(1) and decreasing (increasing) with ρ (σ)
Here two parameters determine the precision of the test, ρ and σ. When ρ increases, the
noise of students passing the same test is more correlated and therefore there is less often
a difference between the sign of ei − eµ(i) and the sign of ti − tµ(i). When σ decreases,
the noise of the test decreases and therefore the difference between ei and ti decreases.
Notice that it is harder to compare students who took different tests than students who
wrote the same test because the correlation is lower in the first case. This fact is in line
with the heuristic about testing.
In the centralized test all students pass the same test, the covariance matrix is there-
fore Σc. The probability of being selected in a centralized test pc(e1, e−1) is the following:
pc(e1, e−1) = P (t1 > t(2)−1|e)
However, the distribution of t(2)−1 is only approximately normally distributed and the
derivation of its moments are cumbersome (Clark, 1961). But the test verifies all the
properties assumed in section 3. We can moreover show that the test verifies the property
required in lemma 3. Indeed:
P (tµ(1) ≥ t1 ≥ tµ(2) ≥ t2|e) = P ((−Y1, Y2,−Y3) ≥ 0|e)
Where Y1 = t1 − tµ(1), Y2 = t1 − tµ(2) and Y3 = t2 − tµ(2). (−Y1, Y2,−Y3) follows
9It does not imply that test are biased toward the mean, i.e. that a high school with high educated
students would grade its student in a more conservative way than a high school with low educated
students. If we want to include such a bias, we can write the mean of the test of a student as the
difference between her level of education and the average level of education of the high school. The
probability of being taken depends then on µ. It is more decreasing in eµi than in the others’ education
and therefore symmetric in e−i.
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therefore a multivariate normal distribution with mean (eµ(1) − e1, e1 − eµ(2), eµ(2) − e2)
and covariance matrix:
σ2(2− 2ρ)

1 −1/2 0
−1/2 1 −1/2
0 −1/2 1

When all students pass the same exam. Moreover:
P (t1 ≥ tµ(1) ≥ t2 ≥ tµ(2) ≥ t2|e) = P ((Y1,−Y4, Y3) ≥ 0|e)
Where Y4 = t2 − tµ(1). (Y1,−Y4, Y3) follows also a multivariate normal distribution with
mean (e1− eµ(1), eµ(1)− e2, e2− eµ(2)) and the same covariance matrix. We now suppose
that e1 = e2 = eh > eµ(1) = eµ(2) = el. Therefore, any point such tat (−Y1, Y2,−Y3) ≥
0 as a symmetric such that (Y1,−Y4, Y3) ≤ 0. The diagonalization of the covariance
matrix gives us that the axis going through the mean in the direction (−1/√2, 0, 1/√2)
is a symmetric axis of the distribution of (Y1,−Y4, Y3). Therefore, any point such that
(Y1,−Y4, Y3) ≤ 0 has a symmetric such that (Y1, Y2, Y3) ≥ 0. We have finally that:
pd(e1, eµ(1))− pc(e1, e−1) =P (t1 ≥ tµ(1) ≥ t2 ≥ tµ(2) ≥ t2|e)− P (tµ(1) ≥ t1 ≥ tµ(2) ≥ t2|e)
> 0
Using this form of test, we could enlarge the space of feasible selection process. In
the German case for example, where the tests are different in different high school but
where the university selects the two best performing student overall, the probability of
being selected would simply be pg(e1, e−1) = P (t1 ≥ t(2)|e). If the university is totally
free to choose how to use the test to select its students. The university would build its
priority ordering following the order of the E[e(θ, µ)|t] using Bayes rule and a prior for
the distribution of e(θ, µ) reflecting the equilibrium of the roommate game.10 The prior
would be uniform on ΘN = {(θh, β, θh, β), (θh, β, β, θh), (β, θh, θh, β), (β, θh, β, θh)} if in
equilibrium µ is a negative assortative matching and uniform on ΘP = {(θh + α, θh +
α, 0, 0), (0, 0, θh + α, θh + α)} if in equilibrium µ is a positive assortative matching. This
model would therefore closely resemble to a system where university can assign "weight"
to high schools to correct for the difference of level between high schools.
B. Formal Proofs
Proof. Lemma 1
10Communication between the university and the student does not help because because the value of
a slot in the university is the same for all students
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Because for all e, ∑i pc(ei, e−i) = 2, we have that pc(eh, eh, el, el) + pc(el, el, eh, eh) =
1 for all (el, eh). Therefore, deriving with respect to eh, for all (el, eh) we have that
dpc
de1
(eh, eh, el, el) + dp
c
de2
(eh, eh, el, el) = −dp
c
de3
(el, el, eh, eh) − dp
c
de4
(el, el, eh, eh) > 0 because
pc is strictly decreasing in e−i.Therefore, pc(eh, eh, el, el) is strictly increasing in eh for
all (el, eh). Because α > 0 and β > 0, we must have that pc(θh, µP ) > pc(θh, µN ), where
pc(θi, µK) = pc(e(θi, µK), e(θ−i, µK)). Finally, because v(·) is increasing, we have that
the utility of the high type is higher in µP than in µN , so the only stable match is where
the high type is together with a high type in high school.
Proof. Lemma 2
Because pd(ei, eµ(i))+pd(eµ(i), ei) = 1, we have that for all e, pd(e, e) = 1/2. Moreover,
because θh > θl + β, we have that pd(θh, θl + β) = 1 − pd(θl + β, θh) > 1/2. Therefore
denoting ud(θh, µ) the utility of the high type when the exam is partially decentralized
and the high school matching is µ, we have that :
ud(θh, µN ) ≥ ud(θh, µP ) ⇐⇒ piu ≥ v(θh + α)− v(θh)
pd(θh, θl + β)− 1/2 = ¯pi
ud(θl, µN ) ≥ ud(θl, µP ) ⇐⇒ piu ≤ v(θl + β)− v(θl)
pd(θh, θl + β)− 1/2 = p¯i
Because β > α, θh > θl and v(·) is concave, we have that p¯i > ¯pi.
Proof. Proposition 1
Point (i) is a direct corollary of Lemma 2. As p¯i > pi, it is always possible to find a
value of piu ∈ (pi, p¯i) such that negative assortative matching is the equilibrium. Point
(ii) follows from the definitions of pi. For pd(θh, θ + β)→ 1/2, pi →∞ and both pi and p¯i
are continuous and decreasing in pd(θh, θ + β). Thus, for the highest values of piu, it is
always possible to induce negative assortative matching. However, for pd(θh, θ+ β)→ 1,
pi → v(θh+α)−v(θh)2 , so that it is never possible to convince a high type to match with a
low type when piu is below this threshold.
Proof. Proposition 2
The sum of the education levels when the equilibrium matching is µN is 2θh+2(θl+β)
whereas it is 2(θh + α) + 2θl when the equilibrium matching is µP . Because β > α, the
average education is higher with negative assortative matching. Because piu is the same
for every student, the sum of the utilities is independent of the probabilistic allocation
of university’s slots. Moreover, because v(·) is concave, θh > θl and β > α, the sum of
the utilities is also higher with negative assortative matching. Using lemmas 1 and 2, we
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can conclude that the partially decentralized exam is strictly better than the centralized
exam when piu ∈ [¯pi; p¯i] and weakly better otherwise.
Proof. Lemma 3
Let e1 = e3 = eh > e2 = e4 = el and suppose that P (r1(e) ≥ r2(e)|r1, r2 ∈ {3, 4}) >
P (r2(e) ≥ r1(e)|r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2}) Because the marginal of the two tests are the same, we
have:
pd(eh, el) =P (r1(e) ≥ r2(e))
=P (r1, r3 ∈ {1, 2}) + P (r1, r4 ∈ {1, 2}) + P (r1 ≥ r2 ∩ r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2})
+ P (r1 ≥ r2 ∩ r1, r2 ∈ {3, 4})
pc(eh, eh, el, el) =P (r1, r3 ∈ {1, 2}) + P (r1, r4 ∈ {1, 2}) + P (r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2})
Therefore, because the test is symmetric, we have:
pd(eh, el)− pc(eh, eh, el, el) = (P (r1 ≥ r2|r1, r2 ∈ {3, 4})− P (r2 ≥ r1|r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2}))
∗ P (r1, r2 ∈ {1, 2})
>0
Proof. Proposition 3
Denoting µt the equilibrium matching when test t is implemented, maximizing the
average type of the selected students is the same as maximizing pt(θh, µt), the probability
of a high type being selected. Indeed:
E[
∑
i∈η−1(u)
θi/2] =
1
2E[
∑
θi1η(i)=u] =
1
2
∑
θiP (η(i) = u) = θhpt(θh, µt) + θlpt(θl, µt)
= (θh − θl)pt(θh, µt) + θl
If piu ∈ [0; ¯pi]∪ [p¯i; +∞], lemmas 1 and 2 tell us that the centralized and the decentralized
tests lead to the positive assortative matching µP . Moreover, we saw in the proof of
these lemmas that pc(eh, eh, el, el) is strictly increasing in eh and that pc(e, e, e, e) =
1/2 = pd(e, e). Therefore, we must have that pc(θh, µP ) > 1/2 = pd(θh, µP ) and the
centralized test is the optimal choice. If piu ∈ [¯pi; p¯i], lemma 1 tells us that the centralized
tests leads to µP whereas lemma 2 tells us that the decentralized test leads to µN .
Because of lemma 3, we have for all α ≥ 0:
pc(θh, µP ) = pc(θh + α, θh + α, θl, θl) < pd(θh + α, θl)
pd(θh, µN ) = pd(θh, θl + β)
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If the peer effects for low type student are big, i.e. β ≈ θh−θl, pd(θh, µN ) ≈ 1/2, whereas
pc(θh, µP ) > 1/2. Therefore for all precision of test and α, the test designer prefers the
centralized test over the partially decentralized test. If decreasing difference and peer
effects are small, i.e. α ≈ β ≈ 0, pc(θh, µP ) < pd(θh + α, θl) ≈ pd(θh, θl + β) and for
all precision of the test the designer prefers the the partially decentralized test over the
centralized test.
Proof. Proposition 4
As in proposition 3, if piu ∈ [0; ¯pi]∪[p¯i; +∞], lemmas 1 and 2 tell us that the centralized
and the decentralized tests lead to the positive assortative matching µP . Therefore, for
test t, the expected average education of the students selected by the university is the
following:
Et[
∑
i∈η−1(u)
ei/2] = (θh + α− θl)pt(θh, µP ) + θl
Finally, because pc(θh, µP ) > 1/2 = pd(θh, µP ), the centralized test is the optimal choice.
If piu ∈ [¯pi; p¯i], the centralized test leads to the same matching and the same average
education. On the contrary, the partially decentralized test leads to µN and the average
education of the students selected by the university,
Ed[
∑
i∈η−1(u)
ei/2] = (θh − θl − β)pd(θh, µN ) + θl + β
So if the test technology is very accurate, i.e pd(θh, µN ) ≈ 1 ≈ pc(θh, µP ), the centralized
test will be better for all values of the parameters (because α ≥ 0). On the contrary, if
the test is very inaccurate, i.e pd(θh, µN ) ≈ 1/2 ≈ pc(θh, µP ), the decentralized test will
be better (because β ≥ α). If the decreasing differences are sufficiently decreasing, i.e
if α ≈ 0 and β ≈ θh − θl, the partially decentralized test always selects students with a
education close to θh whereas the centralized test sometimes selects a student with an
education θl, so the partially decentralized test performs better. If all peer effects are
small, i.e. if α ≈ β ≈ 0, lemma 3 implies that pc(θh, µP ) < pd(θh +α, θl) ≈ pd(θh, θl +β).
Therefore, the partially decentralized test select more often a high educated student and
performs better. On the contrary, if the decreasing difference are almost constant and
peer effects important, i.e. if α ≈ β ≈ θh − θl, the partially decentralized test always
selects students with a education close to θh whereas the expected education of the
student selected by the centralized test is bigger than θh because pc(θh, µP ) > 1/2, so
the centralized test performs better.
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